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Declining Dominance of an Ethnic Group in a Large Multi-ethnic Developing Country: The Case of the Javanese in Indonesia

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Abstract

Indonesia is undergoing a third demographic transition that features changes in ethnic composition. We examine quantitatively the extent and change of dominance of the Javanese, who have experienced below replacement fertility. As used herein, an ethnic group is said to be dominant if it is the largest ethnic group and its percentage is at least twice the percentage of the second largest ethnic group. The Javanese are the largest, most ubiquitous and politically important ethnic group in Indonesia. This quantitative analysis addresses the ethnic dominance and cultural hegemony literature. We question the ubiquity of the Javanese – who represent the process of Javanization – because Indonesia's Javanese character/culture may be eroding. We find that among the Javanese living outside their three home provinces, the percentage of those who speak Javanese daily at home is very low. These Javanese may have adapted to local conditions. We also find that the Javanese are not always the dominant or even the largest ethnic group. In most of the districts, they comprise a very small minority ethnic group. An important finding is that the "third demographic transition" has been and continues to be occurring in Indonesia, a large developing country. Our findings expand the original concept of what constitutes a third demographic transition, which has been applied previously only to developed countries. We conclude that the Javanese are still dominant, but their dominance has declined, and that a third demographic transition is taking place in Indonesia.

Keywords

Javanese, Indonesia, ethnic diversity, third demographic transition, ubiquitous group, local vs migrant ethnic groups

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Third demographic transition in Indonesia

The concept of a demographic transition can be thought of as a process that entails a shift from a high fertility and mortality regime to a low fertility and mortality regime, usually at replacement level of fertility. This type of demographic transition is now often called the first demographic transition. The second demographic transition was coined by Van de Kaa (1987 and 2002) (see also Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2002 and Lesthaeghe, 2010) to describe demographic behaviour in a region that has already finished the first demographic transition and has a sustained below replacement level of fertility. In the second demographic transition, norms have usually shifted from society- to individual-based norms, including self-actualization. It becomes difficult to modify individual behaviour, especially compared to the relative ease of prediction during the first demographic transition, when the state usually had the power to change and monitor individual behaviour, including individual reproductive behaviour. In the second demographic transition, marriage becomes fragile. If there is no enrichment, marriages are likely to break up. It is also more possible to have a separation between reproduction and marital life, and to observe change in living arrangement.

When a region's fertility is below replacement level and a shortage of a young labour force appears, inmigration is more likely to occur, changing the ethnic and cultural composition of a population. Then, the usually higher birth rates among the migrants, including second and third generation migrants, may accelerate the change in ethnic composition. The change in ethnic, race and cultural composition is what Coleman (2006) called the "third demographic transition." It is happening in European countries and other developed countries. Coleman (2012) showed that, if current trends continue, the present combined minority populations in the United States will become the majority in 2043. The US will be the first industrialized country to have a "majority minority" population.

However, Coleman (2006) argued that this third demographic transition may occur in developed countries only, not in developing countries. We argue otherwise, that a third demographic transition may also be underway in large multi-ethnic developing countries, even before these countries enter the second demographic transition.

Indonesia is a useful case study of a third demographic transition in a developing country. Its population is 237.6 million with more than 630 distinct ethnic groups (Ananta et al, 2015) based on the 2010 population census. By 2010, Indonesia as a whole had almost finished its first demographic transition, with its total fertility rate (TFR) at 2.4, close to the replacement level of fertility. Furthermore, the TFR is at or below replacement level in four provinces in the Island of Java: Jakarta (1.8), Yogyakarta (1.9), East Java (2.0), and Central Java (2.1). The last three provinces are the homogeneously Javanese home provinces. Therefore, Indonesia (or some parts of Indonesia) has already entered the second demographic transition. Jones (2002) and Jones and Gabhaju (2008) showed that there have been changes in family values, including among adolescents, in Indonesia.

There are two differences between the third demographic transition in developed countries and in Indonesia. First, internal migration, rather than international migration, may have shaped the change in ethnic composition in Indonesia. The flow of internal migration, as shown by Tirtosudarmo (2009) and Arifin and Ananta (2013), had been observed even before Indonesia had completed its first demographic transition. This may result in changing ethnic composition at the provincial level, and especially at the district level.⁴ Moreover, as discussed in Ananta and Arifin (2014), international in-migration, predicted to rise soon, will also be an important contribution to change in ethnic composition. Therefore, population mobility in general, and migration in particular, may also result in a complex interaction

among various ethnic groups within Indonesia. This interaction may erode the "original" culture of the ethnic groups. For example, the Javanese who are living outside their home provinces and/ or married with non-Javanese may have already eroded their Javaneseness (a proxy measure for this is the number of Javanese who no longer speak Javanese at home on a daily basis, which is relatively high in some provinces).

It should be noted that the Government of Indonesia started to send people overseas in the 1980s. Most of them were low-skilled Javanese workers. This out-flow may have significantly affected ethnic composition in Indonesia. Even though there is out-migration among other ethnic groups, the heavy flow of out-migration of Javanese may have resulted in a declining percentage of Javanese to the total population of Indonesia.

The second difference is that Indonesia is a country with a large area and a large number of ethnic groups. Therefore, the first demographic transition did not occur at the same speed among different regions and ethnic groups. As mentioned earlier, some provinces on the island of Java, particularly the home provinces of the Javanese, were the first provinces that experienced the completion of the first demographic transition. This difference in fertility and mortality may have contributed to the current third demographic transition, which is changing Indonesia's ethnic composition.⁵

The first aim of this paper is to show that a third demographic transition can occur in a large developing country. We do so by explaining the context of the third demographic transition in Indonesia. Furthermore, as the Javanese comprise the dominant ethnic group in Indonesia (Elmhirst 1999; Sutarto 2006; and Cote 2014), we focus on the Javanese to show the process of the third demographic transition. Another important aim of this paper is to provide a quantitative dimension of the discussion on dominant ethnic groups in general, and on Javanese in particular. We utilize the rich 100 per cent sample of the 2010 population census, the first time in Indonesia that a population census included questions on ethnicity and language spoken daily at home simultaneously. This quantitative dimension is expected to enrich the ability of scholars to understand the complex/ broad issue of ethnic dominance, such a cultural hegemony. As used herein, we define an ethnic group to be "dominant" if it is the largest ethnic group and its percentage is at least twice the percentage of the second largest ethnic group.

We therefore have two objectives in this paper. First, we produce statistics on ethnic dominance, with the Javanese in Indonesia as a case study. The discussions on the dominance of the Javanese – and the Javanisation and de-Javanisation – are seldom carried out with high quality statistical data, and usually with no statistical information at all. Lack of statistics in discussing the dominance of the Javanese is partly because of the absence of data on the ethnicity of the Javanese and all other ethnic groups in Indonesia. The government used to prohibit collecting and publishing data on ethnicity, fearing that such information would create social and political instability. On the other hand, the reform era since 1998 has allowed the Statistics-Indonesia (BPS) to collect and publish data on ethnicity in both the 2000 and 2010 population censuses. However, the dataset has not been adequately analysed, including the data on the Javanese. The available statistical data may miss the broad concept of cultural hegemony, but can provide new insights on the understanding of ethnic group dominance.

Second, we study how the Javanese have been spreading and living outside their home provinces. This interaction with the locals, as discussed in an Indian case by Forsberg (2011), may result in so-called "sons-of-the-soil" conflicts. In this paper, however, we focus on the "mix of culture" as a possible cause of the erosion of Javaneseness. We see the Javanese diaspora as a possible indicator of the extent of the Javaneseness of the Javanese. For example, the Javanese who live in their home provinces of Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java are different from the Javanese who settled in the province of North

Sumatera. We also examine the extent of Javaneseness by examining the language that is spoken daily at home by the Javanese at the national and provincial levels.

In this paper, we begin with a discussion on the Javanese as the dominant ethnic group in Indonesia. We continue with an elaboration of the concept of ethnicity and a description of the data. We then discuss the declining dominance of the Javanese population from 2000 to 2010, based on the only two population censuses that collected data on ethnicity.

We then discuss the dominance of the Javanese in their three home provinces and follow up with an analysis of the spread of the Javanese outside of their home provinces. Thus, besides studying the Javanese as the dominant group, we also examine the Javanese as the largest but not dominant group, and as the second largest ethnic group in these provinces. Finally, we discuss instances of the Javanese as small and very small ethnic groups – where they do not make a significant contribution to the total population in the district.

The relevance of the Javanese

Indonesia is a very large archipelagic country, with 17,189 islands and 1,910,91 sq. km of land that stretches geographically along a west-east axis. There are some relatively large islands: Land of Papua,⁷ Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Sumatera and Java. Based on 2010 population census, Ananta et al. (2015) recorded more than 1,400 languages spoken daily at home and more than 630 ethnic groups in Indonesia. As calculated in Arifin et al. (2015), Indonesia has a high Ethnic Fractionalisation Index (EFI), at 0.81, revealing the existence of a huge number of different ethnic groups. Yet, its Ethnic Polarisation Index (EPOI) is at an intermediate level, at 0.50, implying that at the national level, there is a relatively low probability of the occurrence of severe ethnic conflict.

In 2010, Indonesia had a population of 237.6 million, making it the fourth most populated country in the world. Economic development and a large proportion of the population have been distributed more toward the Island of Java, in the west, which is only 6.77 per cent of Indonesia's total land area. But more than half (57.48 per cent) of Indonesia's total population lives on the Island of Java. Java's GDP is 58.07 per cent of Indonesia's total GDP.⁸

The Island of Java is the home of five large ethnic groups, which are among the ten largest ethnic groups in Indonesia: the Javanese (with Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java as the home provinces), the Sundanese (with West Java as the home province), the Madurese (with the Island of Madura in the Province of East Java as the home province), the Betawi (with Jakarta as the home province), and the Bantenese (with Banten as the home province). There are also three small, local ethnic groups: the Badui in Banten, and the Osing and the Bawean in East Java.

Culturally and politically, the Javanese have been very important in Indonesia, especially during the New Order Era (1967-1998), when President Suharto was in power. Even until today, all Indonesian presidents have been Javanese, except Habibie, the third president, who is a mix of Javanese and Buginese. Yet the political dominance of the Javanese in Indonesia is not similar to that of the Malay in Malaysia. As elaborated in Tirtosudarmo (2005), the Malayness forms the State of Malaysia and its ideology. On the contrary, Javaneseness is not used as the base of Indonesian nationalism. Rather, Indonesia is leaning more toward trans-ethnic nationalism.

Nevertheless, as stated in Sutarto (2006) and Cote (2014), President Suharto had special care and attention to the development of Javanese culture. He led Indonesia in a Javanese style, following that of the old Javanese kingdom, applying Javanese norms and ethics, which can be undemocratic and

feudalistic. The majority of government officials, including those outside the home provinces of the Javanese, have been Javanese. Being a Javanese was a respected trait. During the Suharto era, some non-Javanese adopted Javanese names or gave their children Javanese names. Not surprisingly, people had to learn and adapt to the Javanese tradition, language and ethnic characteristics to be "liked" by the Suharto government. In short, there had been a process of Javanization of the Indonesian people.

As shown by Tirtosudarmo (2003, 2009) this process of Javanization was strengthened with the transmigration program, moving people from densely populated Islands of Java and Bali to the sparsely populated islands outside Java. This program was actually created in 1905 under the colonial Dutch administration with the name "colonisation" (*kolonisatie*) – a government sponsored movement of people. As also elaborated by Swasono (1985) and de Vries (1985), it started by sending Javanese from Central Java to Lampung in Sumatera. The program was created partly because of the fear of the colonial government of having too many people on the island of Java. Another reason was the need for labour outside of Java. Therefore, the program was created to send people from the island of Java to the more sparsely populated islands outside of Java. Spontaneous movement (not sponsored by the government) of people from Java also occurred accompanying and following the program. Since 1936, the colonization program spread to other regions in the Sumatera and other islands (e.g. Kalimantan and Sulawesi).

Tirtosudarmo (2009) further showed that this program continued since Indonesian independence, but was then renamed "transmigrasi". However, during the New Order Era, the goal of the program radically changed, no longer as a means to reduce the population of the island of Java. As explicitly stated in 1978, the transmigration program was a means to help regional development outside the island of Java, and not limited to the island of Sumatera. Yet, during the fourth development plan (1984-1989), the transmigration program shifted from a demographic and regional economic development orientation to a geopolitical and geostrategic one, to "fill in" sparsely population regions outside Java. Soetrisno (1985) showed that the government attempted to transform empty border areas into security belts. The government wanted to protect Indonesia from outsiders by constructing strong and resilient communities in the border areas.

Later on, the program not only moved Javanese, but also other ethnic groups from the island of Java (such as Sundanese and Madurese) and from the island of Bali, occupied primarily by the Balinese. The destination areas were extended to other islands, such as Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Indeed, as described in Soetrisno (1985), the islands of Sumatera and Kalimantan were already populated in the 1980s. Therefore, the government shifted its attention to the Land of Papua as a new destination area. As reported by Kompas.com (2010), Lampung already stopped receiving people through the program as early as 1980. Since 2007 Lampung has become one of the sending areas, because its population had grown. It sent people (mostly Javanese) to the island of Kalimantan, especially the provinces of East and Central Kalimantan.

Tirtosudarmo (2009) also showed that the transmigration program did not have a significant demographic impact on the origin areas, especially in the Javanese home provinces. However, it did have an important demographic impact on the destination areas.

The change in ethnic composition may have fuelled unhappiness among local peoples, resulting in "sons of the soil" conflicts (Cote 2014). For example, some ethnic groups, such as the Acehnese, Dayaks and Papuans felt that the Javanese were conquerors or pillagers (Sutarto 2006). Nevertheless, even though the Javanese have displaced local practices in the transmigration destination areas, outside of the island of Java the culture of the Javanese themselves changed. Emerging identities were seen in these

communities, where the Javaneseness has been changing (Elmhirst 2000). Furthermore, Barter and Cote (2015) showed that transmigration program has not necessarily resulted in conflict. Often, transmigrants have been resettled peacefully. In other words, Javaneseness may have been eroding in destination areas.

This Javanization stopped with the fall of Suharto in 1998, the beginning of the reform era. The trend was then reversed to de-Javanisation. During the reform era, politicians and bureaucrats from outside Java no longer needed to pay attention to Javanese traditions and styles. Accompanying the reform era, the decentralisation process, which provides districts with much larger power in managing local development, has further accelerated the process of de-Javanization. Moreover, there has been a rising political trend of *putra daerah* (local people/ sons of the soil), by giving priority to the *putra daerah*, and marginalizing migrants and, therefore, the Javanese.⁹

Aspinall (2011) interpreted this de-Javanization as part of the softening of ethnic politics during the reform era. The political salience of ethnicity has declined significantly and shifted into a weakly ethnicized polity. Ethnic politics, including Javanese politics, is still important in local elections, but ethnicity was no longer a big issue after the election. There were some ethnic disputes during local elections, but these were small and localized and have been peacefully settled.

During local elections, the influence of migrants, particularly Javanese, are still felt. The candidates are usually locals. But, to appease the migrants, the deputies or vice heads are usually migrants, mostly Javanese. To clarify, a migrant group does not necessarily mean those who just moved to the province or district or those who were not born there. They may include those who have never travelled out of the district or province and they were born in. Their forebears may have been there for many generations, but their ethnic home provinces are elsewhere.

At the same time, interestingly, there has also been a new paradigm of the transmigration program during the reform era. The program has been conducted on a district-by-district basis, between the sending districts of Java, Madura, and Nusa Tenggara and receiving districts of Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua. Unlike the prior program, before the reform area, the new program is closely related to oil-palm companies, who need labour. The local governments need capital to develop their areas and therefore they collaborate with the oil palm companies to bring people from traditional sending districts in Java, Madura and Nusa Tenggara. Even the Government of Indonesia, through its Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, announced that the oil palm plantation is the icon of the program's new paradigm. The communities brought and constructed by the oil palm companies are expected to become embryos for the establishment of "integrated self-sufficient cities" or *kota terpadu mandiri* (Potter, 2012). As many of the transmigrants are also Javanese, the new paradigm may have continued the existence and dominance of the Javanese outside the island of Java, countering the process of de-Javanization.

Concepts and data

We use the data from the 2010 Indonesian population census, enriched with the 2000 population census. ¹⁰ In both censuses, the question of ethnicity applies a self-identification concept, where a respondent is free to identify himself/ herself with whatever ethnic group he/ she prefers. The interviewers were equipped with a list of ethnic groups prepared by Statistics-Indonesia, but it is possible that some answers were not in the list. The interviewers were therefore required to record whatever was said by the respondents. For example, an interviewer may think that a respondent does

not "look" Javanese, but if the respondent says that he/ she is Javanese, the interviewer must write down "Javanese".

Thus, the concept of ethnic group is very fluid, based on self-identification. A respondent can change his/ her ethnic identity easily anytime. This concept has an advantage from a statistical point view: the data can be consistent and reproducible because they come from the respondents themselves rather than the perceptions of the interviewers. In theory, whoever interviews one and the same respondent should obtain the same answer, provided that the interviewers follow the agreed-upon procedures.

In the 2010 census, more than 1,400 ethnic categories were recorded. Nevertheless, they are not necessarily distinct ethnic groups. Among the categories, there are ethnic groups with more than one name, more than one spelling. Some also have sub-ethnic groups and sub-sub ethnic groups. Ananta et al (2015) made a special effort to reclassify the ethnic categories into a meaningful list of more than 630 ethnic groups, the so called "New Classification". Without such reclassification, one ethnic group with more than one name, or more than one spelling of its name, or containing nested, sub-ethnic groups could be counted as more than one ethnic group.

In this paper, we follow the New Classification, with four sub-ethnic groups for the Javanese. First is the "Javanese", those who called themselves Javanese in the census and recorded as Javanese. 1) (almost all Javanese are "Javanese"). Three other ethnic groups do not call themselves Javanese, but they are actually sub-ethnic groups of the Javanese. They are the Samin (originally from the North of Central Java), and the Tengger (originating from around Mount Bromo in East Java). The third is "Nagaring" or "Nagarigung," which are not in the list of ethnic categories provided to the interviewers in the 2010 census. Ananta et al. (2015) guessed that Nagaring and Nagarigung are actually referring to the same name. It may refer to people associated with the Javanese palace. On the other hand, Ananta et al. (2015) do not put Bawean and Osing as sub-ethnic groups of the Javanese. These two ethnic groups are distinct from the Javanese. They are local ethnic groups in the province of East Java, in addition to Madurese and Javanese.

However, the 2000 data for the Javanese do not follow the New Classification. The Javanese ethnic group only includes the "Javanese", and excludes the Samin, Tengger, Nagaring and Nagarigung. As the number of these sub-ethnic groups may be very small, this difference in classification of the Javanese may not make a significant difference when we compare the data of Javanese between 2000 and 2010. Yet, caution still needs to be exercised when comparing the 2000 and 2010 statistics.

To measure the extent of the Javaneseness among the Javanese, we examine the use of the Javanese language among all Indonesians (not limited to Javanese), and how large of a per cent of Javanese spoke Javanese daily at home. However, as the data on ethnic groups and language are only collected simultaneously in 2010, the analysis of Javanese language spoken by the Javanese is only carried out for the 2010 data. Moreover, because of space constraint and complexity of the data at the district level, the analysis of language is only carried out on provincial level.

As Indonesia is a very large country, we analyse the geographic concentration (the percentage of Javanese population in a region to the total population in that region) at both the provincial and district levels. We examine local versus migrant ethnic groups, with migrant ethnic groups defined as those originating from outside the province.

We use Ananta et al. (2015) for statistics on ethnic groups at the national and provincial levels and language at the national level in 2010. The Ethnic Fractionalization Index (EFI) and Ethnic Polarization Index (EPOI) at the national and provincial levels are cited from Arifin et al. (2015). The statistics for

the year 2000 are based on Suryadinata, Arifin, Ananta (2003) and Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata (2004). In this paper we calculate the statistics on ethnicity at the district level and language at the provincial level from a tabulation based on the 100 per cent sample of the raw data set of the 2010 population census provided by the Statistics-Indonesia.

Declining dominance of the Javanese

The Javanese have always been the largest ethnic group in Indonesia. They are also the dominant ethnic group, contributing about 40 per cent to the total population of Indonesia, more than double the percentage of the second largest ethnic group, the Sundanese, who comprise about 15.0 per cent. Yet, their percentage has been declining from 47.01 per cent in 1930 to 41.71 per cent in 2000, and down to 40.06 per cent in 2010. There are two reasons for this decline. First, the Javanese have one of the lowest fertility levels among all ethnic groups. Second, the employment-seeking out-migration trend among the Javanese is high, especially among those of younger ages. If this trend continues, the percentage of the Javanese will keep declining, reducing the numerical dominance of the Javanese.

The declining dominance of the Javanese can also be seen from the trend of the use of the Javanese language among all Indonesians. Based on the population aged 5 years old and over, the percentage of Indonesians who spoke Javanese daily at home declined from 32.17 per cent in 1990 to 31.88 per cent in 2010.¹⁴ Moreover, as calculated in Ananta et al (2015), among Javanese aged 5 and older, only 77.35 per cent spoke Javanese daily at home in 2010.¹⁵ On the other hand, some non-Javanese also spoke Javanese. For example, 4.22 per cent of the Madurese spoke Javanese; 2.48 per cent of the Chinese spoke Javanese, and 1.17 per cent of the Bantenese spoke Javanese. Ananta et al. (2015) noted that the Madurese and Bantenese are relatively similar to the Javanese. The Chinese who spoke Javanese may have been Chinese who were born and grew up in the three Javanese home provinces. However, the population of Madurese, Bantenese and Chinese are much smaller than the Javanese and, therefore, the impact on the percentage of Javanese speakers may be not significant.¹⁶

On the other hand, Bahasa Indonesia (the national language) has been increasingly used, from 12.83 per cent in 1990 to 19.95 per cent in 2010¹⁷. There has also been a trend toward the use of the national language and away from Javanese. One possible reason is that people have become more mobile and tend to interact more with other ethnic groups, and therefore they need to speak the national language, which is understood by almost everybody in Indonesia. Another reason, as elaborated by Zents (2015), is that the government has continued to promote the use of the national language, though it also encourages the people to love their local languages. Therefore, if there is no change in the trend, the Javaneseness of the Javanese may continue to decline.

On the other hand, not only are the Javanese still dominant numerically at the national level, they are also spreading all over Indonesia, and the world. As elaborated in Ananta et al. (2015), the Javanese are the most ubiquitous ethnic group in Indonesia. They can be found in almost all Indonesian provinces. Among the 33 provinces of Indonesia (as of 2010), the Javanese are consistently among the ten largest ethnic groups, except in the province of East Nusa Tenggara. Their huge number is one reason why we can find Javanese in almost all of Indonesia's provinces.

Interestingly, it was once said that the Javanese believed in "mangan ora mangan, pokoke ngumpul" (eating or not, the most important thing is being together), indicating the preference of the Javanese to remain in their home areas. Today, however, we can see Javanese everywhere in Indonesia and commonly outside of Indonesia. Indonesia is sometimes said to have "Javanized" all parts of Indonesia by putting the Javanese and their culture everywhere in Indonesia. Yet, it is not clear how the Javanese

who live outside their home provinces maintain their Javaneseness. For example, do they speak Javanese at home daily?¹⁸

Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is a wide geographical variation in the concentration of Javanese among the total populations of the country's various regions. We found that in 2010 their concentration ranges from 1.16 per cent in the province of East Nusa Tenggara to 97.72 per cent in the province of Central Java. At the district level (consisting of regencies and cities), it varies from 0.0 (zero) per cent in many districts (mostly in Eastern Indonesia) to 99.72 per cent in the regency of Grobogan, in the province of Central Java. ¹⁹

Dominance in the home provinces

Table 1 (in the Appendix) indicates that there has not been much change in the pattern of the geographical concentration of the Javanese during 2000-2010 at the provincial level. The interesting thing is that the concentration of the Javanese has declined in its two home provinces (Central Java and Yogyakarta) but rose in the remaining provinces, including another Javanese home province, East Java.²⁰ The rising concentration of Javanese outside the home provinces may indicate continuation of their out-migration from the Javanese home provinces.

As expected, the dominance of the Javanese is very strong in its three home provinces (Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java). The percentages of the Javanese in these provinces are very high, and even almost 100 per cent in Central Java and Yogyakarta. Similar to the national level, the concentration of the Javanese in Central Java and Yogyakarta declined from 2000, indicating the declining dominance of the Javanese in these home provinces. Because these two provinces are homogeneously Javanese, their low fertility may not explain their declining percentage. It is more likely that the declining percentage is because of out-migration from these two provinces. As shown in table 2, Central Java and Yogyakarta have negative net life-time migration, indicating the possibility that the Javanese have migrated out from the provinces. Furthermore, the relatively high life-time and recent in-migration to Yogyakarta, very likely non-Javanese, may have also contributed to the decline in the percentage of the Javanese in the province.

Interestingly, the concentration of the Javanese in another Javanese home province, East Java, rose from 78.35 per cent in 2000 to 79.72 per cent in 2010. The first possible cause of the increase is the relatively small negative net migration (measured by recent migrants) in East Java – only 0.9 per cent, which is much lower than those in Central Java and Yogyakarta.

The second possible cause is the increase in fertility among Javanese in East Java. The Crude Birth Rate (CBR, over 1000 population) in East Java increased from 13.6 in 2000 to 14.5 in 2000. ²¹ This is different from what happened in the other two home provinces. In Yogyakarta, the CBR only rose from 14.0 to 14.4. Even so, the CBR declined from 16.4 to 16.3 in Central Java. It is not clear, however, whether the increase in fertility was found mostly among the Javanese or also among the Madurese, the second largest ethnic group in East Java.

Finally, the third possible cause is the different definition of Javanese used in the 2000 and 2010 data. In the 2010 data, we use the New Classification, where the Javanese include Tengger, a local ethnic group originating from East Java. The 2000 data do not include Tengger. We found that the Tengger comprised 0.05 per cent of total population of Javanese in Indonesia, and 0.17 per cent of the total population of Javanese in East Java. Though small, this difference may partly explain the rising percentage of the Javanese in East Java.

Table 2. Internal migrants from and to Javanese home provinces: Indonesia, 2010 (percentage)

Type of migrants	in	out	net
Life-time migrants			
Central Java	2.80	21.10	-18.30
Yogyakarta	16.30	26.10	-9.80
East Java	2.50	10.30	-7.80
Recent migrants			
Central Java	1.00	3.30	-2.40
Yogyakarta	7.00	3.20	3.70
East Java	0.60	1.50	-0.90

Note: This is the percentage of the migrants to the population aged 5 years old and over in the province.

Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (2011b).

Nevertheless, as indicated in table 3, not all Javanese spoke Javanese daily at home. Only in its three home provinces, most (more than 90 per cent) of them spoke Javanese. The largest percentage outside the home provinces is in Lampung, where 84.32 per cent of the Javanese speak Javanese. In South Sumatera, Bengkulu and Jambi (all on the island of Sumatera, as Lampung is) the percentages are over 70 per cent, but in the remaining majority provinces the percentages are lower than 70 per cent. The province of Jakarta (in the Island of Java) has the lowest percentage. The Javanese form 36.30 per cent of the population aged 5 years and over in Jakarta, but only 7.93 per cent of them speak Javanese. The low and very low percentages of the Javanese language spoken by the Javanese living outside of their home provinces may reveal that their Javaneseness has been eroded by being ubiquitous and living with other ethnic groups.

The province of Central Java is the most homogeneous and least ethnically fractionalized province in Indonesia, with the Javanese forming 97.72 per cent of total population, with an EFI at 0.04. The Javanese are the only local ethnic group in the province of Central Java, with three small sub-ethnic groups. The Javanese live with some small migrant ethnic groups: the Sundanese (1.40 per cent) and the Chinese (0.43 per cent), and other very small groups, such as the Batak (0.08 per cent), Arabs (0.04 per cent), Madurese (0.04 per cent) and Lampung (0.04 per cent). With the very huge difference in the percentage of the Javanese as the largest ethnic group compared to other groups in the province, there is no "antagonism" or significant cultural interaction among ethnic groups, because there is only one very dominant ethnic group: the Javanese. In these provinces, the Javanese can better retain their Javaneseness.

Not only is Central Java the most homogeneous province, it has 35 districts where the Javanese are the largest and most dominant ethnic group in each district, forming at least 90.0 per cent of total population in the districts. There are only three exceptions: the regencies of Cilacap, with 87.28 per cent, Semarang with 87.42 per cent, and Brebes, with 88.76 per cent. In these two regencies, the Javanese live with a relatively large ethnic group, the Sundanese.

Table 3. Javanese ethnic group and Javanese language by province: Indonesia, 2010

	Javanese		Javanese
	ethnic	Javanese	who spoke
	group	speakers	Javanese
Province	(%)	(%)	(%)
Aceh	8.92	3.05	33.12
Sumatera Utara	33.49	7.72	22.64
Sumatera Barat	4.53	2.83	60.83
Riau	29.18	15.05	50.34
Jambi	29.25	21.72	72.41
Sumatera Selatan	27.50	21.00	74.04
Bengkulu	22.70	17.13	72.96
Lampung	64.23	55.41	84.32
Bangka Belitung	8.31	3.75	43.16
Kepulauan Riau	24.53	5.50	21.79
DKI Jakarta	36.30	2.96	7.93
Jawa Barat	13.33	2.15	14.13
Jawa Tengah	97.69	95.99	97.84
DI Yogyakarta	96.37	91.81	94.73
Jawa Timur	79.70	74.52	91.04
Banten	15.66	2.73	14.07
Bali	9.46	3.79	38.50
Nusa Tenggara Barat	1.76	0.26	14.27
Nusa Tenggara Timur	1.18	0.19	15.57
Kalimantan Barat	9.72	5.09	50.25
Kalimantan Tengah	21.82	16.31	72.85
Kalimantan Selatan	14.50	9.17	60.76
Kalimantan Timur	30.41	12.78	40.92
Sulawesi Utara	3.12	0.92	28.07
Sulawesi Tengah	8.50	5.78	65.30
Sulawesi Selatan	2.85	1.23	42.09
Sulawesi Tenggara	7.24	4.72	62.02
Gorontalo	3.44	2.37	65.80
Sulawesi Barat	5.04	3.61	69.85
Maluku	5.33	3.40	61.11
Maluku Utara	4.21	2.59	58.75
Papua Barat	15.19	6.23	40.03
Papua	8.49	2.62	30.13
INDONESIA	40.46	31.88	77.36

Note: This tabulation is based on population aged 5 years old and over. *Source*: Calculated from tabulation provided by Statistics-Indonesia.

Moreover, in most of the districts, the Javanese comprise at least 99.0 per cent of the population. Regency of Grobogan, the most homogeneous district in Indonesia, is found in Central Java, contributing 99.72 per cent of total population in the regency. Grobogan was one of 26 districts in the three Javanese home provinces with an EFI equal to 0.01, the least fractionalized districts. It can be assumed that the Javanese in Grobogan live mostly with Javanese, both in the regency and province.

The Javanese language can be heard frequently in all public areas in Central Java, in addition to Bahasa Indonesia. In Central Java, people need to understand the Javanese language in order to communicate daily, though people also understand and speak Bahasa Indonesia. This is different from a district or province where there are many different ethnic groups, forcing them to speak Bahasa Indonesia more in the public. In short, the Javanese in Central Java are more likely to maintain their Javaneseness, at least in their choice of language.

The province of Yogyakarta is more fractionalized than Central Java with an EFI of 0.07. Javanese is the dominant ethnic group in the province, forming 96.53 per cent of the population. This dominance is also seen in each of the five districts of the province. Each district is at least 90 per cent Javanese. Yogyakarta is a special province because of the officially recognised existence of a Javanese sultan. By law, the Sultan in Yogyakarta is also the Governor of the province, called the Special Region (*Daerah Istimewa*) of Yogyakarta.


In Yogyakarta, as in Central Java, the Javanese are the only local ethnic group. The other ethnic groups are small migrant groups: the Sundanese (0.69 per cent), Malay (0.49 per cent), the Chinese (0.33 per cent), the Batak (0.29 per cent), and many other smaller ethnic groups. In contrast to Central Java, however, none of the ten largest ethnic groups in Yogyakarta contribute less than 0.10 per cent.

On the other hand, in East Java, the third home province of the Javanese, the Javanese comprise only 79.72 per cent of the population. Its EFI is relatively high, at 0.33 – much higher than that in Yogyakarta and Central Java. Therefore, the Javanese are not as homogeneous and dominant there as in Central Java and Yogyakarta, mostly because of the existence of the Madurese, another relatively large local ethnic group in the province of East Java (and the fifth largest ethnic group in Indonesia). The Madurese are the second largest ethnic group in the province, contributing 17.53 per cent to the population. The Madurese, originating from the island of Madura, in the north-eastern part of the province of East Java, can be found in many districts in this province.

There are 38 districts in East Java. Though the majority of the districts are at least 90 per cent Javanese, as in Central Java and Yogyakarta, there are seven districts (all of them are regencies) where Javanese is not the dominant group, and six have low percentages of Javanese. Among these seven districts, there is no dominant ethnic group in the regency of Jember. In this regency, the Javanese are the largest one, forming 61.44 per cent, but less than twice the percentage of the second largest ethnic group, the Madurese, at 37.71 per cent. In the other six districts, the Madurese are the dominant ethnic group, contributing at least 90 per cent in each district. The lowest percentages of the Javanese are seen in the four districts in the island of Madura, the home island of the Madurese; they are the regencies of Bangkalan (2.26 per cent), Pamekasan (1.16 per cent), Sumenep (0.95 per cent) and Sampang (0.72 per cent), making these districts homogeneously Madurese. The other two districts are the regencies of Bondowoso (5.59 per cent) and Situbondo (6.90 per cent), located not far from the island of Madura (see figure 1).

In other words, the Javanese are not always the dominant ethnic group in the districts of East Java, unlike in Central Java and Yogyakarta, where they are the dominant ethnic group in all districts. The Javanese are even a minority ethnic group in six districts in East Java.

Figure 1. Concentration of Javanese in East Java's districts: Indonesia, 2010



Note:

Regencies: Pacitan (3501), Ponorogo (3502), Trenggalek (3503), Tulungagung (3504), Blitar (3505), Kediri (3506), Malang (3507); Lumajang (3508), Jember (3509), Banyuwangi (3510), Bondowoso (3511), Situbondo (3512), Probolinggo (3513), Pasuruan (3514), Sidoarjo (3515), Mojokerto (3516), Jombang (3517), Nganjuk (3518); Madiun (3519), Magetan (3520), Ngawi (3521), Bojonegoro (3522), Tuban (3523), Lamongan (3524), Gresik (3525), Bangkalan (3526), Sampang (3527), Pamekasan (3528), Sumenep (3529)

Cities: Kediri (3571), Blitar (3572), Malang (3573), Probolinggo (3574), Pasuruan (3575), Mojokerto (3576), Madiun (3577), Surabaya (3578), Batu (3579)

Source: Calculated and drawn by the authors.

Dominance outside the home provinces

As shown in table 4 (in the Appendix), the Javanese are also found to be the dominant group in 26 districts outside their home provinces. Most of them (19) are located on the island of Sumatera, especially in the province of Lampung, followed by North Sumatera. This dominance may be the result of the transmigration program, though in some provinces, this dominance may be a result of natural migration.

In Lampung, the first destination area of the transmigration program, the Javanese are the dominant group in all districts, with one exception: the regency of Lampung Barat. In this regency, the Javanese are the largest ethnic group, but the percentage of Javanese there is almost the same with the second largest group, the Lampung, who are local. The Javanese constituted 35.42 per cent and the Lampung 35.31 per cent of the population.

Furthermore, in all districts with Javanese as the dominant group, the second largest ethnic groups are locals. For example, in the regency of Aceh Tamiang, Province of Aceh, the second largest group is the Acehnese. But in the regency of Asahan, in the province of North Sumatera, the Batak are the second largest ethnic group. There are some exceptions, however. In the regencies of Pesawaran and Pringsewu in the province of Lampung on the island of Sumatera, the second largest ethnic group is the Sundanese, a migrant ethnic group originating from West Java. As was the case among the Javanese, the Sundanese may have come to this district through the transmigration programme. In the regency of Mesuji, also in Lampung, the second largest ethnic group is the Malay, who originated from other provinces in the same island of Sumatera.

Table 4 also indicates that the Javanese are the dominant ethnic group in some far-away districts in Papua: the regency of Sorong, province of West Papua; the regencies of Merauke and Keerom, and the city of Jayapura in the province of Papua. The highest percentage of the Javanese outside of their home provinces is in the regency of Indramayu, in the relatively ethnically fractionalized Sundanese province of West Java, with EFI at 0.46. Furthermore, In Indramayu, the Javanese contributed 94.34 per cent, which is a very big contrast to the Sundanese, the local group, who form only 3.54 per cent of the population.

It can be noted that the Javanese are sometimes the largest but not necessarily the dominant group (in the sense of being more than double the population of the next largest group). As shown in table 5 (in the Appendix), there are 35 districts where the Javanese are the largest ethnic group, but not the dominant one. Their share is less than double that of the second largest ethnic group. Most (20) were located on the island of Sumatera. The remaining districts were seen in the island of Java (6), the island of Kalimantan (7), and in Land of Papua (2). The city of Jakarta Selatan is one example of this. The Javanese are the largest ethnic group, but they contribute only 40.01 per cent of the population in the city. The second largest one, the Betawi, a local ethnic group, is relatively large, at 32.35 per cent. Another example is in the regency of Deli Serdang, North Sumatera. The Javanese are the largest ethnic group (51.90 per cent of the population), but the Batak, a local ethnic group, constituted 30.64 per cent of the population. We also find that the city of Sorong in the province of West Papua is a heterogeneous city, with the Javanese constituting the largest ethnic group, contributing only 13.79 per cent of the total population in Sorong. The city had many migrant ethnic groups. The Javanese shared the city with two other almost equally sized migrant ethnic groups: the Buginese (10.50 per cent) and the Ambonese (10.15 per cent), which are from the nearby islands of Sulawesi and Maluku.

Significant second largest ethnic group

In some districts, the Javanese are the second largest ethnic group, but their presence is still considerable when their percentage is more than half of the largest one. There are 41 districts where the Javanese are the second largest ethnic group, but their percentage is considerable (at least half of the largest ethnic group). In this group, the Javanese are always a migrant ethnic group, living in a heterogeneous district with a local group as the largest. An example is the Javanese in the regency of Mimika, province of Papua. The regency is the most heterogeneous district in the province of Papua. The local Mimika ethnic

group is the largest ethnic group with only 12.95 per cent of the population, and the Javanese are the second largest ethnic group with almost the same percentage (12.85 per cent of the population). Another example is the regency of Labuhan Batu, North Sumatera, where the local Batak are the largest ethnic group (43.69 per cent), and the Javanese as the second largest (41.22 per cent). In the city of Tanjung Pinang, Riau Archipelago, the Malay ethnic group is the largest (30.63 per cent), with the Javanese closely following (27.42 per cent) (see table 6 in the Appendix).

Many of the districts with Javanese as a significant second largest ethnic group are found on the island of Sumatera, followed by the island of Kalimantan and Papua. This pattern may reflect the transmigration program, which initially targeted the island of Sumatera, then Kalimantan, and later on Papua as destination areas. On the islands of Maluku, Bali, and Nusa Tenggara, the Javanese are not numerous enough to form the second largest ethnic group.

There are four exceptions where the largest ethnic groups are not locals. First, in the regency of Batubara, province of North Sumatera, the largest ethnic group is Malay, contributing 41.44 per cent. The Malay, in this case, are a migrant ethnic group from other regions within the island of Sumatera. Second, in the city of Depok, West Java, and the city of Tangerang, in Baten, the Betawi (who originated from Jakarta) are the largest ethnic group. Third, the Malay are the largest migrant ethnic group in the regency of Sukamara (Central Kalimantan). Finally, the Buginese, who originated from the island of Sulawesi, are the largest ethnic group in the regency of Berau and the city of Tarakan in the province of East Kalimantan.

The data show five districts where the Javanese are the third largest ethnic group, but their percentage is more than half of the largest one. An example is in the regency of Bekasi, West Java. The largest ethnic group are the Betawi (36.10 per cent), a migrant group, followed by the Sundanese (30.84 per cent), a local ethnic group. The Javanese constitute 23.00 per cent of the population there. Another example is the regency of Buru in the province of Maluku. The Javanese are the third largest ethnic group there, contributing 21.49 per cent of the population. But, the largest ethnic group is the Buru, a local ethnic group, at only 27.04 per cent. The second is the Buton, another migrant group, forming 22.97 per cent. Each of these three ethnic groups are very large relative to the fourth, the Sula, a local group from the islands of Maluku, which only contributed 7.69 per cent to the population (less than half of that of the Javanese). The island of Buru used to be a well-known penal colony of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and many of the detainees were Javanese.

There are two districts with the Javanese as the fourth largest ethnic group, but their percentage is more than half that of the largest one. One of the districts is the regency of Morowali in Central Sulawesi. Buginese, a migrant population, forms 17.73 per cent, followed by Bungku and Mariri (locals). The Javanese are 10.11 per cent.

Small and very small minority groups

In contrast to being the dominant, largest or significant ethnic group, the Javanese can also be a small and very small minority group. Indeed, in the majority of the districts (there are 253 districts, more than half the number of districts in Indonesia) the percentage of the Javanese in each district is less than 10.0 per cent. Among them, there are 166 districts with small percentages of Javanese, between 1.0 per cent and 10.0 per cent. The other 87 districts have Javanese with very small percentages, less than 1.0 per cent, and among them there are eight districts where the Javanese only form less than 0.1 per cent.

All places where the Javanese are under 1.0 per cent of the population are located outside the island of Java, with three exceptions: the homogeneously Madurese regencies of Sumenep and Sampang in the

island of Madura, the province of East Java, and the homogenously Sundanese regency of Garut in the province of West Java. Moreover, the majority of them are located in Eastern Indonesia on the islands of Sulawesi, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara, and Papua. No Javanese as small and very small minority groups can be seen in Bali and Kalimantan. There are only 11 districts with small percentages of Javanese in Sumatera: Gunung Sitoli, Tapanuli Utara, Samosir, Nias Barat, Nias Utara, Nias Selatan (in North Sumatera); Aceh Barat Daya and Aceh Selatan (in Aceh); Tanah Datar, Padang Pariaman and Solok (in West Sumatera). Geographically, the three provinces are adjacent to each other, with North Sumatera bordering Aceh in the north and West Sumatera in the southwest.

In each of these districts, the contribution of the Javanese to the total population is not considerable. The Javaneseness of the Javanese in these districts may have been eroded significantly and may be contributing to a reduction in the dominance of the Javanese in Indonesia.

Concluding remarks

Within the context of a third demographic transition, we have discussed the number, percentage and geographical concentration of the Javanese – the socially and politically dominant ethnic group in Indonesia. We utilized the 100 per cent sample of the raw data of Indonesia's 2010 population census to quantitatively examine the dominance of the Javanese. This quantitative analysis is expected to enrich the literatures on social and political dominance in general and the Javanese in particular.

We conclude that the Javanese, the largest and most ubiquitous ethnic group in Indonesia, is still dominant, but that their dominance has declined. The ubiquity of the Javanese may not reveal a process of "Javanization" because the Javaneseness may have eroded. Among the Javanese living outside their three home provinces, the percentage of those who speak Javanese daily at home is very low. These Javanese may have adapted to local conditions. We also find that the Javanese are not always the dominant or even the largest ethnic group. The Javanese comprise a small ethnic group in the majority of the districts and can even be a very small minority ethnic group in many districts.

The eroding dominance of the Javanese may hint that a third demographic transition – a change in ethnic composition – has been taking place in Indonesia. This finding is in contrast to Coleman's (2006) claim that the third demographic transition is observed in developed countries only. Therefore, we conclude that the concept of a third demographic transition is not applicable only to developed countries. It can also be observed in developing countries. The main difference with the original concept of a third demographic transition is that the transition in Indonesia is mainly because of internal migration, rather than international migration, as is the case in European countries, though fertility differential by ethnic groups also contributes to the third demographic transition in Indonesia. Further studies on the third demographic transition in developing countries should be carried out.

In short, with the rising population mobility and low fertility, the Javanese dominance may continue to decline along with the process of the third demographic transition in Indonesia. Further studies should examine whether this trend and pattern will continue (data will eventually become available from the 2015 intercensal population survey and the 2020 population census). A study with data from other developing countries should be done to examine the process of the third demographic transition in developing countries.

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Appendix

Table 1. Concentration of the Javanese by province: Indonesia, 2000 and 2010

		Conce	entration
Island	Province	2000	2010
Sumatera	Aceh	15.87*	8.94
	North Sumatera	32.62	33.4
	West Sumatera	4.15	4.49
	Riau	25.05	29.2
	Riau Archipelago	na	24.55
	Jambi	27.64	29.09
	South Sumatera	27.01	27.41
	Bengkulu	22.31	22.64
	Lampung	61.89	64.06
	Bangka-Belitung	5.82	8.19
Java	Jakarta	35.16	36.16
	West Java	11.04	13.28
	Central Java	97.96	97.72
	Yogyakarta	96.82	96.53
	East Java	78.35	79.72
	Banten	12.2	15.63
	Bali	6.82	9.59
	West Nusatenggara	1.47	1.76
	East Nusatenggara	0.81	none
Kalimantan	West Kalimantan	9.14	9.74
	Central Kalimantan	18.06	21.67
	South Kalimantan	13.14	14.51
	East Kalimantan	29.55	30.24
Sulawesi	North Sulawesi	2.24	3.13
	Central Sulawesi	8.25	8.42
	South Sulawesi	2.72	2.86
	West Sulawesi	n.a	4.92
	Southeast Sulawesi	7.02	7.14
	Gorontalo	2.46	3.39
Maluku	Maluku	4.66	5.19
	North Maluku	3.17	4.76
Papua	Papua	12.48	8.38
· .r ····	West Papua	n.a	14.76

Note: There was an underestimation of Acehnese in 2000, especially in the regencies of Pidie and Pidie Jaya, and therefore an overestimate of the percentage of the Javanese.

source: The 2000 statistics are cited from Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta (2003); the 2010 statistics are cited from Ananta et al (2015).

Table 4. Twenty-six districts with Javanese as the dominant ethnic group outside their home provinces*

% of	Second Largest Ethnic Group
Javanese	and %
48.31	Aceh, local, 19.56
56.68	Batak, local, 18.25
55.18	Batak, local, 25.50
51.99	Batak, local, 23.67
69.54	Komering, local, 20.76
27.54	Rejang, local, 12.99
61.28	Sundanese, migrant, 13.24
81.25	Lampung, local, 8.41
81.63	Lampung, local, 6.91
50.05	Lampung, local, 20.45
61.72	Lampung, local, 13.34
70.74	Lampung, local, 14.80
59.93	Sundanese, migrant, 17.11
84.91	Sundanese, migrant, 7.76
82.18	Malay, migrant, 6.93
81.54	Lampung, local, 12.18
44.81	Lampung, local, 21.58
40.67	Lampung, local, 15.79
72.45	Lampung, local, 9.71
38.69	Sundanese, migrant, 16.31
93.34	Sundanese, local, 3.54
42.01	Buginese, migrant, 20.69
41.46	Mooi, local, 15.46
34.32	Marind Anim, local, 16.55
34.34	Kerom, local, 15.30
19.17	Buginese, migrant, 7.95
	Javanese 48.31 56.68 55.18 51.99 69.54 27.54 61.28 81.25 81.63 50.05 61.72 70.74 59.93 84.91 82.18 81.54 44.81 40.67 72.45 38.69 93.34 42.01 41.46 34.32 34.34

Note: *This does not include the 71 districts in Central Java, Yogyakarta, and East Java, where the Javanese are the dominant ethnic group in each of the districts.

Source: Authors' own calculation.

Table 5. Thirty-five districts with the Javanese as the largest but not dominant ethnic group

Regency of Asahan, North Sumatera Regency of Deli Serdang, North Sumatera Regency of Labuhan Batu Selatan, North Sumatera	Javanese 59.17	(percentage)
Regency of Asahan, North Sumatera Regency of Deli Serdang, North Sumatera Regency of Labuhan Batu Selatan, North Sumatera	59.17	
Regency of Deli Serdang, North Sumatera Regency of Labuhan Batu Selatan, North Sumatera	59.17	
Regency of Labuhan Batu Selatan, North Sumatera		Batak, local, 30.13
	51.90	Batak, local, 30.64
C'. CTI I TI IN IN	49.24	Batak, local, 45.94
City of Tebing Tinggi, North Sumatera	40.92	Batak, local, 34.67
Regency of Siak, Riau	37.25	Malay, local, 23.77
Regency of Rokan Hulu, Riau	38.04	Malay, local, 26.15
Regency of Bengkalis, Riau	31.14	Malay, local, 27.59
Regency of Rokan Hilir, Riau	44.99	Malay, local, 30.50
City of Dumai, Riau	30.05	Malay, local, 24.75
Regency of Tanjung Jabung Timur, Jambi	36.98	Buginese, migrant, 32.01
Regency of Tanjung Jabung Barat, Jambi	36.31	Banjarese, migrant, 28.62
Regency of Ogan Komering Ilir, South Sumatera	38.71	Malay, local, 26.15
Regency of Musi Rawas, South Sumatera	40.77	Rawas, local, 28.32
Regency of Banyu Asin, South Sumatera	37.51	Malay, local, 33.25
Regency of Rejang Lebong, Bengkulu	30.33	Rejang, local, 27.01
Regency of Bengkulu Utara, Bengkulu	41.19	Rejang, local, 31.69
Regency of Mukomuko, Bengkulu	37.66	Mukomuko, local, 27.11
Regency of Lampung Barat, Lampung	35.42	Lampung, local, 35.31
Regency of Bintan, Riau Archipelago	31.65	Malay, local, 31.10
City of Batam, Riau Archipelago	28.10	Batak, migrant, 18.91
Island of Java (6)		
City of Jakarta Selatan, Jakarta	40.01	Betawi, local, 32.35
City of Jakarta Timur, Jakarta	38.28	Betawi, local, 29.68
City of Jakarta Barat, Jakarta	31.43	Betawi, local, 29.76
City of Bekasi, West Java	37.01	Betawi, migrant, 28.57
City of Tangerang, Banten	31.21	Betawi, migrant, 27.90
Regency of Jember, East Java	61.44	Madurese, local, 37.71
Island of Kalimantan (7)		
Regency of Kotawaringin Barat, Central Kalimantan	47.91	Malay, migrant, 26.24
Regency of Paser, East Kalimantan	26.18	Pasir, local, 22.38
Regency of Kutai Kartanegara, East Kalimantan	29.14	Kutai, local, 24.74
Regency of Kutai Timur, East Kalimantan	27.52	Buginese, migrant, 21.24
Regency of Penajam Paser Utara, East Kalimantan	41.26	Buginese, migrant, 26.84
City of Samarinda, East Kalimantan	36.58	Banjarese, migrant, 24.45
City of Bontang, East Kalimantan	36.28	Buginese, migrant, 30.50

Island of Papua (2)		
City of Sorong, West Papua	13.79	Buginese, migrant, 10.50
Regency of Nabire, Papua	22.21	Auwye, local, 20.38

Source: Authors' own calculation.

Table 6. Forty-one districts with Javanese as a significant second largest ethnic group: Indonesia 2010

Province, District	Largest Ethnic Group and %	% of the Javanese
Island of Sumatera (19)		•
Regency of Aceh Singkil, Aceh	Batak, migrant, 43.15	22.38
Regency of Labuhan Batu, North Sumatera	Batak, local, 43.69	41.22
Regency of Labuhan Batu Utara, North Sumatera	Batak, local, 46.45	46.25
Regency of Simalungun, North Sumatera	Batak, local, 51.94	45.31
Regency of Batubara, North Sumatera	Malay, migrant, 41.44	38.30
City of Medan, North Sumatera	Batak, local, 35.20	33.01
Regency of Dharmasraya, West Sumatera	Minangkabau, local, 63.12	31.95
Regency of Pasaman Barat, West Sumatera	Minangkabau, local, 49.83	29.98
Regency of Indragiri Hulu, Riau	Malay, local, 44.87	35.56
Regency of Pelalawan, Riau	Malay, local, 34.96	31.84
Regency of Kampar, Riau	Malay, local, 46.91	28.21
Regency of Merangin, Jambi	Malay, local, 55.91	33.36
Regency of Muaro Jambi	Malay, local, 42.91	38.51
Regency of Tebo, Jambi	Malay, local, 47.07	44.80
City of Jambi, Jambi	Malay, local, 39.79	20.91
Regency of Musi Banyuasin, South Sumatera	Musi, local, 55.27	28.85
Regency of Ogan Komering Ulu Selatan, South	Malay, local, 29.33	25.34
Sumatera	•	
City of Prabumulih, South Sumatera	Rambang, local, 32.64	16.50
City of Tanjung Pinang, Riau Archipelago	Malay, local, 30.63	27.42
Island of Java (3)		
City of Jakarta Pusat, Jakarta	Betawi, local, 33.91	29.02
City of Depok, West Java	Betawi, migrant, 36.93	32.93
City of Tangerang Selatan, Banten	Betawi, migrant, 36.12	34.75
Island of Kalimantan (12)		
Regency of Kotawaringin Timur, Central	Dayak, local, 43.28	25.98
Kalimantan	14.40	22.01
Regency of Sukamara, Central Kalimantan	Malay, migrant, 44.18	23.91
Regency of Lamandau, Central Kalimantan	Dayak, local, 52.61	33.93
Regency of Seruyan, Central Kalimantan	Dayak, local, 37.53	34.64
Regency of Pulang Pisau, Central Kalimantan	Dayak, local, 39.80	32.31
Regency of Tanah Laut, South Kalimantan	Banjarese, local, 60.81	32.37
Regency of Kota Baru, South Kalimantan	Banjarese, local, 38.81	21.42
Regency of Tanah Bumbu, South Kalimantan	Banjarese, local, 35.46	31.15
City of Banjar Baru, South Kalimantan	Banjarese, local, 56.95	33.22
Regency of Berau, East Kalimantan	Buginese, migrant, 26.64	23.01
Regency of Bulungan, East Kalimantan	Dayak, local, 39.45	21.79
City of Tarakan, East Kalimantan	Buginese, migrant, 35.75	23.49
Island of Sulawesi (2)	0.1 1.26.42	10.17
Regency of Banggai, Central Sulawesi	Saluan, local, 26.42	19.15
Regency of Konawe Selatan, Southeast Sulawesi	Tolaki, local, 39.63	21.05
Land of Papua (5)		
Regency of Teluk Bintuni, West Papua	Aikwakai, local, 20.33	14.45
Regency of Manokwari, West Papua	Arfak, local, 29.90	18.78
Regency of Jayapura, Papua	Sentani, local, 18.15	16.17
Regency of Mimika, Papua	Mimika, local, 12.95	12.85
Regency of Sarmi, Papua	Biga, local, 14.56	9.01

Source: Authors' own calculation.

Endnotes

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¹ See Ananta, Arifin, Hasbullah, Handayani, and Pramono (2015) for a detailed discussion on ethnicity at national and provincial levels in Indonesia.

² The statistics for the TFR are cited from Badan Pusat Statistik (2012a).

³ In the early 1990s, McDonald (1994) already discussed the possibility of the second demographic transition happening in developing countries. For discussions on changing family values in Southeast Asia, readers can refer to Jones, Hull, and Mohamad (2011).

⁴ District is an administrative boundary below province. A district may be a regency or a city.

⁵ In terms ethnicity, the Javanese, the Chinese and the Balinese have the lowest fertility rates, below replacement level. Thus, they have already entered the second demographic transition. See Ananta et al (2015) for a detailed discussion on fertility of the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Indonesia.

⁶ For a discussion on the complex issue of cultural hegemony, originating from Antonio Gramsci, readers may refer to, for example, Lears (1985), Adamson (1986) and Varela, Dhawan, and Engel (2011).

⁷ The Land of Papua refers to the western part of Island of New Guinea, the second largest island in the world. The eastern part is another country, Papua New Guinea.

⁸ The statistics are cited from Badan Pusat Statistik (2012), referring to the statistics in 2012.

⁹ The politics of sons of the soil may result in conflict if not civil war, as is happening in many regions of the world. Readers may read, for example, Rhee (2008) and Fearon and Laitin (2011) for discussions on sons of the soil and its possible consequence on conflict and civil wars.

¹⁰ All statistics used in this paper are based on the sample of Indonesian citizens only.

¹¹ A district can be a regency or a city.

¹² The accuracy of the 1930 data may not be as high as those of 2000 and 2010, and there are some differences in the classification of the Javanese, particularly with the 2010 census. However, the difference may not be significant, and we can still conclude the Javanese has been the dominant ethnic group in Indonesia, though the percentage has been declining.

¹³ For a more detailed discussion on this trend, see Ananta et al. (2015).

¹⁴ The statistics for 1990 is calculated from Badan Pusat Statistik (1992); for 2010, from Ananta et al. (2015). The question on language was asked in 1990 and 2010 population censuses, but not in 2000 census. Ethnicity was not asked in the censuses before 2000. The corresponding percentage of the Javanese ethnic group using population aged 5 years old and over in 2010 is 40.47 percent. The statistics mentioned earlier (40.06 percent) refers to the total population including those aged below 5 years old. ¹⁵ As the data on language spoken by ethnic groups is only available in the 2010 population census, we do not know whether there has been any change on the percentage of Javanese who speaks Javanese.

¹⁶ See Ananta et al. (2015) for a more detailed discussion on the Madurese, Bantenese, and Chinese.

¹⁷ The statistics for 1990 are calculated from Badan Pusat Statistik (1992); for 2010, from Ananta et al. (2015).

¹⁸ At this juncture, it is also tempting to analyse the drivers of the migration of the Javanese and migration pattern of the Javanese. However, that is beyond the scope of this paper.

¹⁹ Zero percent of Javanese in a district can mean that there is no Javanese at all or that the number of the Javanese in that district is not significant compared to the total number of Javanese in Indonesia.

²⁰ The data for the 2000 is cited from Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata (2004), while that for the 2010s is from Ananta et al. (2015). Though Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata (2004) calculated the percentage of the Javanese in each district in 2000 and we calculated the percentage in 2010, we have difficulty in comparing them. There have been a lot of district fragmentations during 2000-2010, from 30 provinces and 340 districts in 2000 census to 33 provinces and 497 districts in 2010 census. In 2015 there are 34

provinces and 542 districts. A special study should be conducted to trace the change in boundaries, to enable conducting analyses of the dynamics at the district level.

²¹ The statistics on fertility is cited from Badan Pusat Statistik (2011a).

 $^{^{\}rm 23}$ See an earlier discussion in this paper for the sub-ethnic groups of the Javanese.