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Marital Assimilation and Economic Outcomes in the Second Generation

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Abstract

Much of the research on the economic integration of immigrants centers on educational and occupational mobility from the first through third generation. Although intermarriage is a key component of both old (Gordon 1964) and new (Alba and Nee 2003) perspectives on immigrant assimilation, the role of intermarriage in the economic integration of immigrants remains poorly understood. As the population of immigrants and children of immigrants has increased in the past few decades, the increasing availability of marital partners with the same national origin has led to an increase in endogamous marriages in the second generation. What are the implications of the decline in intermarriage for the economic outcomes of the second generation of post-1960s immigrants? We use pooled cross-sectional data from the IPUMS-CPS 1996-2010 to investigate the relationship between assortative mating by national origins and the economic well-being of adult children of immigrants. We find that (1) children of immigrants who partner with members of the same national-origin group have lower income and living standards relative to those who intermarry; (2) children of immigrants who partner with a native-born spouse or cohabiting partner are not economically advantaged as compared to those who partner exogamously with first and second generation immigrants; and (3) the economic gains from intermarriage depend on the race and ethnicity of both partners, with Asian immigrants the only group to show no effect of assortative mating.

Keywords

Immigration, intermarriage, household income

Introduction

Despite decades of delay and decline in marriage, marital patterns offer a window into social fluidity, and marital homogamy remains the primary mechanism for social reproduction. We tend to meet people in the places we live, study, work, and pray, and for most of us these people form the pool of potential marital partners. As a result of processes of selection and exclusion in these arenas, we enter into intimate unions with people who tend to be very similar to ourselves. When this similarity is based on ascribed characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and social class, marital homogamy both reflects and reproduces social cleavages. In the US, long-term trends in assortative mating suggest increasing openness on the basis of race and ethnicity (Batson, Qian, and Lichter 2006; Kalmijn 1991; Lee and Bean 2004; Mare 1991). The post-1960s waves of Hispanic and Asian immigrants to the US epitomized this openness with high rates of intermarriage with the native-born population (Lee and Bean 2004). Yet, after decades of rising rates of intermarriage, rates of inter-racial marriage between whites and Hispanics and whites and Asian-Americans declined during the 1990s, and intermarriage between immigrant and native-born co-ethnics increased (Qian and Lichter 2007). This reversal challenges the implicit presumption that processes of immigrant incorporation are progressive from one generation to the next, and raises questions about the relationship between marital assimilation and the achievement of parity in living standards.

Despite the importance of assortative mating in the stratification literature, and the centrality of intermarriage to both old (Gordon 1964) and new (Alba and Nee 2003) perspectives on immigrant assimilation, few studies have examined the relationship between marital assimilation and socioeconomic assimilation across immigrant generations. In the case of the most recent waves of US immigrants arriving after the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, one explanation may be the relative youth of the second generation. In the last decade, a burgeoning literature has begun to describe trends in family formation in this population (Glick, Ruf, White, and Goldscheider 2006; Rosenfeld 2002). A separate literature examines the implications of immigration for social stratification in the U.S. Researchers have studied the educational attainment, employment, occupations and relative earnings of immigrants. Few empirical studies consider assortative mating and economic well-being among U.S. immigrants, and those that do limit their attention to the foreign born and/or the children of earlier waves of immigrants (Chiswick and Houseworth 2011; Furtado and Theodoropoulos 2010).

We argue that the implications of immigration for social stratification are best understood by drawing on insights from the assortative mating literature. In contrast with the "straight-line" assimilation pathway associated with earlier waves of European immigrants to the U.S. who were fully incorporated into the American mainstream by the third generation, some immigration scholars have argued that the racial and ethnic diversity among the most recent waves of immigrants may lead to distinct patterns of incorporation, or segmented assimilation (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Some national origin groups may assimilate into the mainstream, others may achieve socioeconomic parity while maintaining their ethnic and sociocultural distinctions, and still others may experience downward assimilation as they are incorporated into a permanent position of disadvantage. An understanding of these processes of incorporation requires an understanding of how marriage markets and labor markets work in conjunction to shape the economic well-being of each generation.

As a starting point, this paper examines assortative mating and economic outcomes among the married and cohabiting children of the most recent wave of US immigrants. Our analysis relies on pooled cross-sectional data from the 1996-2011 IPUMS-CPS, which allows us samples of sufficient size to compare within and across the largest groups of immigrants by nation of origin. We focus on family formation in the second generation born after 1965, and we define endogamous unions in terms of shared national origin. Throughout this paper, we use the term "immigrant" to encompass the foreign-born and the native-born with at least one foreign-born parent. We use the term "native-born" as shorthand for the native-born children of two native-born parents.

Background

A long tradition of social science scholarship has investigated stratification and the socioeconomic assimilation of immigrants (Chiswick 1978; Duncan and Duncan 1968; Park and Myers 2010). Much of that attention centers on education and the earnings of immigrants in general (Borjas 1985; Borjas 1987; Borjas 1995; Hall and Farkas 2008; Kaushal 2011) or for specific immigrant groups such as Hispanics (Allensworth 1997; Borjas 1982) or Asian-Americans (Kim and Sakamoto 2010; Tong 2010; Zeng and Xie 2004). This research finds steep earnings penalties among first-generation immigrants. Low immigrant earnings are explained only in part by low educational attainment. First generation immigrants are also disadvantaged by language difficulties, a lack of familiarity with the labor market, and social networks that are rich in immigrant ties but relatively poor in ties to the native population. The children of these immigrants do not experience the same disadvantages as their parents, but Park and Myers (2010) study of occupational attainment in the second generation of post-1965 immigrants found they have not yet reached parity with the mainstream.

The empirical evidence on the material well-being of immigrants is consistent with classical and contemporary theories of structural assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Portes and Zhou 1993). Our approach to socioeconomic assimilation builds on Alba and Nee's (2003:28) conceptualization of parity, that "…members of the immigrant minority and others similarly positioned have the same life chances in the pursuit of contested goods..." Economic assimilation is expected to increase between the first and second generation with the acquisition of labor market skills and specific cultural knowledge of the US labor market. Economic incorporation should continue to increase between the second and third generation with the expansion of US-born social networks that can augment specific cultural knowledge of the US labor market. Likewise, adoption of work-related norms, including gender norms, should increase between the first and third generation. While many scholars agree that these intergenerational processes are at work across the spectrum of immigrant groups, segmented assimilation approaches predict that some groups will be unable to overcome the disadvantaged position of the first generation because of prejudice and institutional racism in the host society (Portes and Rumbaut 1996).

Despite the important contributions of the current literature, empirical scholarship on the socioeconomic assimilation of immigrants remains limited in several ways. First, few studies have addressed social stratification among the adult children of immigrants. Instead, scholars have been attentive to the acquisition of human capital and access to labor markets. Empirical research has addressed generational shifts in language acculturation (Alba, Logan, Lutz, and Stults 2002), educational assimilation (Boyd 2002), and spatial assimilation through residential mobility (Alba, Logan, Stults, Marzan, and Zhang

1999; Iceland and Scopilliti 2008); most recently, scholars have turned their attention to occupational attainment in the second generation (Park and Myers 2010). In contrast, there is scant research on earnings and income in the second-generation, and extant studies target specific racial-ethnic groups (Sakamoto, Woo, and Kim 2010) and/or regional labor markets (Goodwin-White 2008; Haller, Portes, and Lynch 2011; Kim 2006).

Second, empirical research on socioeconomic outcomes among immigrants has largely focused on individual earnings, rather than on family or household income. Occupation, education, and earnings are appropriate measures of individual life chances, but household income is arguably a more meaningful measure of individual living standards. Living standards, in turn, are undeniably related to the life chances of all household members, children as well as adults. Since household income profiles and household composition are likely to vary across immigrant groups with very similar individual earnings profiles, the study of household incomes is an essential aspect of the socioeconomic assimilation of immigrants. Household income is also the conventional measure used in studies of income inequality. Increasing our knowledge of household income profiles among immigrants can advance the study of long-term trends in income inequality.

Third, there has been surprisingly little cross-fertilization between the extensive literature on the economic well-being of immigrants and the equally extensive body of research on intermarriage. Recent empirical research on marital patterns among U.S. immigrants has centered on trends in endogamy by cohort and immigrant generation, both overall and within specific racial, ethnic or national-origin groups (Arias 2001; Dávila and Mora 2001; Lichter, Carmalt, and Qian 2011; Min and Kim 2009; Qian and Lichter 2011; Raley, Durden, and Wildsmith 2004; Rosenfeld 2002; Zhenchao, Ruf, and Blair 2001). The findings from the assortative mating literature suggest that demographic shifts in the 1960s and 1970s initially led to a rise in intermarriage. Not only were immigrants marrying the native-born at high rates, but many of these marriages crossed racial-ethnic boundaries because they paired native-born whites with Asian or Hispanic immigrants. By the 1990s, however, rates of intermarriage between whites, Hispanics and Asians had dropped. The conclusion among most demographers is that these trends reflect shifts in the composition of marriage markets, as the rising population of native-born and second generation immigrants during the last two decades greatly increased the opportunities for endogamous marriage among the most recent waves of immigrants. In addition to shifting opportunity structures, research on second-generation marital choices suggests that the large differences in endogamy across groups (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2010) may also reflect sociocultural distinctions in marriage preferences.

The implications of these trends in intermarriage for immigrant incorporation into the U.S. stratification system have yet to be examined, but evidence from international studies generally finds a positive association between intermarriage and economic well-being. French immigrants who intermarry have higher earnings (Meng and Meurs 2009) and endogamous marriage among Dutch immigrants is most common among the least educated (van Tubergen and Maas 2007). One study in Australia found no earnings disadvantage for native-born workers who married immigrants, while intermarriage was associated with significantly higher incomes among immigrants (Meng and Gregory 2005).

The international evidence is consistent with a structural approach that links marital resources to labor market resources. Conventional perspectives on economic assimilation presume that full parity in the labor market may not be achieved until the third generation, because both the children and the

grandchildren of immigrants are likely to have superior access to labor market information as compared to their parents. However, immigrants who form marital and cohabiting unions with a native-born partner can benefit from the knowledge of the spouse. According to Meng and Gregory (2005) , intermarriage improves immigrants' access to important knowledge about labor market institutions and to instrumental social networks, contributing to a "faster speed of assimilation" (135). If intermarriage increases instrumental resources, we would expect that children of immigrants who form unions with the native-born will have higher income and living standards than children of immigrants in endogamous marriages. We would also expect the penalties for endogamy to be especially severe if the marital or cohabiting partner is foreign-born.

The expectation that intermarried households have higher income and living standards can also be derived from a status-exchange perspective, for reasons that are contingent on recent trends in U.S. immigration. Status-exchange theory maintains that intermarriage is structured by social class and the racial status order as much as by social affinity between partners (Kalmijn 1998). From an exchange perspective, racial-ethnic minorities with high socioeconomic status can negotiate upwards mobility in the stratification system by marrying into the majority group. Unlike structural assimilation theory, the economic advantages of intermarriage accrue to the partner who is already a member of a dominant social group, especially a low-SES member of the racial majority. Since a majority of post-1965 immigrants are Hispanic, Asian and Black, and a very large majority of native-born children of native-born parents are non-Hispanic White, intermarriages between an immigrant and native-born partner often cross racial-ethnic boundaries. If status-exchange processes are a factor in U.S. marriage markets, we would expect endogamous unions to be associated with relatively lower economic outcomes, and intermarriage – especially interracial marriage – to be associated with higher income and well-being. Moreover, status-exchange theory predicts that the benefits of inter-racial marriage would not be fully accounted for by educational attainment.

Critics of status-exchange theory maintain that preferences for educational homogamy provides a better explanation for observed patterns of interracial marriage (Rosenfeld 2005). However, educational preferences are also a form of status preferences, and cultural characteristics such as language or religion can lead to a tension between socioeconomic aspirations and sociocultural family aspirations. These tensions and the rigidity of the U.S. racial order may contribute to marriage between immigrants who do not share the same national origin, but share a cultural affinity and a position within the same broad pan-ethnic racial category. If exogamous unions reflect a preference for educational homogamy over shared national origins, we would expect that some well-educated members of the second generation will form interracial unions, and others will partner exogamously but will form pan-ethnic unions within the same racial-ethnic group. In both cases we would expect these unions to have higher income and living standards than endogamous unions, and in both cases we would expect those differentials to be accounted for by variation in education attainment.

The analyses that follow provide an empirical assessment of the economic incorporation of the most recent waves of immigrants to the United States by investigating marital similarity and household income and living standards in the second generation. To summarize, conventional perspectives on economic assimilation leads to the expectation that members of the second generation who partner with the native-born will be have the best economic outcomes, that members of the second generation in endogamous unions will be economically disadvantaged, and that the greatest disadvantages will be experienced by

those who partner with foreign-born co-nationals. We also test status exchange and educational homogamy perspectives on intermarriage by examining pan-ethnic and inter-racial unions. Both perspectives predict economic advantages for inter-racial unions, and educational homogamy predicts advantages for pan-ethnic unions. However, the educational homogamy perspective predicts that these differences will be fully accounted for by differences in educational attainment, while status-exchange predicts that the advantage of intermarriage with a member of a higher-status racial-ethnic group will persist net of education.

Data and Methods

We examine the income and living standards of partnered children of immigrants using the harmonized IPUMS-CPS (King, Ruggles, Alexander, Leicach, and Sobek 2004). The source data are taken from the Current Population Survey's Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC), a nationally representative survey of the U.S. population collected each March as a supplement to the basic monthly survey. The rotation group structure of the CPS calls for each eligible address for the March survey to be interviewed in two consecutive years[1]. To avoid duplicates, we selected observations from the first four rotation groups in the years 1996-2011 to produce a single pooled sample.

We identified children of immigrants using the response to a question on whether each parent was native-born or foreign-born. Foreign-born parents may have been born abroad to U.S. citizens, a nuance which is captured in the CPS for the respondent but not for the respondent's parents. This makes our measure less than perfect, but the number of foreign-born U.S. citizens is quite small. For example, in these data less than one percent of all native-born citizens were born abroad to American parents. Without data on the citizenship status of parents, a foreign-born parent serves as a reasonable proxy for an immigrant parent.

Our sample includes men and women who were U.S. citizens at birth and had at least one parent born outside the United States or in U.S. outlying areas such as Puerto Rico. These are the second generation, although children of immigrants with one U.S.-born parent are sometimes referred to as the 2.5 generation. We also included immigrants who were born outside the U.S. but arrived by the age of 6 and were citizens at the time of the survey. These restrictions minimize the risk that the schooling, labor market and marriage market experiences of the 1.5 generation are fundamentally different from the experiences of U.S.-born children of immigrants. We use the term "second generation" to refer to all sample members, and we include controls for generational status in the multivariate analyses.

Because we are interested in the marital assimilation of the most recent waves of immigrants, we included only those members of the second generation who were born in 1965 or later. From this sample, we selected all those who were married and living with a spouse. We also include cohabitants who are maintaining their own household, because the CPS only reports information on cohabitation for the head of household. Once we had identified our focal sample, we excluded observations if the national origins of either partner could not be determined. Our final sample includes observations on 8,133 men and 9,824 women aged 16 to 45 who are children of immigrants and in marital or cohabiting unions.

[1] The CPS is a monthly survey of residential addresses with eight rotating interview groups. Each address is surveyed for four consecutive months, then not surveyed for eight months, and surveyed again for four consecutive months.

Dependent Variables: Income Measures

We consider the material well-being of second-generation immigrants as captured through measures of household income and adjusted income. Household income is a more accurate measure of material well-being than individual income, Household income is also better-suited than family income as a measure of material well-being for this population, because it takes into account the income of cohabitants and other nonrelatives in the household, and it includes all families in multifamily households. The CPS measures household income as the sum of the individual income of all household members, from all sources (labor income, business income, rent, interest and dividends, unemployment and retirement income, child support, and other cash transfers from public and private sources), in the calendar year prior to the March interview. We use the natural logarithm of household income, after first adjusting the income measures for each wave to 1999 dollars. A small number of households (less than one-tenth of one percent) report no income or negative household income; we assign these households a value of zero on the log income measure.

In addition to nominal household income, we examine two measures of standards of living that take into account differences in household composition. The first is an adjusted income measure that takes into account the number and age of household members. We use the OECD-modified equivalency scale to assign a weight to each household that captures material needs and economies of scale based on household composition. A value of 1 was given to the first household member, a value of .5 to each additional adult member, and a value of .3 to each additional child (OECD Project on Income Distribution and Poverty). We divided household income in 1999 dollars by the sum of these values and use the natural logarithm of this household equivalent income as a measure of living standards.

For purposes of comparison, we also examined the income-to-needs ratio using the measures of family income and needs available in the data. This measure is calculated by the U.S. Census Bureau for the purpose of producing poverty estimates, but because the Census Bureau defines excludes cohabiting partners from its definition of a family unit, this measure is available only for married sample members.

National Origins and Racial-Ethnic Groups

We identify national origins using variables measuring the country of birth, mother's birthplace, and father's birthplace. If both partners share the same non-US national origins on any of these variables, the union is classified as endogamous. If the partners do not share the same national origin, or if the spouse or cohabiting partner is the US-born child of two US-born parents, national origin is determined by the country in which both parents were born, or by mother's birthplace if the parents do not share a birthplace, or by father's birthplace if only the father is foreign-born.

We created a combined racial-ethnic classification by first determining Hispanic ethnicity, and then for non-Hispanics we used the questions on race. The CPS began allowing respondents to report multiple race identities in 2003, and the proportion of respondents who self-identify as biracial or multiracial in this sample is about 3.5%, higher than among Americans as a whole. We recoded as many of these racial classifications as possible into the same race categories used prior to 2003 by prioritizing black identities first, followed by Asian or Pacific Islander. A small number of respondents who could not be classified were retained in an "other" category. Because of the salience of race to Hispanic identities, we created

categories for Hispanic and Black Hispanics, in addition to categories for White, non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, and Asian/Pacific Islander.

We use national origin and racial-ethnic group to identify five types of marital and cohabiting unions among children of immigrants: (1) *Native intermarriages* are unions with a US-born person with US-born parents; (2) *Inter-racial unions* are unions with an immigrant or child of immigrants from a different racial-ethnic group; (3) *Pan-ethnic unions* are unions with an immigrant or child of immigrants from the same racial-ethnic group; (4) *Endogamous Second Generation unions* are unions with a person who shares the same national origins and is a child of immigrants; and (5) *Endogamous Foreign-born unions* are unions a person who shares the same national origins and first immigrated to the U.S. after the age of six.

Methods and Control Variables

We use linear regression to estimate group differences in household income across the five household types. The multivariate analyses of household income and living standards include controls for marital status, since cohabitants tend to have smaller households and substantially lower household incomes as compared to married couples. We also include controls for the generational status of the focal individual (i.e., foreign born, both parents foreign born, one parent foreign born) and the educational attainment of each partner as measures of household human capital. We include these results in the tables, but we do not present coefficient estimates for the remaining controls, specifically the age of each partner, the state in which the couple resides, and the survey year. All analyses are weighted using household weights supplied by the CPS. Since some households have multiple eligible partnered children of immigrants, we adjusted these weights by dividing the weights by the number of eligible sample members in the household, and we adjusted the standard errors to allow for within-household error correlation.

Results

Rates of in-marriage and out-marriage are highly variable across national-origin groups in the US. For most national-origin groups, endogamous unions and unions with the native-born together account for nearly 9 in ten unions. As table 1 shows, Mexicans are the largest group and have the highest rates of endogamous marriage. Endogamy rates are also high among Puerto Ricans and Cubans, the next largest Hispanic groups, and the smaller Hispanic groups have high rates of union-formation with other immigrant groups. At the other extreme, Northern Europeans overwhelmingly partner with the native-born. Endogamy rates among Asian national-origin groups vary, with very low rates among the Japanese and high rates of in-marriage among East Indians. Immigrants from China have relatively high rates of unions with other immigrant groups.

Assortative mating is structured by sociocultural preferences, but also by the US racial order. Table 2 shows that native-born unions are the most common outcome for white, non-Hispanic members of the second generation, followed by blacks. A majority of Hispanics and Asian-Americans are in endogamous unions with other first and second generation immigrants. Assortative mating among black Hispanics are more comparable to the patterns found among non-Hispanic blacks than the patterns found among other Hispanics, and for all groups intra-racial unions are more common than inter-racial unions. Both Asians and Blacks exhibit gender differences in endogamy. Asian men are substantially more likely to partner

endogamously than Asian women, and Black women are more likely to partner endogamously than Black men.

Household Income

Table 3 presents coefficient estimates for the regression of the log of household income on partner similarity among second-generation men. The baseline model includes controls for marital status, the age of both partners, state of residence and survey year; cohabitants have significantly lower household income than do married couples. The baseline results show that the most economically disadvantaged members of the second generation are those who have partnered with a member of the same national-origin group. Men in endogamous unions with foreign-born wives and cohabiting partners have household income that is about 30% lower than the income of men who partner with the native born, and men in endogamous second-generation unions have income that is lower by more than 10%. Both groups have lower income than men in pan-ethnic unions, who have roughly the same income as men in unions with the native born. Men in inter-racial unions have the highest household income among all second generation men, enjoying double-digit advantages as compared to men in unions with the native-born and men in pan-ethnic unions (p=0.02), and even greater differentials as compared to men in endogamous unions.

The results from Model 2 show no significant differences in the household income of men by generational status. Instead, Model 3 shows that differences in educational attainment among second generation men account for much of the observed group differences in household income. Once men's education is included in the models, there are no substantial or significant differences in the household income of men who partner with the native born, men in pan-ethnic unions, and men in endogamous unions with second generation women. Women's educational attainment also accounts for some of these income differentials, but the results in Model 4 show that net of the educational attainment of both partners, the household income of men in endogamous unions with a foreign born partner is more than 15% lower than men in unions with the native-born. On the other hand, even after controlling for education, men in inter-racial unions have income that is 10% higher than men in unions with the native-born. Tests on the household type coefficients (not shown) find that the income disadvantage for foreign-born unions, and the income advantage for interracial unions, are significant as compared to every other group.

Table 4 presents the same models for second generation women. The baseline model shows that like men, women in endogamous unions have significantly lower household income, especially when their partner is foreign-born. Women in inter-racial unions have higher household incomes than women in endogamous or pan-ethnic (p=0.04) unions, but the advantage as compared to women in unions with the native-born is not statistically significant. In contrast with the findings for men, the results in Model 2 show that women who have a US-born parent are worse-off economically than women with two foreign-born parents. This finding is consistent with some of the literature on downwards assimilation among new immigrants groups, but without further investigation into assortative mating among the specific subgroups that contribute to this result, any interpretation remains speculative. The results when controlling for women's own education in Model 3 echo the findings for men in that education accounts for one third or more of the income differentials across groups, and Model 4 shows that the impact of partner's education accounts for an additional one third or more of the income disadvantage for endogamous unions. Net of both partners' educational attainment, however, the results in Model 4 show that second-generation

women in unions with a partner who shares their national origin have significantly lower incomes than women in unions with a native-born partner. The relative income disadvantage compared to women with native-born partners is about 18% for women in endogamous unions with a foreign-born partner, and about 8% for women in endogamous unions with a second-generation partner, and both groups are also significantly worse off economically than women in inter-racial unions. For women as well as for men of the second generation, partnering within the same national origin group is associated with economic disadvantage, and unions with partners of a different racial-ethnic immigrant group are at least as economically well-off as unions with the native-born.

Living Standards

Household income presents only a partial view of economic well-being, because households differ in their size and composition. Economies of scale mean that a household with four members may have greater needs than a household with just two members, but these needs of the four-person household are likely to be substantially less than twice the needs of the two-person household. We investigate household living standards among partnered second-generation women using a household income equivalency measure that adjusts the income measure used in the previous analyses for the size and composition of the household. We also use a measure of family income to needs, which relies on the same conceptualization of different needs depending on composition and age. The family income to needs measure differs in that it includes income only from family members related by blood marriage or adoption, and it adults this income measure by the composition of the same family unit. Since cohabitants and their children are not considered to be part of a single family unit, we exclude all cohabitants from the income-to-needs analysis.

Table 5 presents the results of the analysis of living standards among partnered second-generation men. The baseline results in Model 1 show that the disparities in living standards are even wider than the income disparities for men who partner with women from the same national-origin group, suggesting that these households are larger in size than other households. Men in endogamous unions with foreign-born women have living standards that are 35% lower than men in unions with the native-born, and men in endogamous unions with second-generation women have living standards that are over 15% lower than men in unions with the native-born, as compared to baseline income disparities of 30% and 10%, respectively. The results in the full model show that endogamous unions are associated with significantly lower living standards than men in unions with the native-born, even net of educational attainment. Men in pan-ethnic unions have living standards that are smaller in magnitude and not significantly different from either men in endogamous unions or men in endogamous second-generation men. Men who partner with first and second generation immigrants outside their own racial-ethnic group have living standards that are significantly higher than all other groups, by 10% or more.

The income-to-needs results in Models 3 and 4 show nearly the same results for endogamous marriages as for all endogamous unions. Controlling for the education of both partners reduces the disadvantage by one-third to one-half, but estimated living standards are still significantly lower for endogamous unions. When cohabiting unions are dropped from the analysis, however, the results show that inter-racial marriage is associated with a smaller economic advantage. Interracial marriages with other immigrants and children of immigrants are associated with baseline living standards that are 12.7% higher than the living standards of men in unions with the native-born. After controlling for education, the advantage is

not statistically significant except in comparisons with men in endogamous unions with a foreign born partner. These results suggest that inter-racial marriages are likely to be worse off economically than inter-racial cohabiting unions, in part because they are likely to maintain smaller and more economically active households.

The results from the analysis of the living standards of partnered women in the second generation are presented in table 6. The baseline results for all second-generation women in Model 1 show the same pattern of substantial disadvantage for endogamous marriage as is found among men, and women in pan-ethnic unions show a smaller but significant baseline disadvantage of 12% as compared to women in inter-racial unions and nearly 7% as compared to women in unions with the native born. The findings from Model 2 show that educational attainment accounts for only about half of the disparities in living standards experienced by women in endogamous unions. The family living standards results in Models 3 and 4 show a similar pattern of results. Even when the analysis is limited to married couples and their families, second generation women in endogamous unions have significantly lower living standards than second generation women in pane-ethnic marriages, in inter-racial marriages, and in intermarriages with the native born

Endogamy and Exogamy within Racial-Ethnic Groups

The results to this point demonstrate that second generation men and women in endogamous unions have lower household income and living standards as compared to children of immigrants who partner exogamously. The results also suggest that inter-racial unions among second-generation immigrants are associated with higher income than unions with natives, a finding that is consistent with status-exchange theory only if these unions involve racial-ethnic minorities partnering with a higher-status racial-ethnic group. Moreover, we might expect that out-marriage among groups with high levels of educational attainment would be less advantageous than out-marriage among low-education groups. This motivates a group-specific analysis that allows comparisons of endogamy by national origins, regardless of generational status, and exogamy by racial-ethnic group, regardless of generational status. This means that the large group of sample members who partner with the native born are now grouped by the racial-ethnic group of their native-born partner, instead of grouping all native-born unions together. The data do not allow an analysis of specific national-origin groups, so in our final analysis we examine the relationship between economic outcomes and endogamy separately for four broad racial-ethnic categories: Hispanic, Black, Asian and Pacific Islanders, and White, non-Hispanic. We include Black Hispanics in both the Hispanic racial-ethnic group and the Black racial-ethnic group, and include an indicator variable to denote Black Hispanic status. In order to increase the power of the analyses, we pool men and women[2].

Among the four groups, second-generation Asians have the highest level of educational attainment, with more than half earning a bachelor's degree or greater, and fewer than 20% reporting no postsecondary education. Asians are followed by non-Hispanic Whites, 42% of whom have a bachelor's degree or more, and then by Blacks, 35% of whom have a bachelor's degree or more; just fewer than 30% of Whites and Blacks have no post-secondary education. Second-generation Hispanics have the lowest educational attainment, with fewer than 20% reporting a four-year college degree and more than half

[2] Since some unions include two partners who are members of the second generation, we include both partners but adjust the weights of each partner by one half.

reporting no postsecondary schooling. Black Hispanics are more similar to non-black Hispanics than to Blacks in their educational attainment, but are more likely to report at least some college education.

Table 7 presents selected results from the full models for household income and living standards analyses by racial-ethnic group. Models 1-4 present coefficient estimates from the household income models, and Models 5-8 present results from the analysis of living standards as measured by equivalent income. It is useful to note that cohabitation is associated with lower income for all groups except for Blacks, who have lower rates of marriage than the other groups. Also, Black Hispanics are worse off than other Hispanics, net of age and education, and have economic outcomes that are comparable to other second-generation Blacks. Finally, we note that once inter-racial unions include all inter-racial unions with the native-born, the advantages that accrued to men in these unions in the earlier analyses disappear.

The results for Hispanics in Models 1 and 5 show that endogamous unions carry an 8% income disadvantage among men, and a 10% disadvantage in living standards. The economic outcomes for Hispanic men in exogamous unions show no significant differences whether or not the partner shares the same racial-ethnic group. Unlike Hispanic men, Hispanic women do not experience a penalty for endogamous unions, suggesting that Hispanic men are more likely to partner with foreign-born women than are Hispanic women. However, inter-racial unions among Hispanic women of the second generation are associated with significantly better economic outcomes than those of other Hispanic men and women, amounting to a 14% advantage in income and living standards as compared to Hispanic men in inter-racial unions.

Endogamous unions among Blacks are not economically disadvantaged. Black men of the second generation experience no significant economic disadvantage for partnering with women who share their national origins as compared to Black men in other unions. They also experience no significant advantage for inter-racial unions, and in fact the coefficient estimates in Model 2 and Model 6 suggests a negative relationship between racial intermarriage and economic outcomes for second generation Black men. Black women overall fare better economically than black men, and as was the case among Hispanic women, Black women in interracial unions have the highest income and living standards among all Black children of immigrant households. Black women in interracial unions have incomes that are roughly 22% higher and living standards that are 16% than the incomes and living standards of Black men in same-race exogamous unions. These women are significantly better off economically than all other groups of Black men, and although they appear to be advantaged as compared to other groups of Black women, the differences across groups of Black women are not statistically significant[3].

Endogamy has no bearing on the economic outcomes of the racial-ethnic group with the highest educational attainment. Asian men and women show no significant differences in economic outcomes regardless of partner's national origin or race, and the estimated income differentials across union types are relatively small. Overall gender differences in household income among second-generation Asians are also negligible (p=0.915), despite gender differences in inter-racial unions. In contrast with Asians, Models 4 and 8 show that endogamy and outmarriage are related to income differentials among second generation White men and women. Non-Hispanic White men and women in endogamous unions have incomes that are lower by more than 10% as compared to men and women in unions with partners who

[3] The advantage of interracial unions for Black women persists when Black Latinos are dropped from the analysis.

share their race but not their national origins. The best economic outcomes among White children of immigrants are found among White women in unions with White men who do not share the same national origins.

Summary and Conclusions

We examined household income and living standards among married and cohabiting adults born to immigrants after the Immigration Reform Act of 1965. As expected, we found that endogamous unions are economically disadvantaged, and the disadvantages are most severe for members of the second generation who form unions with foreign-born co-nationals. These differences hold for men and for women, and they are only partly accounted for by variation in educational attainment. However, we found no economic advantages for men and women in unions with the native born as compared to those in exogamous unions with other first and second generation immigrants. Among second-generation men only, we found that inter-racial unions in the second generation are associated with higher income and living standards, and again this difference is only partly explained by variation in educational attainment.

Our analyses by racial-ethnic group found significant economic disadvantages for endogamy only among Hispanic men and non-Hispanic White men and women; Hispanic women in endogamous unions were worse off than women in pan-ethnic unions but the differences were not significant. Interestingly, we found that assortative mating is associated with differences in the household incomes and living standards of every racial ethnic group with the exception of Asian-Americans. Asian-Americans are the most educated, have variable rates of endogamy by national-origin group, and as a whole are about equally likely to partner endogamously as they are to partner with the native-born.

We also found that the economic advantages of inter-racial unions disappear for men once interracial unions with the native-born are taken into account. Instead, we found that the Hispanic and Black women, the groups most disadvantaged in the labor market, experience the greatest economic gains from racial intermarriage. Further analysis showed that a large majority of Hispanic women in interracial unions have White partners, and about half the Black women in interracial unions have White partners.

Our results are in line with some, but not all of our expectations. We find strong evidence that marriages and cohabiting unions with members of the same national-origin group are associated with economic disadvantage. Since we find no significant disadvantages for marriages and cohabiting unions with non-co-national first and second generation immigrants, this evidence leads us to two conclusions. First, we believe this evidence indicates that the children of the most recent waves of immigrants form unions partly on the basis of shared education and placement in the US racial order, and partly on the basis of shared sociocultural origins. Second, we conclude that sociocultural preferences for marital similarity based on origins will slow the pace at which some groups achieve full parity with non-immigrants.

We find little support for theoretical perspectives on economic assimilation that suggest that it is only in the third generation that immigrant groups can fully capture the knowledge and resource base necessary to achieve success in the labor market. Male children of immigrants in unions with the native born are as well off as men in unions with other first and second generation exogamous unions. Among women, it appears that second generation immigrants in pan-ethnic unions may experience disadvantages ranging from 5-7% as compared to women in unions with the native-born, but this finding is not statistically significant either before or after controlling for education. Moreover, although the labor market resources

of native-born men may be more useful to immigrant women than the labor market resources of native-born women are to immigrant men, we found that with the exception of Asian-Americans, second generation women in our sample had higher incomes than second-generation men. However, a limitation of this analysis is that we examine household income rather than the separate labor market contributions of husbands, wives, cohabiting partners, and other household members. Labor income is the largest component of household income, but further research on earnings and income is necessary to provide a more thorough assessment of the three-generation assimilation hypothesis.

Our results provide substantial support for the educational homogamy hypothesis and limited support for status-exchange theory. We found that differences in the economic outcomes by partner's national origins, race and generational status were largely accounted for by the educational attainment of both partners. These differences did not disappear altogether with controls for educational attainment, but the most persistent differences remain for endogamous unions, a finding that is consistent with the tension between educational homogamy and sociocultural preferences for a partner who shares the same national origins. This conclusion does not rule out the possibility that status exchange process are at work simultaneously with educational preferences. Some of our results suggest this is the case in certain limited situations: immigrant men in interracial unions with first and second generation women seem to experience advantages, as do Black and Hispanic women in interracial unions with native-born men. These findings contribute to the ongoing debate in the assortative mating literature on the explanations for inter-racial marriage, but further research is necessary to unpack the relative contributions of educational homogamy among the least and best educated to the economic well-being of children of immigrants in panethnic and interracial unions.

Our goal in this study was not to assess the extent to which second generation immigrants had achieved economic parity with the native-born, but to examine the association between assortative mating and economic outcomes in the second generation. Based on the findings that unions with the native-born provide no significant material advantage to children of immigrants, we might speculate that economic incorporation can be attained within the second generation. However, it is possible that our immigrant-native intermarriages involve native-born men and women who are not representative of all native-born men and women. Further research that compares the economic outcomes for partnered children of immigrants with the economic outcomes for couples who are both native-born is necessary to make a conclusive assessment.

The results also provide an opportunity for speculation about the prospects for future economic incorporation of immigrants groups. We were especially interested in the economic consequences of endogamy by shared national origins, and our findings suggest reasons for optimism, and some reasons for worry about the future incorporation of new nonwhite minorities. This study provides reason to be optimistic about the future economic prospects of Asian-Americans. Asians have higher income and educational attainment Hispanics, Blacks, and non-Hispanic Whites, and there is no significant relationship between endogamy and economic outcomes among Asians. The study provides reason for pessimism about the pace of economic incorporation among most Hispanic immigrant groups. Hispanics in the second generation have low average educational attainment and a high propensity to partner with first and second generation Hispanic immigrants, both of these factors will inhibit economic incorporation. Finally, there is reason for worry about the pace of Black immigrant integration. Despite the relatively high levels of educational attainment among second-generation Black immigrants, Black

children of immigrants in this sample have lower incomes than Hispanics, and Blacks who intermarry with the native-born are likely to intermarry with African American Blacks, who occupy a disadvantaged position in the labor market. Moreover, Black Hispanics in this sample have educational profiles that are more similar to non-black Hispanics, but their marital patterns and economic outcomes are more similar to non-Hispanic blacks, an indicator that they occupy a similarly disadvantaged position in the US racial order.

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Table 1. Endogamy & Native Intermarriage among Children of Immigrants, Selected National-Origin Groups

National Origins	%Same National Origin	Native Born	*N*
Mexico	65.5%	30.0%	5,254
Puerto Rico*	51.0%	36.0%	1,546
Germany	5.6%	85.2%	1,035
Canada	7.9%	83.9%	969
Philippines	38.6%	51.3%	880
Italy	12.0%	73.8%	692
Cuba	46.2%	40.2%	537
England	5.1%	86.6%	447
South Korea	31.1%	56.6%	341
China	43.4%	36.1%	296
India	59.2%	33.2%	289
Vietnam	47.7%	36.8%	277
Japan	12.9%	76.2%	264
Dominican Republic	48.2%	28.3%	247
El Salvador	21.1%	53.8%	247
Portugal	32.3%	54.9%	235

*Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory of the United States

Table 2. Assortative Mating among Men and Women of the Second Generation by Racial Ethnic Group

Second Generation Men (by racial/ethnic group)	Partner has different national origins			Partner shares the same national origins			
	Native-born	Different Race	Same Race	Child of Immigrants	Foreign Born	Co-national Total	Sample size
	%	%	%	%	%	%	*N*
White, non-Hispanic	75.2	4.7	7.1	9.8	3.2	13.0	3,085
Hispanic, including Black	34.0	3.1	7.7	38.0	17.4	55.4	3,725
Black Hispanic only	48.3	*	*	*	*	35.4	111
Black, including Hispanic	57.1	5.2	8.9	15.3	13.6	28.8	340
Asian or Pacific Islander	32.3	3.2	12.3	31.4	20.9	60.0	1,115

Second Generation Women (by racial/ethnic group)	Partner has different national origins			Partner shares the same national origins			
	Native-born	Different Race	Same Race	Child of Immigrants	Foreign Born	Co-national Total	Sample size
	%	%	%	%	%	%	*N*
White, non-Hispanic	73.8	3.8	6.9	10.0	5.6	15.6	3,615
Hispanic, including Black	30.4	2.3	7.0	34.7	25.7	60.4	4,480
Black Hispanic only	51.2	*	*	*	*	33.8	171
Black, including Hispanic	48.5	6.3	9.1	14.2	21.9	36.1	422
Asian or Pacific Islander	42.0	5.6	8.6	26.4	17.4	43.8	1,498

Table 3. Coefficient Estimates from the regression of (Ln) Household Income on Partner's Nativity and Race, Male Children of Immigrants 1995-2011 (N=8,133)

	Model (1) Baseline	Model (2) Nativity	Model (3) Own Education	Model (4) Partner's Education
Partner Coethnicity (v s. All Native-Born)				
Different Racial-Ethnic Group	0.138**	0.138**	0.096*	0.094*
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Shared Racial-Ethnic Group	0.012	0.012	-0.002	-0.006
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Shared National Origins, Child of Immigrants	-0.112***	-0.112***	-0.034	-0.020
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Shared National Origins, Immigrant	-0.352***	-0.350***	-0.248***	-0.188***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Cohabiting union	-0.228***	-0.228***	-0.156***	-0.149***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Own Nativity (vs. one parent is US-born)				
Both Parents Foreign Born		0.004	0.004	0.013
		(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Immigrated by Age 6		-0.008	-0.016	-0.008
		(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Own Education				
Less than High School			-0.302***	-0.184***
			(0.035)	(0.034)
Some College			0.142***	0.062*
			(0.026)	(0.025)
College degree			0.458***	0.272***
			(0.029)	(0.031)
Advanced degree			0.746***	0.486***
			(0.036)	(0.038)
Partner's Education				
Less than High School				-0.275***
				(0.036)
Some College				0.114***
				(0.026)
College degree				0.278***
				(0.030)
Advanced degree				0.419***
				(0.037)
Constant	9.270***	9.270***	9.376***	9.460***
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.123)	(0.139)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include controls (not shown) for age of both partners, state and year.
+p<0.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 4. Coefficient Estimates from the regression of (Ln) Household Income on Partner's Nativity and Race, Female Children of Immigrants 1995-2011 (N=9,824)

	Model (1) Baseline	Model (2) Nativity	Model (3) Own Education	Model (4) Partner's Education
Partner Coethnicity (vs. All Native-Born)				
Different Racial-Ethnic Group	0.054	0.043	0.027	0.012
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Shared Racial-Ethnic Group	-0.057	-0.074*	-0.057+	-0.051
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Shared National Origins, Child of Immigrants	-0.192***	-0.218***	-0.112***	-0.084***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Shared National Origins, Immigrant	-0.396***	-0.434***	-0.254***	-0.194***
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Cohabiting union	-0.193***	-0.190***	-0.137***	-0.114***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Nativity (vs. one parents US-born)				
Both Parents Foreign Born		0.070**	0.040*	0.038*
		(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Immigrated by Age 6		0.112***	0.081**	0.061*
		(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Own Education				
Less than High School			-0.372***	-0.291***
			(0.036)	(0.035)
Some College			0.170***	0.109***
			(0.024)	(0.024)
College degree			0.478***	0.277***
			(0.025)	(0.028)
Advanced degree			0.715***	0.414***
			(0.031)	(0.033)
Partner's Education				
Less than High School				-0.136***
				(0.031)
Some College				0.115***
				(0.023)
College degree				0.308***
				(0.027)
Advanced degree				0.516***
				(0.031)
Constant	9.410***	9.377***	9.585***	9.634***
	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.131)	(0.131)
	(0.153)	(0.157)	(0.152)	(0.154)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include controls (not shown) for age of both partners, state and year.
+p<0.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 5. Results from the Regression of Second-Generation Men's Adjusted Household Income on Partner Nativity & Race

	Equivalent Income (Married & Cohabiting)		Income-to-Needs (Married Only)	
	Baseline	Full Model	Baseline	Full Model
Partner Coethnicity (vs. All Native-Born)	*N*=8133	8133	*N*=6874	6874
Different Racial-Ethnic Group	0.135**	0.090*	0.120*	0.050
	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.055)	(0.048)
Shared Racial-Ethnic Group	-0.010	-0.025	-0.019	-0.032
	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.037)
Shared National Origins, Child of Immigrants	-0.170***	-0.061*	-0.191***	-0.072*
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Shared National Origins, Immigrant	-0.434***	-0.242***	-0.443***	-0.238***
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Cohabiting union	-0.230***	-0.145***		
	(0.030)	(0.027)		
Nativity (vs. one parents US-born)				
Both Parents Foreign Born		-0.005		-0.034
		(0.021)		(0.024)
Immigrated by Age 6		-0.045+		-0.068*
		(0.026)		(0.030)
Own Education				
Less than High School		-0.209***		-0.231***
		(0.033)		(0.040)
Some College		0.085***		0.082**
		(0.024)		(0.029)
College degree		0.291***		0.342***
		(0.031)		(0.033)
Advanced degree		0.530***		0.583***
		(0.038)		(0.042)
Partner's Education				
Less than High School		-0.284***		-0.249***
		(0.036)		(0.043)
Some College		0.126***		0.164***
		(0.025)		(0.029)
College degree		0.309***		0.397***
		(0.029)		(0.034)
Advanced degree		0.455***	-0.106	0.529***
		(0.036)	(0.188)	(0.040)
Constant	8.972***	9.175***	6874	0.070
	(0.192)	(0.169)		(0.187)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include controls (not shown) for age of both partners, state and year.
+p<0.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 6. Results from the Regression of Second-Generation Women's Adjusted Income on Partner Nativity & Race

	Equivalent Income (Married & Cohabiting)		Income-to-Needs (Married Only)	
	Baseline	Full Model	Baseline	Full Model
Partner Coethnicity (vs. All Native-Born)	9824	9824	8399	8399
Different Racial-Ethnic Group	0.060	0.018	0.063	0.001
	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.056)	(0.045)
Shared Racial-Ethnic Group	-0.071*	-0.061+	-0.061	-0.045
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.035)
Shared National Origins, Child of Immigrants	-0.249***	-0.121***	-0.263***	-0.117***
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.027)
Shared National Origins, Immigrant	-0.482***	-0.246***	-0.513***	-0.242***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Cohabiting union	-0.198***	-0.112***		
	(0.027)	(0.024)		
Nativity (vs. one parents US-born)				
Both Parents Foreign Born		0.023		-0.003
		(0.019)		(0.022)
Immigrated by Age 6		0.037		0.013
		(0.024)		(0.027)
Own Education				
Less than High School		-0.322***		-0.354***
		(0.034)		(0.040)
Some College		0.132***		0.140***
		(0.024)		(0.028)
College degree		0.327***		0.392***
		(0.027)		(0.032)
Advanced degree		0.461***		0.547***
		(0.033)		(0.038)
Partner's Education				
Less than High School		-0.152***		-0.165***
		(0.030)		(0.035)
Some College		0.125***		0.123***
		(0.022)		(0.026)
College degree		0.331***		0.353***
		(0.027)		(0.032)
Advanced degree		0.547***		0.566***
		(0.031)		(0.035)
Constant	9.060***	9.306***	-0.247	0.068
	(0.153)	(0.138)	(0.183)	(0.167)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include controls (not shown) for age of both partners, state and year.
+p<0.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 7. Assortative Mating and Household Income by Racial-Ethnic Group, Children of Immigrants

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)	Model (8)
	Household Income				Household Equivalent Income			
	Hispanic	Black	Asian	White	Hispanic	Black	Asian	White
Union Type (vs. Men, Same-Race Union)	*N*=8191	758	2606	6690	8191	758	2606	6690
Men, Inter-Racial Union	-0.004	-0.083	-0.049	0.039	0.023	-0.072	-0.001	0.028
	(0.035)	(0.099)	(0.088)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.098)	(0.083)	(0.046)
Men, Shared National Origins	-0.081*	0.010	0.024	-0.183*	-0.099**	-0.057	-0.021	-0.224**
	(0.032)	(0.104)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.031)	(0.101)	(0.080)	(0.084)
Women, Same Race Native or Immigrant	0.021	0.089	-0.011	0.050*	0.030	0.097	-0.018	0.046*
	(0.030)	(0.073)	(0.061)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.072)	(0.058)	(0.021)
Women, Inter-Racial Union	0.134***	0.202*	0.028	0.004	0.149***	0.147+	0.102	0.007
	(0.033)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.047)	(0.032)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.047)
Women, Shared National Origins	-0.024	0.081	-0.033	-0.105+	-0.049	0.012	-0.067	-0.135*
	(0.031)	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.064)	(0.030)	(0.094)	(0.085)	(0.064)
Ethnicity & Marital Status								
Black Latino	-0.092+	0.007			-0.088+	0.014		
	(0.049)	(0.075)			(0.045)	(0.070)		
Cohabitant	-0.095**	0.014	-0.163*	-0.13***	-0.083**	0.022	-0.12+	-0.15***
	(0.029)	(0.083)	(0.066)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.081)	(0.064)	(0.034)
Constant	16.45**	13.935	26.48**	21.88***	19.20***	13.077	21.10*	23.18***
	(5.42)	(16.90)	(10.22)	(6.65)	(5.21)	(16.49)	(9.70)	(6.60)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models include controls for survey year and age and education of both partners
+p<0.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001