

# Population Review

Volume 50, Number 1, 2011

Type: Article pp. 40-61

## Naturalization Policies in France and the USA and Their Impact on Migrants' Characteristics and Strategies

**Author:** Jean Louis Rallu

**Affiliation:** INED, Paris

**Corresponding author/address:** Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques, Paris; email: rallu@ined.fr

### Abstract

Naturalization policies in France and the USA are not much different, but migration policies are quite different, with selective migration and a permanent residence scheme (green card) in the USA but not in France. Naturalization trends are directly affected by policy changes, including anticipation effects and structural effects like the size and composition of migrant cohorts as regards origin and type of entry visa (including regularization in the USA). Selective migration policy in the USA enables more migrants to meet the requirements for naturalization on an individual basis than in France where one third of all naturalizations are by marriage. The US green card impacts socio-economic characteristics of migrants: migrants with high human capital tend to naturalize less than people with mid-level qualification and income, probably because they can stay permanently with a green card. As part of migrant strategy, migrants often use naturalization as a form of security against low human capital or to increase their chance on the labour market. For some migrants, naturalization is part of a life course project. More migrants remain foreigners in France than in the USA. This seems to be related to France's non-selective migration.

### Keywords

Naturalization policies, USA, France, migration, integration, naturalization provisions, migrants' human capital

The impact of policies on demographic phenomenon like fertility or migration is difficult to estimate and often controversial. This is certainly the case for naturalization. Moreover, naturalization is not the best case to show the impact of policies because it is dependent on migration, integration and naturalization policies as well as on migrant cohort size and composition by origin and qualification. However, it is interesting to try to disentangle the impacts of policies and structural effects. Selection effects are particularly important. In addition, there are self-selection effects along the migration and naturalization processes. Thus, usually, naturalized migrants show higher socio-economic characteristics than foreign migrants. However, this is not always the case, and the role of citizenship status on integration is still disputed (Kogan 2003; Freeman 2003; Chiswick 1978).

With regard to migration policies, France and the USA are very different. Permanent residence is only granted through naturalization in France, while the 'green card' is an alternative to naturalization in the USA. Thus, the comparison of the two countries should show the impact of selective migration policies and different schemes of permanent residence on the proportions of migrants naturalizing and their socio-economic characteristics.

This paper will analyze naturalization policies in France and the USA and their impact on naturalization levels and trends in a broader context of migration policies. It will consider the impact of policies on citizenship status of people and also of migrants' couples. In a second approach, we shall compare socio-economic characteristics of naturalized migrants in France and the USA to estimate the impact of policies on naturalized citizens' human capital, and have insights into migrants' strategies to naturalize or not. We shall also consider the impact of naturalization on migrants' integration which also affects the characteristics of naturalized migrants observed by censuses. Based on these findings, the paper will mention what effects could be expected if more selective migration policies and a permanent residence scheme are introduced in France and other EU countries.

## **1. Theoretical framework and data**

From the viewpoint of host countries, migration and naturalization policies aim at selecting residents (with short or long-term visas) and new citizens who will have the same rights as natives (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2000; Martiniello 1995; Bauböck 1994). From the viewpoint of migrants, naturalization is a strategy. It can be a mechanism of adaptation or survival, a way of improving socio-economic status, a proof of cultural assimilation or part of a life course project. Our approach is to use naturalization time series and census data to estimate the effect of policies and strategies of migrants at the macro level. Data of naturalization services and censuses do not enable us to disentangle the effects of the various selections and behaviours. Longitudinal surveys or biographic data would be necessary to do this, but such data are often lacking. However, it is of major interest to see how the possibly contradicting interests of states and migrants are reflected at the macro level in naturalization trends and characteristics of naturalized migrants.

### *Selection effects in migration and naturalization*

Migration and naturalization policies impact naturalization via various selections which are compounded by self selection of migrants. Migrants also develop strategies to counter policy changes, anticipating them or using different ways to reach their goal. We shall first review the various selections and paths migrants follow along the migration-naturalization process.

Naturalization comes at the end of the migration process. The migration-naturalization process includes many steps:

- self selection of migrants,
- selection of migrants by immigration services – this step does not apply for illegal arrivals,
- self selection again to apply for naturalization and
- selection by naturalization services.

For the USA, getting permanent residence is an additional step before naturalization. However, this can be considered as part of migration policy and migrants' selection. There is also a selection due to return migration, the effect of which is difficult to estimate even with survey data because no information is available on return migrants<sup>1</sup>. This aspect will not be addressed here. But, independently of selection effects, there are also impacts of naturalization on migrants' labour market integration.

Various processes and decisions occur at each step. Migrating itself is a multi-stage selection and self selection process (Borjas 1987; Massey 1987), starting with interest in migrating, actively preparing to leave, succeeding in getting documents or entering illegally. Then, migrants can decide to settle permanently, return, re-emigrate or do circular migrations. Regarding naturalization, migrants face various choices and constraints, such as renouncing their citizenship (if dual citizenship is not allowed by their origin or host country) and considering the social and economic benefits of naturalizing. There is also self selection in applying as some migrants consider they have no chance to be granted citizenship and do not apply (Portes and Curtis 1987; Balistreri and Van Hook 2004). But, migrants can also choose to apply through various provisions. At the level of naturalization services, besides checking the requirements for naturalization are fulfilled, there are also impacts of cohorts' size and composition. The composition of migrant cohorts by origin, qualification, and status at entry (including undocumented migrants who have been legalized) affect the proportion of people who get host country's citizenship. Large cohorts increase the workload of naturalization services and delay the processing of applications. Large cohorts can also result in stricter application of the law. Therefore, we shall have to consider changes in migration flows by origin and types (status) to analyze the impact of policy changes on trends in naturalization (section 3).

#### *Theoretical framework*

As regards characteristics of naturalized migrants (section 4), more selective migration policies should result in higher proportions of migrants able to meet the requirements for naturalization. However, migrants may not necessarily choose to naturalize, mostly if there are alternative ways to stay such as permanent residence permits. Migrants can also escape the selection process and naturalize by marriage.

We expect that, despite a stricter naturalization policy in the USA than in France (see below), more selective migration policy in the USA will result in higher proportions of migrants able to meet the requirements for naturalization, leading to higher proportions of naturalized migrants in the USA than in France. We also expect migrants with the highest human capital to be more likely to naturalize, which would be in accordance with selective naturalization policies. However, the 'green card' effect may affect the propensity to naturalize in different ways according to human capital of migrants.

Concerning the way migrants naturalize, census data do not enable us to know the provisions used to naturalize. However, we can separate migrants into two groups: single and married. Single who entered after age 18 naturalized on their own (those entered younger may have naturalized with their parents). Although some married naturalized citizens may have naturalized before marriage, most of them probably naturalized by marriage and significant differences should appear between them and singles. We expect that singles will show more clearly the impact of policies on socio-economic characteristics of naturalized migrants, as well as specific strategies (Liang 1994). Married naturalized migrants should show weaker selection effects than singles. The information available for both spouses should also reveal various aspects of migrants' strategies to naturalize in relation to their own and their spouse's human capital. As there are larger proportions of

---

<sup>1</sup> Only, surveys in origin countries provide information on return migrants. Comparison with migrants is possible in the frame of simultaneous surveys in destination and origin countries (Rallu 2008).

naturalization by marriage in France than in the USA, the difference between singles and married migrants should be larger and the selection effect of policies should be reduced in France.

There is also an impact of naturalization on migrants' integration, such as increasing chances to get a job, a higher occupation or accessing public sector jobs (Brastberg et al. 2002). Such effects cannot be separated from selection effects in census data. However, we need to estimate them.

Finally, origin deserves special attention. Origin is acknowledged to have a major role in being granted a visa (through quota and other selection processes) and is strongly related to migrants' status (some origins have high proportion of illegal/legalized migrants) and integration. Migrants have different strategies according to their origin. Proximity migration is well known to result in lower naturalization rates inside the EU as well as in North America, including among Canadians, Mexicans, and a few other Central and South American migrants (Garcia 1981; Portes and Curtis 1987; Balistreri and Van Hook 2004).

### *Data*

We shall use naturalization statistics from USCIS (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) and from the 'Ministère de l'Intérieur' and DPM (Direction de la Population et des Migrations, Ministère des Affaires Sociales, and recently Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'outre-mer, des collectivités territoriales et de l'immigration) in France to analyze trends in naturalization. We shall also use US census 2000 (PUMS – Public Use Microdata Sample - 5%) and France 1999 census and family survey (EHF – Enquête sur l'Histoire des Familles) associated with the census to study socio-economic characteristics of naturalized migrants. The Histoire de Vie (HDV) will be used to assess the impact of naturalization on migrants' integration and compare our results with those of a panel survey in the USA (Bratsberg et al. 2002). The HdV is a biographic survey carried out by INSEE and INED in 2003. It includes information on dates of arrival and naturalization of migrants, as well as migration and work histories.

The 5% PUMS of US census 2000 include 1.5 millions foreign-born - 60% of which were naturalized; 850,000 entered before 1990 and 40,800 were still singles. The EHF includes 24,000 foreign immigrants who entered before 1990, of whom 42% were naturalized; 470 were still single. The Histoire de Vie (HDV) survey includes 670 migrants entered after age 18, of which 226 are naturalized.

### *Methods*

Time series of naturalizations will be used to study the impact of policy changes on trends. We shall also consider how trends are affected by factors such as composition of migrant cohorts by origin and processing practice of naturalization administration. We shall pay special attention to naturalization data by provisions.

As the population eligible for naturalization is difficult to estimate due to different provisions, each with different eligibility rules, naturalization rates are rarely calculated. Instead, we shall use cohort data: the proportion of migrants naturalized by year of immigration, comparing the levels of naturalization in France and the USA from census data<sup>2</sup>. But, cross sectional census data do not enable us to see the impact of specific policy changes, because migrant cohorts are affected by many policy changes along their life. However, the differences will translate the overall migration and integration context.

---

<sup>2</sup> Cohort analysis based on naturalization service data by year of immigration is available for the USA (Baker 2008), but not for France where data come from two different administrations and datasets did not provide the same information until recently.

Concerning the characteristics of naturalized migrants, we shall use logistic regressions of a dichotomous naturalization outcome<sup>3</sup>. However, migrant population is not homogenous, including recent migrants who do not meet the required duration of stay for naturalization, people who were naturalized with their parents when they were still children, and married people part of whom naturalized by marriage. Therefore, we shall separate the sample into sub-samples. We shall only consider migrants entered before 1990 to account for eligible duration (plus time to get immigrant status in the USA) and time of processing application. We shall study separately single people entered after age 18 who mostly naturalized on an individual basis and married people, most of whom naturalized by marriage and were not subjected to the same selection process.

There are different kinds of variables related to naturalizations: *endogenous variables* associated with eligibility such as duration in country, fluency in host country's language and special situations that facilitate naturalization like serving in the US Army; *control variables* such as sex and age; and *explicative variables* like origin, education, occupation and, for the USA, income, tenure and receiving public assistance. For France, no information is available on tenure, income and public assistance, but EHF survey includes variables on neighbourhood characteristics, desire to return to country of origin and stability of employment<sup>4</sup> that have strong effects on naturalization. Tenure and desire to return can be considered as indicators of life course projects.

As both the US and France census data sets are very large, results are significant for small populations. So, we can disaggregate data to consider, for instance, people with a PhD or with high income, whereas the former are often considered together with people having BA and over, hiding specific behaviour of higher educated people.

Bi-probit models have been used to estimate the impact of naturalization on labour market outcomes of naturalized migrants, using HdV survey biographic information on year by year employment status of naturalized migrants before and after naturalization compared to native French. The dichotomous variable is being in stable employment vs. unstable employment<sup>5</sup>.

## 2. Naturalization policies

### *General context*

The USA has selective migration policy and a permanent residence (green card) scheme. France adopted a selective migration policy 'migration choisie' from 2005. From WWII to 1974, France was opened to work migration, mostly of unqualified workers. This scheme ended in 1975 and, since then, migration has mostly consisted of family reunification. The French resident card is valid for 10 years only<sup>6</sup> and, although it is rather easily renewable, naturalization remains the only way to stay permanently. In 1985, the Schengen Agreement granted free circulation inside the EU to citizens of the 15 old member states (Weil and Hansen 1999). It was subsequently extended to other EU member states<sup>7</sup>. As regards integration policies, France is lagging behind the USA with a poorly implemented discrimination law that was revised in 2001 and no affirmative action programmes.

### *Eligibility for naturalization*

---

<sup>3</sup> We dropped variables that were not significant from the models because they bring 'noise' to estimates. Thus, models include different variables in some cases, but they all have significant effect on the dependent variable.

<sup>4</sup> Having not experienced work interruption of 2 years or more.

<sup>5</sup> The definition of unstable employment in the HdV survey is 'unemployed, successively employed and unemployed over several years, or short jobs over two years'.

<sup>6</sup> There are also 'cartes de séjour' valid 1 or 3 years.

<sup>7</sup> With the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. UK and Ireland joined in 1999. Free circulation will be extended to new member states in 5 to 7 years.

Both France and the USA have *jus soli*. However, there are important differences in their naturalization policies (table 1).

*In the USA*, the main eligibility requirements for naturalization are – to be 18 or over and to have been a permanent resident for 5 years without leaving the country for trips of more than 6 months, or – to have been married to and living for 3 years with a (same) US citizen who must have been himself a US citizen for 3 years. In addition, beyond the ‘no trip longer than 6 months abroad’ requirement, an overall physical presence in the USA for 30 months (18 months for married people) and 3 months residence in State of application are required. Special schemes apply for military. People who are currently in the US Armed Forces, have served for 1 year and are permanent resident at time of interview are eligible to become a US citizen. There are also special provisions for widows of military<sup>8</sup>. Naturalization is also on three conditions of good moral character, English and civics knowledge, and attachment to the Constitution. Applicants have to pass a naturalization test.

Table 1: Summary of eligibility for naturalization in the USA and France<sup>(a)</sup>

USA	France
<b>General context</b>	
Quota, but actually selective migration policy	Weak selective migration policy from 2005
Permanent residence ‘green card’	No permanent residence - 10 years resident permit (renewable)
Jus soli	Jus soli (with restrictions in 1993-1998 – see text)
<b>Eligibility for naturalization</b>	
Age 18 or over + 5 years permanent resident	Age 18 or over + 5 years after legal entry (2 years for students succeeding in 2 years university courses)
No trip longer than 6 months abroad and minimum of 30 months in the US	‘Résidence in France habituelle et continue’ (short trips abroad allowed)
Married and living with same US citizen for 3 years (at least 18 months in the US)	Immediately at marriage until 1993 (2 years in 1993-1998, unless child is born from marriage – see text for recent changes)
Currently in the US Army: in US Army for 1 year and permanent resident at time of interview (special provisions for widows – see text)	
<b>Integration</b>	
Good moral character, English language ability, knowledge and attachment to the US Constitution	Good moral character, not convicted, French language ability, adopted French habits and customs, stable own (or family) income in France; all family members reside in France since 2003, knowledge of rights and duties of French citizens
<b>Naturalization test</b>	
Yes	No

(a) Naturalization provisions have often changed in France (see text). The situation in this table relates mostly to the pre-2000 situation, in relation to census data analyzed in this paper.

*In France*, naturalization ‘par décret’ is possible for people aged 18 or more<sup>9</sup> who have legal immigrant status and continuously<sup>10</sup> resided (‘résidence habituelle et continue’) in France for 5

<sup>8</sup> Spouses of US citizens ‘who died during a period of honorable active duty service in the Armed Forces’ (spouse must have been married to and living with him/her at the time of his/her death) and are a permanent resident on the day of interview are also eligible to become a citizen

<sup>9</sup> Children under 18 can be naturalized with their parents under certain conditions; they are small numbers and are labelled as ‘effet collectif’; they are included with ‘naturalization by declaration’.

<sup>10</sup> This does not exclude short trips abroad.

years (2 years for students who succeeded in two years university courses)<sup>11</sup>. Applicants must not have been convicted, show good moral character and assimilation (French ability, having adopted French habits and customs, - plus, since the November 26, 2003 law, knowledge of rights and duties of French citizens). They must also prove that they have a stable income (either from their job or from their family) in France to support themselves and show that all family members reside in France.

There were frequent changes in eligibility for naturalization by marriage with a spouse who is a French citizen, from the former immediate naturalization<sup>12</sup> to two years common life (1993-1998), later reduced to one year (1998-2003). Until 2003, the duration requirement was waived in case a child was born from the marriage. In November 2003, the eligible duration was set again to two years of “common affective and material life” (extended to three years in case there was no continuous residence in France for 12 months) and the birth of a child could no longer waive the duration requirement. There were also new requirements: the applicant must not have been convicted, show integration and good ability in French language. Most recently, the July 2006 law extended these durations to respectively four and five years of marriage. Children under 18 can be naturalized at the same time as their parents.

Beside naturalization by marriage, most changes in the French naturalization laws have been directed at the second generation. Since the attempt by President Giscard d’Estaing to reject *jus soli* in the second half of the 1970s (Weil 2002), right-wing governments have contemplated whether or not the children of migrants should be automatically given French citizenship at age 18, or if they should fill an application (express the will to become French citizen) and from what age they could do so (13, 16 or 18 years, cf. the 1993 law). When *jus soli* was not automatic, from 1993 to 1998, it was possible to ask for French citizenship later, but it had to be done before age 21. From 1998, France-born children of foreign parents are French citizens automatically (‘de plein droit’) at age 18 on condition they resided in France, continuously or not, for 5 years after age 11<sup>13</sup> and show good moral character<sup>14</sup>. It is, however, possible to apply from age 16, and parents can apply for their child when she/he is 13 if she/he resided in France from age 8.

France has “dual *jus soli*”, enabling France-born children of Algerians born before 1962 to be French citizens, as children of foreigners born in France (until 1962 Algeria consisted of three French departments). Since 1994, this applies only to Algerians and not all foreigners born in former French departments. Dual *jus soli* was modified at the same time as *jus soli* in 1993 and 1998.

Altogether, naturalization law is not much different in France and the USA. However, the naturalization process seems quicker in France because the five-year residence period starts from arrival with legal status (against from permanent residence in the USA) and it is possible to waive or reduce the duration of residence requirement. Until 2006, naturalization by marriage was possible after shorter duration of stay in France than in the USA. A major difference with the USA is the fact that, despite *jus soli*, France-born children of foreign immigrants had to ‘naturalize’ in 1993-1998 and were included in statistics. In other years, they were included as ‘estimates’. To make data more comparable, we shall consider separately naturalizations before and after age 18 in France. In both countries, the way to estimate assimilation mostly rests on interpretation of the law by administration officers. Local administrative practices can also make naturalization more or less difficult.

---

<sup>11</sup> Eligible duration of residence is waived for spouse and children of naturalized people, people who were born in former French territories, military, people who rendered exceptional service to France and refugees.

<sup>12</sup> French citizenship by marriage is automatic but needs to be requested on a form.

<sup>13</sup> This condition is waived for people living in a country the official language of which is French (or who studied for 5 years in a French school)

<sup>14</sup> However, from 1998 to 2003, there was no conviction that barred becoming French, but the November 2003 law restored this rule.

Recent changes to naturalization law in France have made naturalization more difficult. The changes have also reduced the duration of file processing. No recent changes to naturalization law in the US have been made. The 1995 US immigration law is directed at illegal migrants. In France as well, illegal migrants have been the focus of stricter law enforcement. For documented migrants, the effect of the ‘migration choisie’ has not been clearly assessed yet. Recent changes in migration law have no effect on the present study because recent migrants are not eligible for naturalization.

### 3. Policies and naturalization trends and stocks

Although there was no major change in US naturalization law during this period, trends show steep increases and declines (figure 1). The second half of the 1990s has seen naturalization figures inflated by eligibility of immigrants legalized by the 1986 IRCA (Immigration Reform and Control Act Amnesty), with 1,044,689 naturalizations in 1996 and above 800,000 in 1999 and 2000. But, only 463,204 naturalizations were recorded in 2003. The decline in ‘IRCA effect’ is not the only cause of this drop that reaches 110,000 between 2002 and 2003 while IRCA migrants dropped only by 20,000. The decline was mostly due to backlogs in file processing. The increase in 2008 is the result of anticipations, following the announcement in January 2007 of increased fees from July 30, 2007. The number of applications tripled in May-July 2007 (Chischti and Bergeron 2008). As there are low proportions of naturalization by marriage and no change to the naturalization law in the US, data on provision will not be considered.




Figure 1 : Naturalization in the USA and France, 1995-2008

Sources : USCIS annual reports; C. Régnard 2007; Ministère de l'intérieur, de l'outre-mer, des collectivités territoriales et de l'immigration 2009. (see annex table 1, p. 61)

In France, changes in the processing of applications explain most of changes in trends in naturalizations ‘par décret’ (at age 18 and over). Shorter processing of applications resulted in an increase of naturalizations above age 18 from 28,800 in 1995 to above 40,000 in 1996-1998 and 52,800 in 2000 (figure 2 and annex table 2, p. 61). It was followed by a decline to around 45,000 in 2001-2002 and by a new increase to above 66,000 in 2004 when duration of application processing was reduced to one month. The declines in 2001-2002 and 2005-2006 are mostly due to the end of the effects of shorter processings.



Increasing the duration of common life eligible for naturalization by marriage (by ‘declaration’) leads to declines after the law is passed, but it is also a cause of anticipations. The change from two years to one year common life in 1998 resulted in increasing numbers of naturalizations by marriage in 1999 and 2000 (figure 2). But, the increase in 2003-2004 is mostly due to shorter processing of applications. The steep decline in 2005 translates the return to a required two years common life from November 2003. But, the increase in 2006 is due to anticipation of the July 2006 law increasing eligible common life to 4 years. Couples who had been already married for two years rushed to apply for naturalization when the new law was being discussed.




Figure 2: Naturalization by provision in France, 1995-2008

Sources : C. Régnard 2007; Ministère de l'intérieur, de l'outre-mer, des collectivités territoriales et de l'immigration 2009.

Finally, in both France and the USA, overall trends appear to be nearly as much affected by changes in processing practices as by policy changes. Migrant cohort size affects processing time, because large cohorts can cause backlogs as well as stricter interpretation of the law.

#### *Proportions of naturalized migrants at censuses*

The proportions of naturalized people in 1999 and 2000 censuses by period of arrival show a big gap between France and the USA (figure 3). For migrants who arrived 20 to 50 years before the census, French levels are 25 to 35 percentage points below USA levels. The gap between the USA and France is smaller for arrivals before WWII when mostly Italians and Spanish migrants came fleeing non-democratic regimes. Around 1975, French data show two different trends with higher proportions naturalized since then. This is due to a new law in 1973 making naturalization by marriage easier. There is also an effect of the origin and types of migrants. The entrance of workers almost stopped from 1974 and most of immigration thereafter was by family reunification. From the 1950s to the mid 1970s, the ‘open border’ made migration back and forth easy, and it was not necessary to naturalize. Lower naturalization may still affect older cohorts who did not naturalize early. Moreover, migration between 1960 and 1975 included many Portuguese who did

not apply for naturalization because they expected to become members of EU<sup>15</sup>. Portuguese have also low mixed marriage rates and seem to have considered migration to France as temporary or proximity migration, a similar attitude with Canadians and Mexicans in the USA.




Figure 3: Proportion (%) of naturalized migrants by period of arrival, France 1999 and US 2000 censuses.

Whenever immigrants are more often naturalized in the USA than in France, there are large gaps according to origin in both countries (table 2). In France, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians (former French Indochina) show the highest proportions and North Africans and Turks the lowest. Nationals of non EU member states naturalize frequently as well as Italians and Spanish, because many of the latter arrived before WWII. For the USA, it appears rather similar levels for all continents (between 2/3 and 3/4 naturalized), except for America and especially Mexico. Mexicans have moderate interest in naturalizing because they think of moving back and forth or returning permanently<sup>16</sup>. Thus, Vietnamese show similar proportions of naturalized people in the USA and France. But, Africans are about twice as much naturalized in the former. This is probably because they are a small-selected population with much higher qualification in the USA than in France.

Thus, selective migration and integration (affirmative action) policies in the USA result in much higher proportions of migrants naturalized than in France. However, the proportions of migrants naturalized by origin reflect both the selection by naturalization services and the self-selection of migrants in applying for naturalization. Data on applications would be necessary to disentangle these effects. Migrants from neighbouring countries: Mexicans in the USA and Portuguese, North Africans and Turks in France, have the lowest proportions of naturalized people.

<sup>15</sup> Actually, the proportion of naturalized migrants among Spanish and Portuguese declines respectively by 20 and 30 percentage points between the 1950s and 1960-1964 cohorts, as they expected already to become EU members. For Italians, a decline by 20 percentage points occurs gradually between the 1945-1949 and 1955-1959 cohorts. Note that Spain, Portugal (and Italy until 1992) do not allow dual citizenship, except with South American countries for Spain.

<sup>16</sup> The 1998 dual nationality law of Mexico resulted in nearly doubling of US naturalization of Mexicans in 1999 and 2000, but naturalizations returned to previous levels in 2001 and further declined thereafter.

Table 2: Proportion (%) of naturalized migrants by country of former citizenship, migrants entered before 1990; France 1999 and US 2000 censuses.

France		USA	
Vietnam	84.7	Taiwan	83.6
Other Europe	76.6	Vietnam	82.3
R Lao	70.5	Philippines	81.4
Cambodia	70.3	Cuba	79.3
Italy	65.4	Italy	78.7
Spain	63.6	China PR	74.9
other Asia	57.3	Pakistan	74.8
other Africa	49.7	Europe	74.3
Tunisia	48.2	Turkey	74.1
America-Oceania	48.2	Asia	73.9
Other EU	48.0	Rep Korea	73.3
Morocco	32.5	India	70.7
Portugal	32.2	Africa	66.1
Algeria	29.7	America (excluding Mexico)	59.2
Turkey	20.6	Spain	57.2
n. s.	82.0	Mexico	36.8
Total	49.5	Total	60.1

#### *Naturalizations by provision*

The distribution of naturalizations by provision reveals very important differences. In the USA, naturalization is mostly an individual matter that is accomplished through the general provision (87.7% in 2001). Only 7.2% of naturalizations were by special provisions, mostly by marriage (7.1%), leaving 0.1% for military special provision<sup>17</sup>. The main change in recent decades consists in the dwindling of the proportion of naturalizations of members of the Armed forces since the early 1970s when it reached above 9% due to Vietnam war.

In France, around one third of naturalizations at age 18 and over are by marriage (32.9% in 2006). It was slightly higher in the early 1990s, reaching 37%. Higher naturalization by marriage in France than in the USA is due to more frequent mixed marriages in the former and to the fact that naturalization was possible after shorter duration of marriage.

The different distributions of naturalizations by provision in France and the USA, linked with different frequencies of mixed marriages, have an important impact on the situation of migrants by citizenship status. Among couples including at least one migrant, there are more couples of two foreigners in France than in the USA: 31.1% against 17.8%, and more couples of two naturalized migrants in the USA than in France: 25.0% against 12.6% (table 3a). Compared to the independence hypothesis<sup>18</sup>, couples are more concentrated on partners of same citizenship status, either 'native', naturalized or foreign citizens, in France and the USA, showing that there is a tendency to avoid mixed marriages in both countries, but to a higher extent in the USA with ratios of observed couples of 'native' citizens to the independence hypothesis of 1.09 against 1.06 (table 3b). In France, due to high levels of mixed-marriages and a large proportion of naturalizations by marriage, couples consisting of a 'native' citizen and an immigrant are also closer to independence hypothesis than in the USA (0.7 against 0.5) where mixed marriage is not so common (Bean 2003). But, as a result of lower naturalization rates, couples where both spouses are foreign

<sup>17</sup> In 2001, provision was not reported for 5% of naturalizations.

<sup>18</sup> In the independence hypothesis, marriage is random and the proportions of mixed marriages exactly reflect the proportions of males and females of each origin/status in the population.

citizens are much more frequent than predicted by independence hypothesis in France than in the USA: 13 times against 5 times.

*Table 3a: Distribution of couples including at least one migrant by citizenship status (%).*

M/F	France				USA				
	Fr by birth	naturalized	Foreign cit	Total		US citizen	naturalized	not US cit.	total
French by birth		18.6	4.9	23.5	US citizen	15.0	10.3	25.3	
Naturalized	18.7	12.6	2.3	33.6	Naturalized	11.5	25.0	9.6	46.1
foreign cit.	9.4	2.4	31.1	42.9	Not US cit.	5.6	5.2	17.8	28.6
Total	28.1	33.6	38.3	100.0	Total	17.2	45.1	37.7	100.0

*Author's calculation from France 1999 and the US 2000 censuses*

*Table 3b: Ratios of actual living arrangements by citizenship status to independence hypothesis, France 1999, USA 2000 censuses.*

	France			USA			
	Fr by birth	naturalized	Foreign cit.		US citizen	Naturalized	not US cit.
French by birth	1.06	0.68	0.17	US citizen	1.09	0.55	0.24
Naturalized	0.65	7.88	1.24	Naturalized	0.44	20.19	4.93
Foreign cit.	0.26	1.17	13.64	not US cit.	0.12	2.29	5.00

*Author's calculation from France 1999 and the US 2000 censuses*

Regarding different frequencies of mixed marriages in France and the USA, these differences are probably due to earlier steps of the migration process. The French pattern of non selective migration results in mostly low qualified migrants who cannot meet the requirements for naturalization unless they marry a French citizen. This deprives high proportions of foreign couples of civic rights. However, one citizen in a couple is enough to gain permanent residence status (renewable 10 year permit in France or green card in the USA) and, in both France and the USA, couples consisting of a naturalized citizen and a foreigner are more frequent than predicted by the independence hypothesis, mostly in the USA. Such situations can sometimes be explained by the law on dual nationality in countries of origin: if dual nationality is not allowed, a foreign spouse can choose not to naturalize.

#### 4. Characteristics of naturalized migrants

We shall now consider correlates of naturalization using census data

##### *In the USA*

As expected, results of logistic regressions on being naturalized (see table 4, p.59) show that endogenous variables like duration in country and English ability have significant effects in all sub-samples. Recent arrivals and people with low skill in English are less likely to be naturalized. Serving in the Army favours eligibility and is significantly associated with naturalization, but surprisingly not for singles entered after age 18.

As regards non endogenous variables, let's first consider all migrants entered before 1990. Males are less naturalized than females. As expected, human capital is strongly correlated with naturalization: migrants with no or low diplomas, low occupation and income are less likely to be naturalized. For education, there is an almost linear increase in naturalization up to BA/BS level and the same occurs with income up to 40 000\$ – 50 000\$. But, surprisingly, it is followed by declines creating inverse U (or J) curves. PhD holders are 38% less likely to be naturalized than migrants with below 1 year of college education. Migrants earning 100 000\$ or more are less naturalized than those in the middle income groups. Similar results are observed for occupation. Managers and professionals are less often naturalized than the reference group (office workers).

Receiving public assistance has also a significant effect, probably because those who receive it have better knowledge of administration.

For singles who entered at ages 18 and over, factors of naturalization are in the same direction (except for being member of US Army), but they show greater contrast to reference group for sex, education and occupation. For instance, single PhD holders are 60% below reference category against 38% for all migrants; for professionals these figures are respectively 6% and 2%, and single technicians are 11% less likely to naturalize, while they naturalize more in the all migrants sample. This is as expected: selection effects are stronger for those who naturalize on an individual basis than for all migrants, part of whom naturalized by marriage.

For couples, despite low naturalization by marriage in the USA, spouse's citizenship has the strongest effect on being naturalized. Migrants married to a naturalized person are, according to regions of origin, 6 to 10 times as likely to be naturalized as those married to foreign European citizens (reference). Migrants married to a native US citizen are less likely to be naturalized than those married to a naturalized citizen (odds ratios of 2.5 against 6 to 10). Probably, spouses apply about at the same time, or naturalized people are more likely to marry among themselves as they belong to similar social classes. Surprisingly, the effects of spouse's education, income and occupation are often in the opposite direction to interviewee's same variables. People whose spouses have low education or income, or are not working are more often naturalized. But effects are in the same direction for PhD holder or manager spouses as for interviewees. It seems that there is a strategy to use marriage or naturalization as a security against spouse's low human capital.

There is another group of variables that are more closely related to life course projects. Home ownership, with or without mortgage, is positively associated with naturalization, showing that naturalization is part of a life course project.

Finally, the strongest effects appear for continent of birth, showing again the importance of origin on naturalization. Asians are more than twice as much naturalized as Europeans (ref.), but Mexicans (proximity migrants) are 32% less naturalized (gap is smaller at 11%) when they are married). Oceanians are also less naturalized than Europeans. They could be considered as 'cultural proximity' migrants, most of them being native English speakers from Australia and New Zealand that are traditional immigration countries. A shortcoming of census data is that they do not tell if migrants are less naturalized because they apply less due to unwillingness to naturalize or self selection, or because their applications are more often rejected. According to Portes (1987), self selection is important for Mexicans.

Altogether, these findings translate the usual fact that people with low human or social capital are less naturalized mostly because they do not qualify and often do not apply. A lower propensity to naturalize among migrants with the highest human capital reveals that they think they do not need US citizenship to succeed and can stay with green card or do not intend to settle permanently. Thus, naturalization has become a kind of mechanism of survival for relatively low qualified migrants who can meet the requirements, including people on public assistance. For many, naturalization is certainly a kind of security and a way of getting access to a larger labour market. The strategy inside couples to use naturalization as an insurance against spouse's low qualification also points in this direction. But, there are also migrants for whom naturalization is part of a life course project.

### *In France*

The only endogenous variable available in the French dataset is duration since arrival. It has a much smaller effect for couples than for all migrants as a result of a shorter duration of stay required to naturalize by marriage (immediate naturalization before 1993, and still so until 2003 for those who have a child). Males and people with low education and occupations are

significantly less naturalized (see table 5, p.60), and migrants with highest occupations like managerial staff and professionals are significantly more naturalized, especially among singles. However, ‘craftsmen and tradespersons’, a category that includes self-employed and employers, are less naturalized. The unexpected fact that migrants who were employed without interruption of two or more years (an indicator of employment stability) are less often naturalized than those who experienced such interruptions could be an effect of low qualified workers finding easier jobs because the manufacture and construction sectors of the French economy rely abundantly on unqualified foreign workers. Such people may not apply for naturalization thinking they would be rejected or are not granted French citizenship when they apply. However, there could also be an impact of better knowledge of administration for those who experience frequent work interruption and benefit from social subsidies. Neighbourhood<sup>19</sup> has strongly significant effects. People living in rural and small urban areas or in administrative urban centres are more often naturalized than those living in large and poor urban or industrial areas (ref.). Noticeably, those living in the most upscale areas of Western Paris are less likely to be naturalized than those in small urban areas or in administrative urban areas.

Singles who entered after age 18<sup>20</sup> show rather the same patterns as the ‘all’ sample but differences are larger, particularly for low diplomas and managerial staff, showing a stronger effect of socio-economic characteristics when people naturalize individually than by marriage.

Naturalization appears to be part of a life course project. The desire to return to the country where migrants lived during their childhood strongly reduces the probability of being naturalized<sup>21</sup>.

Origin<sup>22</sup> has strong effects. Asians naturalize 7 to 18 times and ‘other Africans’ 5 times as much as ‘other EU citizens’ (ref.), but Moroccans naturalize only 40% more than the reference group and Algerians and mostly Turks naturalize significantly less (respectively 2% and 14%). Former Spanish, Italian and ‘other non EU’ European citizens are more likely to be naturalized than the reference group. But Portuguese, typical ‘proximity migrants’, who expected to become an EU member state, are 28% less likely to be naturalized.

For couples, given high proportions of naturalizations by marriage, the effect of being married with a native French is strongly associated with being naturalized, but, people married with a naturalized citizen are the most likely to be naturalized. Given the high frequency of naturalization by marriage, it is probable that a significant part of these naturalizations occurred through this provision (see footnote 10). The effect of managerial occupations is smaller for couples than for singles and higher education is associated with lower naturalization as well as higher spouse’s education. But those having experienced work interruptions are more likely to naturalize, showing that marriage is a way to naturalize for migrants with unstable employment and low human capital. Results by origin for couples show different effects comparatively to the ‘all’ sample. Algerians, Portuguese and Turks naturalize 2.5 times to 4.8 times as much as ‘other EU citizens’, whereas they were less likely to naturalize in the ‘all’ sample, again an effect of easier naturalization by marriage.

### *France and the USA compared*

---

<sup>19</sup> We use a neighbourhood classification made by INSEE that reflects both geographical and social (major occupations of the population) variables.

<sup>20</sup> The number of singles who entered as adults is small and some variables like age, sex, desire to return, activity profile and neighbourhood are not significant and have not been included in the model. For some other variables, categories had to be pooled.

<sup>21</sup> The group with highest naturalization is those who answered ‘already there’. They are people who entered as young children and still live in the region of their childhood.

<sup>22</sup> We use former nationality as indicator of origin to avoid bias due to French people born abroad or in former colonies; former nationality is not available for the USA and country of birth was used instead.

Year of arrival, an endogenous variable, has a negative effect in France and the USA: recent arrivals are less likely to be naturalized due to the time necessary to naturalize. Its low effect for couples in France is consistent with immediate naturalization by marriage for most of the period before the 1999 census. In both countries, people with low human capital: low diploma, occupation (and income in the USA), and those living in poor areas (in France) are less likely to be naturalized. But, in the USA, people with higher education, occupation or income are less likely to naturalize than people with mid-level human capital, mostly for singles. This is not the case in France where single migrants with higher education or in managerial positions tend to naturalize more, maybe because there is no other way to get permanent residence in France, whereas green card exists in the USA. However, there are hints that the fact of belonging to higher social classes operates in France like in the USA, with people residing in the most exclusive areas being less likely to naturalize than those in middle class areas.

These results reflect the different ways migrants use to naturalize according to their human capital in front of more or less selective provisions and alternative schemes of permanent residence. Such strategies are not specific to the USA. In Canada, a higher degree than BA has a negative effect on citizenship acquisition and this effect becomes seven times stronger at PhD level (DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2008).

Using naturalization as a security against spouse's low human capital appears in both countries, but to a lesser extent and less consistently with education levels in France. Spouse's low diploma (CAP in France; under high school graduate in the USA), low work status and mid-level occupation (not working and low income in the USA; employee in France) are associated with higher naturalization. The knowledge and use of public assistance in the USA or social subsidies for those in long-term unemployment in France have also positive impacts on naturalization.

In the USA, effects for all migrants, singles and couples are in the same direction, because most people naturalize on the general provision, and less than 10% naturalize by marriage. In France, where one third of adults' naturalization is by marriage, there are important differences between couples, singles and all migrants, at both ends of the spectrum of human capital. People with low or middle human capital: BEP (a mid level vocational diploma), employees and those who experienced work interruptions are much more likely to be naturalized for couples than for singles or all migrants. At the other end, managers in couples are less naturalized than among all migrants, and there is even an inverse effect for people with highest education who naturalize less than reference, whereas they naturalize more among all migrants. This appears also for origin the effect of which is several times higher for couples than for all migrants in France, while it is not much different in the USA. This translates how naturalization by marriage reduces the selection of naturalized migrants in France.

In France and the USA, the role of life course projects such as no desire to return to country of birth (France) or owning his house (USA) are associated with higher naturalization.

Finally, in France and the USA, origin has the strongest effect on naturalization, with Asians the most likely to naturalize and 'proximity' migrants less likely to naturalize. However, the effect of origin is much stronger in France than in the USA for all sub-samples. Data on applications and their issues would be necessary to better understand the role of origin. Information on countries allowing dual citizenship may also explain some of these differences, although changes in citizenship laws appeared to have temporary effects for Mexicans. It would also be better to have biographic data to study strategies and the different paths to naturalization. Nevertheless, this paper shows that policies and migrants' strategies have important effects on naturalized migrants' socio-economic characteristics and these effects are different for singles and married people.

## **5. Impact of naturalization on migrants' integration**

We shall now consider how naturalization increases migrants' labour market outcomes, with regard to access to stable employment in France.

The instrumental variable that we use in the bi-probit model is marital status. Having been married is strongly associated with being naturalized because marriage is a frequent way of getting French citizenship whereas it is not significantly associated with having stable employment. The test confirms that there is endogeneity between being naturalized and being in stable employment.

The correlates of being naturalized have the expected effects. Duration of stay in France has a positive effect on being naturalized (table 6). The negative effect of year of observation shows that naturalization has become more difficult over time which is consistent with increasing common life duration required to get French citizenship through marriage. Females and people having been married are more likely to be naturalized which is also consistent with previous result (see above). Like with logistic regressions, the probability of being naturalized increases with educational level. As regards origin, Portuguese, Algerians and Turks (although with low significance for the latter) are less likely to naturalize than 'other former EU citizens' (ref.).

Table 6: Bi-probit estimates of being naturalized and being in stable employment for migrants in France. Histoire de Vie Survey, INSEE 2003.

Estimates of being naturalized		Estimates of being in stable employment	
Constant	29,5	constant	61,4
Duration	1,0616 ***	Year	0,9703 ***
Year	0,9838 ***	Sex (male) (ref.)	1
Sex (male) (ref.)	1	Sex (female)	0,6818 ***
Sex (female)	1,5987 ***	Naturalized (no) (ref.)	1
Single (yes) (ref.)	1	Naturalized (yes)	1,8772 ***
Single (no)	1,8379 ***	<b>Former citizenship</b>	
<b>Former citizenship</b>		other EU (ref.)	1
other EU (ref.)	1	Portugal	1,8821 ***
Portugal	0,4897 ***	Other Europe	0,6549 ***
Other Europe	1,5031 ***	Morocco	0,8334 *
Morocco	1,0294	Algeria	0,8267 *
Algeria	0,4014 ***	Tunisia	0,5339 ***
Tunisia	0,9703	Sub-Saharan Africa	0,6443 ***
Sub-Saharan Africa	1,7531 ***	Turkey	0,7645 *
Turkey	0,8090 c	VietNam, Laos, Cambodia	1,3982 *
VietNam, Laos, Cambodia	2,3500 ***	Am., Oc., M.-East, other Asia	0,7770 **
Am., Oc., M.-East, other Asia	1,2657 ***	<b>Educational level</b>	
<b>Educational level</b>		No education (ref.)	1
No education (ref.)	1	Incomplete 1ary	0,8184 *
Incomplete 1ary	1,3954 ***	Completed 1ary	0,7721 **
Completed 1ary	1,3722 ***	Lower 2ary	0,7999 **
Lower 2ary	1,5638 ***	Higher 2ary	1,1176
Higher 2ary	2,6253 ***	Technical/prof. Short	1,1389
Technical/prof. Short	2,2356 ***	Technical/prof. Long	1,0565
Technical/prof. Long	1,4532 ***	Tertiary (incl. technical)	0,8256 *
Tertiary (incl. technical)	2,1652 ***		
-2LL -6701.7851			
N = 9371			

\*\*\* significant at .001 level ; \*\* .01 ; \* .05, c 0.10



The effect of naturalization on being in stable employment is quite high. Migrants are 88% more likely to be in stable employment when they are naturalized. Decline in stable employment with time is due to decades-long increase in unemployment in France. The increase in the likelihood of being in stable employment with educational level is as expected. People with no education (ref.) are actually more frequently in stable employment than people with education up to lower secondary, probably as a result of more competition and difficulty for migrants to access mid-level jobs than unqualified jobs. Most importantly, the reversal for migrants with tertiary education shows that people with high education have difficulties to get stable employment. Perhaps this is because the difficulty to get a job matching their qualification leads them to change jobs frequently. Former Portuguese and citizens of ex-French colonies in Asia have higher employment than former 'other EU citizens', showing that inequities in the labour market remain after naturalization.

A positive own effect of naturalization also exists in the U.S. Bratsberg et al. (2002) show that a shift to white-collar jobs follows immediately naturalization, but access to public sector or union jobs occurs more gradually. Wage growth becomes faster after naturalization.

These results assess that benefits are attached to naturalization itself independently of the various selections that naturalized migrants undergo. The more rapid wages growth and more stable employment situation after naturalization show the impact of citizenship status. Thus, low naturalization in France hinders the economic integration of migrants, including those with no qualification who show more stable employment after they became French citizens.

## **Conclusion**

Difficulties to assess the impact of policies on naturalization are important due to the many selections and self-selections along the migration, integration and naturalization process. It appears that changes in trends in naturalization by marriage in France are linked with policy changes regarding the eligible duration of common life, but also with the anticipation of these changes. In the USA, major recent changes are due to the size and composition of cohorts, with the impact of IRCA migrants becoming eligible from the mid 1990s, as well as anticipations before fee increases. In both countries, changes due to backlogs or shorter processing of applications have a large impact on yearly naturalization figures. These changes can actually be considered as part of policies, or more precisely as policy implementation.

Overall naturalization levels, however, appear also to be linked with the migration, and integration policy context. Selective migration policies in the USA result in migrants being able to meet the requirements for naturalization, and they mostly naturalize on an individual basis. In France, the absence of a selective migration policy (until 2005) resulted in large proportions of migrants unable to naturalize individually, and therefore many migrants can only naturalize by marriage. However, this leaves larger proportions of migrants, alone or couples, as foreigners in France than in the USA and hinders migrants' civic participation and integration.

Naturalization increases with human capital in both France and the USA. However, migrants with high human capital tend to naturalize less in the USA where green card is an alternative to naturalization. People with high human capital tend to consider they do not need to naturalize while others use naturalization as a security against low own or spouse's human capital. In France where citizenship is the only way to have permanent residence, except for EU nationals, similar effects are much more limited. Frequent naturalization by marriage in France also reduces the selection effect of naturalization. Thus, migrants chose between various options to stay permanently and their strategy is related to their own as well as to their spouses' human capital.

Beyond the various selections operated by policies, access to citizenship is important for both migrants and receiving countries as it increases their integration into the labour market in both France and the USA.

The introduction of selective migration policy in France in 2005 should result in more migrants able to meet the requirements for naturalization and reduce the population deprived of civic rights. The introduction of permanent residence permit in France (as well as in other EU countries) could result in reduced qualification of naturalized citizens. However, this effect would be marginal in France where marriage is likely to remain a frequent and less selective way to naturalize in the frame of high proportions of mixed marriages. Moreover, the distribution of naturalized population by qualification would not change rapidly because naturalization occurs several years after immigration.

## References

Aguirre, B. E. and Rogelio Saenz (2002). Testing the Effects of Collectively Expected Durations of Migration: The Naturalization of Mexicans and Cubans, *International Migration Review*, 36(1):103-124.

Aleinikoff, A. T. and Douglas Klusmeyer ed. (2000), *From Migrants to Citizens : Membership in a Changing World*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC.

Baker, B. C. (2008), *Trends in Naturalization Rates: 2008 Update*, Dept of Homeland Security, USA, [http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois\\_natztrends\\_fs\\_2008.pdf](http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_natztrends_fs_2008.pdf)

Balistreri, K. S. and Jennifer Van Hook (2004), The More Things Change the More they Stay the Same: Mexican Naturalization Before and After Welfare Reform, *International Migration Review*, 38(1):113-130.

Bauböck, Rainer ed. (1994), *From Aliens to Citizens, Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe*, Aldershot ; Brookfield, USA ; Hong Kong : Avebury.

Bean, F. D. and G. Stevens (2003), *America's Newcomers and the Dynamic of Diversity*, - New York: Russell Sage Foundation, XVI.

Borjas, G. J. (1987), Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants, *The American Economic Review*, 77(4):531-553.

Bratsberg, B., J.F. Ragan, Z.M. Nasir (2002), The Effect of Naturalization on Wage Growth, *Journal of Labor Economics* 22(3):568-597.

Chishti, M. and C. Bergeron (2008), USCIS: backlog in naturalization applications will take nearly three years to clear, *Policy Beat*, 15 February 2008, Migration Information Source, <http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id=673>

De Voretz, D.J. and S. Pivnenko (2008), The Economic Determinants and Consequences of Canadian Citizenship Ascension, in *The Economics of Citizenship*, edited by Bevelander P., D.J. De Voretz, MIM, Malmö University.

De Voretz, D.J. and S. Pivnenko (2005), Self-selection, immigrant public finance performance and Canadian citizenship, *Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/Institute for the Study of Labor*, IZA Discussion Paper No. 1463.

Evans, M.D.R. (1988), Choosing to Be a Citizen: The Time-path of Citizenship in Australia, *International Migration Review*, 22(2):243-264.

- Fougère, D. and Mirna Safi (2005). «L'acquisition de la nationalité française : quels effets sur l'accès à l'emploi des immigrés?». France, *Portrait Social*, Edition 2005-2006, 163-184.
- Freeman, G. P. (2003), “*Incorporating immigrants in liberal democracies*”, The Centre for Migration and Development, Working Paper 03–09.
- Garcia, J.A. (1981), Political Integration of Mexican Immigrants: Exploration into the Naturalization Process, *International Migration Review*, 15(4):608-625.
- Kelley, J. and I. McAllister (1982), The decision to become an Australian citizen, *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, 18(3):428-439
- Kogan, I. (2003), “Ex-Yugoslavs in the Austrian and Swedish labor markets: the significance of the period of migration and the effect of citizenship acquisition”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29(4):595–622.
- Lebon, A. (various years), *Immigration et présence étrangère en France*, Direction de la Population et des Migrations, Paris: La documentation française.
- Liang, Z. (1994), Social Contact, Social Capital, and the Naturalization Process: Evidence From Six Immigrant Groups, *Social Science Research*, 23(4):407-437
- Martiniello, M. (1995), ed. *Migration, citizenship and ethno-national identities in the European Union*, Aldershot, Avebury, UK.
- Massey, D. S. (1987), The Ethnosurvey in Theory and Practice, *International Migration Review*, 21(4):1498-1522.
- Portes, A. and John. W. Curtis (1987), Changing Flags : Naturalization and its determinants Among Mexican Immigrants, *International Migration Review* 21(2):352-371.
- Rallu, J. L. (2008), “One-way or both-ways migration surveys” (pp. 273-292) in *International Migration in Europe: New Trends and New Methods of Analysis*, edited by C. Bonifazi, M. Okolski, J. School, P. Simon, IMISCOE, Amsterdam: Univ. Press,.
- Rallu, J. L., F. Munoz-Perez, M.J. Carrilho (2000), Return migration from Europe to Spain and Portugal, *Studi Emigrazione/Migration Studies*, XXXVII(139):625-649.
- Régnard, C. (2007), *Immigration et présence étrangère en France en 2006*, rapport annuel de la DPM / Ministère de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du co-développement ; Ministère du travail, des relations sociales et de la solidarité, Paris: la Documentation française.
- Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel de Contrôle de l'Immigration (2009) *Rapport au Parlement, Les Orientations de la Politique de l'Immigration*, Paris: Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'outre-mer, des collectivités territoriales et de l'immigration.
- USCIS (various years), *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, USA Department of Justice, United States Citizenship and Immigration Service, Washington.
- Weil, P. (2002), *Qu'est-ce qu'un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution*, Paris: Grasset.
- Weil, P. and Randall Hansen ed. (1999). *Nationalité et citoyenneté en Europe*, Paris: La Découverte.

Table 4: Odds ratios of being naturalized, for all migrants, single and married migrants with spouse present ('couples'). USA, 2000 census

	all	single	couples		all	single	couples		couples		couples
<b>year of arrival</b>	0.9428***	0.9420***	0.9383***	<b>C of birth</b>				<b>Spouse's citizenship</b>		<b>spouse's occupation</b>	
<b>Age</b>	1.0094***	1.0505***	1.0016***	Asia	2.3129***	2.4459***	2.5224***	US citizen	2.4881***	not working	1.1032***
<b>Age2</b>		0.9997***		America	1.1212***	1.1360	1.1157***	Asia-Oc naturalized	6.8943***	managers	0.9475***
<b>Sex</b>				Africa	1.4941***	1.3459***	1.6916***	Asia-Oc not citizen	1.0262***	professional	1.0378
Male	0.8650***	0.7445***	0.9021***	Oceania	0.6429***	0.5270***	0.7240***	American nat.	7.7835***	technician	0.9785***
Female (ref.)	1	1	1	Mexico	0.6836***	0.7603***	0.8909***	American not cit.	1.4714***	service worker	1.0615*
<b>marital status</b>				Europe (ref.)	1	1	1	African nat.	7.1185***	sales w.	1.0036*
Spouse present	1.1792***		1.3059***	<b>Education</b>				African not cit.	1.4871***	office w.(ref.)	1
Spouse absent	0.9011***			<10th grade	0.6200***	0.5347***	0.5567***	Mexican nat.	6.2858***	farm fishery forest w.	1.0053
Widowed	1.0837***		1.2777	10-11 <sup>th</sup>	0.7248***	0.6668*	0.6885***	Mexican not cit.	1.2865***	construction w.	1.0145
Divorced	1.1003***		1.2205*	12 <sup>th</sup>	0.8355***	0.7669	0.7605***	European nat.	10.7252***	repair w.	1.0736
Separated	0.9766***		1.0332**	high sch. Graduate	0.8716***	0.8069	0.8549***	European not cit. (ref.)	1	production w.	1.0255
Never married (ref.)	1		1	college < 1 (ref.)	1	1	1	<b>spouse's education</b>		transport w.	1.0574
<b>Income</b>				college no degree	1.0556***	0.9007***	1.0280***	<10th gr	1.2151***	Army	1.1454
<9999	0.7945***	0.7985***	0.7589***	associate degree	1.1747***	1.0111***	1.1355***	10-11 <sup>th</sup>	1.0505	unempl since 1995	1.0472
10-19999	0.8483***	0.8664***	0.8592***	BA/BS	1.1776***	0.9243***	1.1255***	12 <sup>th</sup>	1.1752***		
20-29999	0.9894***	1.0191	0.9977***	MA/MS	1.0472***	0.7682	1.0881***	high sch. Graduate	1.0538*		
30-39999	1.0862***	1.1143	1.0870***	Professional degr.	1.2421***	0.8620	1.1940***	college < 1 (ref.)	1		
40-49999	1.1644***	1.1978*	1.1451***	PhD	0.6239***	0.3983***	0.7066***	college no degree	0.9786***		
50-59999	1.1577***	0.9810	1.1975***	<b>English</b>				associate degree	1.0203		
60-69999	1.1529***	1.3425**	1.1734***	very well	1.5121***	1.6842***	1.5934***	BA/BS	1.0358		
70-79999	1.1355***	1.1592	1.1378***	Well	1.7932***	1.7946***	1.8336***	MA/MS	0.9949*		
80-89999	1.1025**	1.4179**	1.1074*	notwell/at all (ref.)	1	1	1	professional degree	1.1104**		
90-99999	1.0360	1.0203	1.0964	<b>Occupation</b>				PhD	0.7849***		
>100000 (ref.)	1	1	1	not working	0.8824	0.8869*	0.8174***	<b>spouse's income</b>			
<b>Tenure</b>				Managers	0.8418***	0.7397	0.8514**	<9999	1.1046***		
n.a.	0.7991***			Professional	0.9803***	0.9417*	0.9275***	10-19999	1.0196**		
Owned/loan	1.1411***		1.0244***	Technician	1.0036***	0.8885*	0.9933***	20-29999	0.9732		
Owned	1.1846***		1.0523***	service worker	0.8756	0.7635	0.8817	30-39999	0.9746		
Rented	0.8053***		0.8126***	sales w.	0.8316***	0.7560	0.8350***	40-49999	0.9916		
Occupied free (ref.)	1		1	office w. (ref.)	1	1	1	50-59999	0.9749		
<b>Public assistance</b>				farm, fishery,	0.6308***	0.5874*	0.6697***	60-69999	0.9586		
no	0.9174***			construction w.	0.6691***	0.6074**	0.6783***	70-79999	0.9936		
yes (ref.)	1			repair w.	0.8705	0.7782	0.8470**	80-89999	0.9666		
				production w.	0.8476***	0.8673*	0.8538**	90-99999	0.9459		
				transport w.	0.8377***	0.8436	0.8415***	>100000 (ref.)	1		
				Army	1.6973***	0.3797	2.1676***				
				unempl since 1995	0.7599***	0.8314	0.7589**				
-2LL	911051	46675	523341								
N	837296	40775	535361								
Intercept	116.4	116.5	126.3								

\*\*\* significant at .0001 level ; \*\* .001 ; \* .01

Table 5: Odds ratios of being naturalized, for all migrants, single and married migrants with spouse present ('couples'). France, 1999 census

	all	singles	couples		all	singles	couples		all	couples
<b>year of arrival</b>	0.9359***	0.9466***	0.9977***	<b>Diploma</b>				<b>activity profile</b>		
				no diploma	0.4024***	0.3895**	0.4421***	work interruption > 2 y	1.6782***	2.1615***
<b>age</b>	1.0456***		1.0334***	CEP (1ary)	0.6565***	1.7989	0.6783	no interruption > 2 years	1.4807*	1.7605
				BEPC (lower 2ary)	0.8141	1.2522	0.7359	n.s.	1.4927	1.9094**
<b>age2</b>	0.9994***			CAP (vocational)	0.9068	1.2465	0.8370	never worked (ref.)	1	1
				BEP (vocational)	0.9614*	0.8595	1.1480**	<b>Neighborhood</b>		
<b>Sex (male)</b>	0.6236***		0.6559***	Bac (technical) (ref.)	1	1	1	farms, agro-industry	1.5774	
Female (ref.)	1		1	Bac (high s. graduate)	0.9617	0.5437	0.8040	rural/small urban	2.0222***	
<b>Citizenship (former)</b>				DEUG (Univ 2 y)	0.9307	0.6644	1.0273*	urban center/administration	1.7515***	
Spain	1.5755***	5.2825	4.4061*	2/3rd cycle (univ >2 y)	1.1124***	1.0954	0.9344**	specialized industrial	1.4579	
Italy	1.0539***	2.8140	3.1186***	<b>Occupation</b>				Paris-suburbs	1.3793	
Portugal	0.7238***	2.1518	2.6112***	agri/forestry/fish	1.0479		0.8407	large urban/poor	1.1600***	
non EU Europe	3.1626***	11.3034	4.4629	crafts/tradesmen	0.7559*	0.1508*	0.7818	Western Paris/3ary	1.2026**	
Algeria	0.9823***	3.4484	2.8092***	managerial staff	1.3193***	2.6504***	1.4037***	industrial area (ref.)	1	
Morocco	1.4256***	6.1873	4.6288	mid-level occ. (ref.)	1	1	1	<b>spouse's citizenship</b>		
Tunisia	2.3703	8.6937	6.4282	employees	0.9659	0.8078	1.1440**	French by birth		32.5247***
other Africa	4.7875***	8.9290	9.3727***	production worker	0.7183***	0.6036	0.7831	Naturalized		78.7990***
Turkey	0.8562***		4.7679	retired	0.8448	0.8814	0.7370*	Foreign citizen (ref.)		1
Cambodia	8.2170***	15.6129	14.4573**	un empl/not in LF	0.8095	0.7314	0.7580*			
R Lao	7.5481***	9.6427	21.9595***	<b>desire to return</b>				<b>spouse's diploma</b>		
Viet Nam	18.6324***		19.3096***	yes	0.3756***		0.4260***	no diploma		0.9626
other Asia	5.8276***	26.8939***	6.3943	don't know	0.4990***		0.5397**	CEP (1ary)		1.1029
America-Oceania	2.8757	6.3079	2.3769***	already there	0.8504***		2.4244***	BEPC (lower 2ary)		1.2618
n.s.	0.7465***		6.7788	no (ref.)	1		1	CAP (vocational)		1.2941*
other EU (ref.)	1	1	1					BEP (vocational)		1.0699
								Bac (high s. graduate)		1.3419
-2LL	16390.4	457.54	9320.05					Bac Technical		0.9835
N	15092	471	13829					DEUG (Univ 2 y)		0.8835*
Intercept	64.02	52.57	1.35					2/3rd cycle (univ >2 y) (ref.)		1

\*\*\* significant at .001 level ; \*\* .01 ; \* .05

Annex table 1: Naturalization in France and the USA, since 1995

	USA	France (>age 18)	France total
1995	485720	45485	92410
1996	1040991	60302	109823
1997	596010	62859	116194
1998	461169	62563	123761
1999	837418	70432	147522
2000	886026	78881	150025
2001	606259	69153	127548
2002	572646	70503	128092
2003	462435	82322	144640
2004	537151	100815	168826
2005	604280	85311	154827
2006	702589	88845	147868
2007	660477	77182	132002
2008	1046539	76787	137452

Sources : USCIS annual reports; C. Régnard 2007; Ministère de l'intérieur, de l'outre-mer, des collectivités territoriales et de l'immigration 2009 : [http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers\\_det\\_res&numrubrique=242&numarticle=1457](http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers_det_res&numrubrique=242&numarticle=1457)

Annex table 2: Naturalizations by types in France, 1995-2006

	naturalizations			under age 18	Total	naturalization after age 18	Distribution (%)	
	after age 18	by marriage	Total after age 18				by marriage	under age 18
1995	28826	16659	45485	46925	92410	31,2	18,0	50,8
1996	41175	19127	60302	49521	109823	37,5	17,4	45,1
1997	42014	20845	62859	53335	116194	36,2	17,9	45,9
1998	40450	22113	62563	61198	123761	32,7	17,9	49,4
1999	46344	24088	70432	77090	147522	31,4	16,3	52,3
2000	52825	26056	78881	71144	150025	35,2	17,4	47,4
2001	45159	23994	69153	58395	127548	35,4	18,8	45,8
2002	44152	26351	70503	57589	128092	34,5	20,6	45,0
2003	51401	30921	82322	62318	144640	35,5	21,4	43,1
2004	66375	34440	100815	68011	168826	39,3	20,4	40,3
2005	63784	21527	85311	69516	154827	41,2	13,9	44,9
2006	59569	29276	88845	59023	147868	40,3	19,8	39,9
2007	46200*	30989	77182	54820	132002	35,0	23,5	41,5
2008	60600*	16213	76787	60665	137452	44,1	11,8	44,1

\* estimated using average ratio for 2003-2006.

Sources : C. Régnard 2007; Ministère de l'intérieur, de l'outre-mer, des collectivités territoriales et de l'immigration 2009 : [http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers\\_det\\_res&numrubrique=242&numarticle=1457](http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers_det_res&numrubrique=242&numarticle=1457)