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ART Regulation, Immigration, and the Quiet Return of Positive Eugenics in Europe

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Abstract

The recent influx of refugees into Western Europe has posed significant challenges to welfare states, prompting governments to adopt policies aimed at protecting the state's economic prosperity and national identity. By critically examining welfare states' population policies, this article extends existing welfare regime typologies to capture the notion of "people's nation" welfarism. We argue that in such states, selective state-subsidization of Assisted Reproduction Technologies (ART) and integration policies are influenced by a eugenic productivist approach aimed to counter demographic pressures on welfare systems. Within this framework, we trace the evolution of the phenomenon of contemporary eugenic productivism in three inclusive Nordic welfare states Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, followed by a comparative policy analysis among nine European states. We find that states in which immigration integration outcomes are low, state coverage of ART tends to be high and by nature, design, or both more accessible to native populations. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings.

Keywords: Eugenics, Population, Welfare Dependency, Immigration, Assisted Reproduction Technology (ART), Nordic Welfare State.

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Introduction

Europe has been deeply shaken by recent waves of incoming refugees and immigrants. One consequence of this population influx has been the enhancement of the nativist Radical Right, which, although not achieving power in most European countries, might be considered a movement "in crescendo". Yet, more important than its electoral success, is the fact that the Radical Right political discourse and parts of its ideology are being adopted silently in some cases and openly and proudly in others by the political center.

A key issue currently debated in many European states with respect to phenomenon of immigration, concerns setting entrance criteria and integration policies. While for over 20 years, a multicultural approach dominated in most Western democracies (Kymlicka, 2007; Kymlicka, 2010; Parekh, 2006; Warikoo, 2020;

Wieviorka, 2012), currently a more balanced debate, or, some would argue, one overtly critical of multiculturalism in favor of civic integration, has gained predominance. Several Right-wing parties, fearing the particularistic excesses of multicultural politics, have endorsed the conspiracy theories of the Great Replacement, initially advanced by the French Renaud Camus, suggesting that the white population is gradually being extinguished and replaced by immigrants. On the other side of the political spectrum, leftist parties have also criticized multiculturalism as a mechanism which obscures the power and racism involved in demarcating the limits of tolerance (Johansson, 2022; Modood, 2005).

Recent research on the effects of welfare generosity for both immigrants and natives in Western democracies suggests that welfare states may not be supportive of immigrants (Bostic & Hyde, 2023). Related to this debate but somehow taking place behind the scenes, are references to concepts seemingly abandoned long ago, such as the ‘demographic problem’ and ‘exclusionist nationalist policies’, which appear to be returning to the fore. Claims that European welfare states are exposed to social, political and economic pressures to practice some degree of control over their demographic compositions, have become a legitimate part of the discourse in many Western democracies (Beets, 2011; Kocourkova et al., 2014; Van Tubergen et al., 2004), driven, we argue, by a eugenic productivist approach aimed to counter demographic burdens on welfare systems.

Against the backdrop of declining fertility rates among the native population in many of the immigrant-receiving European states, scholars have produced a sizable body of research analyzing the impact of immigration on various characteristics of the state that are relevant for this article, such as employment status and local labor markets (Özgüzel & Edo, 2023), and fertility rates among immigrants (Amuedo-Dorantes & Arenas-Arroyo, 2021), and among natives (Seah, 2018). Yet, the role of fertility policies in this context is largely neglected in the literature. Thus, this article examines a largely overlooked and under-researched dimension of current demographic debates: the use of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) in Western countries. We argue that policies regulating ART particularly through criteria for public funding function as strategic tools that shape demographic outcomes (Bergsvik et al., 2021; Chambers et al., 2021). By focusing on these seemingly neutral technologies, we seek to fill a gap in the literature, overtly situating ART policies within broader discussions on immigration, population trends, and the rising influence of nationalism.

To explore this topic, we examine ART policies and immigration integration in three Northern European countries: Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. The focus on these countries is not by chance. Although additional western European countries, widely defined, might also serve as ample candidates for a research on the use of ART programs as a strategy to influence demographics, the reason for our selection lies in what could be defined as “country reputation”. Sweden, for example, is known for its generous social benefits and commitment to gender equality, and was ranked in 2018 as the most reputable country in the world, by the Reputation Institute. Sweden is followed by Finland, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Japan, Denmark and the Netherlands as the top 10 most reputable countries. Thus, although it might seem counterintuitive at first glance, we analyze in this paper some of the most reputable countries on an issue that is tearing societies apart, precisely because of its doubtful moral character. The countries analyzed in this article allow for a systematic comparison along a continuum of welfare generosity. Rather than relying solely on their generous social benefits, we aim to capture the theoretical distinctions within the welfare regime framework by enabling cross-national comparison of ART spending and immigration policies in relation to welfare state institutions, demographic pressures, and national policy decisions.

It is important to note that while these states constitute developed liberal welfare democracies, all three also represent ethnonational states. In the past these countries would be termed productivist-welfare states, states in which the promotion of welfare is underpinned by national productivity considerations, rather than only by humanitarian or social justice concerns. Albeit to different degrees, in these states the synthesis of welfare and production was considered to be the foundation of the "people's home" country, namely an ethno-national country. Historically, one of the instruments used by governments to sustain the welfare productivist "people's home" was through eugenic policies. Under the presumption that both good and bad human characteristics are genetically transmitted (Galton, 1883), an array of eugenic selective breeding practices, most notably sterilization of people carrying "undesirable" traits, were pursued by the state, aimed to improve the human race, and, no less, to help reduce social margins and enhance the productive segments of society. In this sense, the noted countries considered that through eugenics a democratic welfare state could be sustained (Spektorowski & Ireni-Saban, 2015).

The question this article poses is whether, in current times, societies, which are predominantly liberal, promote open market economies, and value diversity, might develop alternative — less blatant— methods in order to preserve the same productivist goals of the past. In other words, is the ideology of productivist eugenics continuing, under a different name and under different methods in welfare states, all in the interest of preserving the "people's home" country?

We begin with a discussion of the potential of ART policies as a demography-influencing mechanism in welfare states. We then introduce the concept of eugenic productivism, which reflects this process, and suggest that the existing typology of welfare regimes should be extended to include the concept of eugenic productivist states. Next, highlighting the conceptual link between eugenic practices of the past and present-day ART regulation, we argue that in effect ART policies constitute a modern-day method of eugenics designed to promote the procreation of the most capable segments of society, and that these practices are most commonly found in states with poor immigrant integration outcomes. To illustrate the claim that ART policies are inversely correlated with immigrant integration outcomes, we examine ART policies (measured by the level of state-coverage) and immigration integration outcomes (measured by immigrant employment levels) in the noted three developed national welfare states: Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, and compare them to six less inclusive, western European states. We conclude the article with a discussion of the implications of our findings.

ART as a National-Demographic Strategy

While ART is used primarily to treat infertility by means of artificial or partially artificial fertilization, the available technologies are also used by fertile people for genetic-related reasons (e.g., to pre-select genetically healthy fetuses) or for social reasons such as gender preference. Through innovative treatments such as insemination (e.g., IUI) or laboratory fertilization of the oocytes (as in IVF), new forms of parenthood are created. Male gay spouses become biological parents, single women or lesbian couples become mothers (Bleiklie et al., 2004; Bryld, 2001).

Europe has become a world leader in the utilization of ART. In 2005, almost 56% of all ART cycles (aspirations) world-wide were conducted in Europe, 23% took place in Asia, and 15% in North America (Chambers et al., 2021; Präg & Mills, 2015). Seemingly promoting the well-being of the whole of society, ART and ART policies appear to be completely disassociated from eugenics. However, we argue, a deeper examination reveals a more nuanced relationship. Through public financing policies, governments influence accessibility of individuals to ART according to their social eligibility (Shenfield et al., 2010), consequently

turning state funding of ART into a veiled mechanism for national demographic influence. This is particularly true in European welfare states, where the use of ART and state investment in ART are relatively high compared to other parts of the world. (Bergsvik et al., 2021). Insinuating that old eugenics are reappearing in modern European welfare democracies under a different name is a morally and politically loaded suggestion. Yet, while the mere mention of eugenics raises controversy, the many questions raised by ART policies and their potential influence on society, warrant serious theoretical and empirical attention. Exploration of the demographic relevance of the regulation and public financing of ART allows a glimpse into the modern-day practice of productivist-welfare eugenics.

Contemporary productivist-welfare eugenics refers to states' welfare policies intended to influence a society's demographic composition and, subsequently, its prosperity. This is accomplished by encouraging natality among members of society who participate in the labor market, to the exclusion of those not considered part of the productivist public. ART may serve this end through state-funding and other regulatory mechanisms. This is particularly relevant today in Europe against the backdrop of rising immigration rates and declining natural birth rates among native citizens (Präg & Mills, 2015). Although no direct link has been established between public coverage and immigration integration policies, we suggest that analyzing ART policies from a productivist-welfarist eugenics approach allows for a better understanding of the implications of state regulation of ART and consequently its affordability, for immigration policy-making in the most generous welfare societies in Northern Europe.

What lies at the heart of the ART-productivist eugenics relationship? Challenged in a globalized world by ever-growing economic competition and the increasing movement of people across borders, immigrant integration policies in welfare countries are under constant review (Dancygier & Donnelly, 2013; Dancygier & Laitin, 2014; Goodman, 2015). In face of these challenges, wealthy welfare states essentially have three broad strategy-options. The first option reflects a liberal productivist approach. According to this view, states should encourage immigration and dismantle the welfare state to lessen the growing burden on the state. These steps would constitute a natural boost to productivity. To be sure, immigration may have positive effects on society. Utilitarian arguments suggest that immigrants' contributions to impoverished western European pension funds help keep the funds economically solvent (Banting, 2014; Scholten, 2010). However, immigrants may also become dependent on well-structured universal welfare systems. For this reason, encouraging productivism through open gates would also likely result in reduced welfare systems.

Banting (2000) and Freeman (1986) argue that claims suggesting that sustaining immigration might undermine the welfare state are basically economic. The main thesis of these claims is that restrictive immigration policies are essential to protect the economic benefits of the welfare state system. Glyn (2006) notes that when significant numbers of needy people receive welfare benefits, the result might be increased taxation. If the needy are newcomer foreigners, this might erode the solidarity and willingness of citizens to help foreigners. States thus might have to choose between limiting immigration and limiting the accessibility of immigrants to welfare benefits (Banting, 2000). This dilemma is further compounded when the population perceives their welfare systems not only as just, but also as part of their historical legacy, and as an important tool in preserving their national identity.

This leads to the second option: limiting immigration to preserve the people's home spirit. By pursuing this option, though, countries could lose potential productivity achieved by population growth. Thus, the third option entails mitigating the negative impact of immigration by increasing society's stronger segments, i.e., by encouraging higher birth-rates among the economically productive native population (Fox, 2013; Koskela, 2014).

The above concerns indeed constitute partially “hidden” or, subconscious concerns that, we argue, have motivated Sweden, Denmark, and Finland to constrain immigration and invest in ART programs. While there is hardly a “smoking gun” to unequivocally prove governmental intent, there is enough evidence, based in historical and current developments, to suggest that these countries’ concerns regarding welfare, productivity, and cultural identity might lead them to reevaluate past ideologies under more neutral names. As noted, the basic aims are similar.

By enhancing the declining reproductive capacity of the more economically productive parts of society, “people’s home” productivist-welfare regimes advance two interconnected ends: increased national economic productivity and protection of the hegemonic national culture. Following the logic of productivist-welfarism, one mechanism to reduce the burden placed on national budgets by economically dependent people such as immigrants with weak access to labor markets, is by increasing reproduction of the more economically productive natives, who have greater potential to raise economically independent and productive children. By subsidizing ART and setting eligibility criteria, governments are able to determine who is entitled to these technologies and to whom they will be most accessible, consequently favoring procreation by one group over another. While the impact of ART use and fertility trends across European countries are discussed in the literature, the demographic potential of ART affordability to the public has not been studied comprehensively (ESHRE, 2010; Mills et al., 2011). Putting limits on public health care resources allocated to those who are not able to pay out-of-pocket, implicates inequalities in access based on affordability. Our main thesis in this respect emerges from the North European welfare nations’ need to reduce welfare dependency.

Although Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, provide state funding of ART, they diverge in the degree of coverage offered. Whereas Sweden provides full state-coverage, Denmark and Finland provide only partial coverage. It is important to note that even in countries with the highest degree of state-coverage, ancillary pre-pregnancy treatments such as counseling, ovulation stimulation drugs, and ultrasound scanning, are not covered. This is the case in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, which are considered highly inclusive welfare-states in which immigrants enjoy broad access to welfare-state provisions. Yet, it is in these states, we claim, that we can most identify selective pro-natalism through the implementation of ART policies.

In the next section, we discuss eugenic productivism as a concept that expands the existing typology of welfare regimes to include the notion of “people’s nations” welfarism. We then discuss how the ideas of productivism and welfare were connected to eugenics in the past and how eugenics might still be perceived as a policy tool to sustain a productive and welfarist society. While a productive society in a capitalist system requires reducing welfare entitlements and a growing population (achievable through immigration), countries that historically considered themselves ethno-national people’s homes, based their welfare systems on different variants of eugenic policies. Thus, eugenic policies (both negative and positive variants) served as the basis for obtaining a synthesis between productionism and national welfare necessary for the survival of an ethnonational people’s home.

Eugenic Productivist-Welfare Regimes

Historically, the aim of a universal welfare system has been to secure society’s welfare by securing the basic needs of the population through fair and equitable redistribution of resources and opportunities (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The moral added-value of the universalist principle lies in the notion of advancing social justice and preserving the dignity of those in need.

Europe's emphasis on the welfare state in the 1970s was followed by a certain shift away from welfare programs in the 1980s, as politicians and taxpayers increasingly infused neo-liberal ideas into policy-making by stressing the need to lower taxes, reduce public spending and regulation, and enforce more personal responsibility on issues of economic wellbeing (Kelsey, 1995). Subsequently, in the 1990s, liberal states focused on the reduction of taxes, social spending, and "welfare dependency", and developed policy-programs called "welfare-regimes" (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Mishra, 1984).

To measure the level of a country's overall welfare regime, Esping-Anderson offered a framework based on five dimensions of welfare-regimes: (1) principles of solidarity, (2) pronatalism, (3) social justice, (4) securing children's well-being, (5) autonomy of parental choices (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kenworthy, 1999). This framework produced a typology of three types of welfare-regimes: 1) social democratic regimes such as those found in Finland, Denmark, and Sweden, which represent inclusive, liberal, and generous welfare regimes; 2) conservative welfare regimes of the type found in Germany, France, and Switzerland; 3) liberal welfare regimes of the type found in the UK, USA, Canada, and Australia.

On the national level, the principle of universalism, which is characterized as a unique combination of social justice, solidarity, and pronatalism, is typically bound by strict eligibility criteria such as citizenship or legal residency (Korpi & Palme, 1998, 2003). Yet, within a single country, welfare programs frequently impose other, more nuanced, forms of exclusionary practices. These practices may result from a link between pronatalism and nationalism, through which a nation's strength and authenticity are tied to the biological and cultural reproduction of its people (Yuval-Davis, 1997).

This observation suggests that Esping-Andersen's typology, while highlighting how welfare regimes differ in pronatalist provisions, it does not fully account for how welfare policies can also serve exclusionary and national-demographic goals. In particular, the linkage between pronatalism and nationalism indicates that welfare provisions can simultaneously foster inclusion for some groups while excluding others such as immigrants, minorities, or those deemed "non-reproductive" within national context. This may reinforce boundaries of belonging to nationalism beyond citizenship or legal residency. (Joppke, 2007) Expanding the typology to explicitly incorporate these exclusionary practices would enable a more nuanced understanding of how welfare regimes not only provide social provisions but also reproduce national identities and demographic objectives.

Pronatalist politics in "settler societies" such as Israel for example, or in a "people's home" like Sweden, or in France, a "republic motherhood", are associated with high levels of support for women and workers. A shift has occurred in the extent to which different groups benefit from social transfers, given their working status and citizenship. A recent reordering of priorities among welfarist goals has occurred with pronatalism moving to the forefront while social justice concerns have become less visible.

Our examination of Sweden, Denmark, and Finland supports the claim that in inclusive welfare-states where immigrants have high access to welfare-state provisions, we are most likely to see selective pronatalism. These countries have similar historical experiences with national welfare. Unlike universal welfare societies, such as The Netherlands and Norway, they have historically emphasized protecting their national stock, while displaying clear productivist tendencies, namely welfare for the strong rather than for the feeble. All three states practiced eugenic measures in the past, the ideological basis of which was a synthesis between productivism and welfarism. In other words, it was eugenic productivism, a form of selective pronatalism, rather than universal pronatalism that motivated policies encouraging fertility programs. Thus, by expanding the existing typology of welfarist societies, we suggest that these countries, seeking to

preserve their ethnonational features, are more accurately placed in the category of productivist welfare societies.

We present below the emergence of the eugenic productivist perspective and how it materialized in population practices in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland as they aspired to consolidate welfare productivist systems for their respective “people’s homes”.

Welfare-States and Nationalism: From Eugenics to Positive Eugenic Productivism.

Eugenics is a pseudo-science combined with social policies. Underlying eugenics, a term coined by Francis Galton in 1883, is the conviction that human traits of character, both good and evil, are genetically transmitted (Galton, 1883). In his construction of the eugenics solution to population degeneration, Galton divided the practice of eugenics into positive and negative, both aimed at improving the human race through selective breeding. Negative eugenics aims at discouraging procreation by persons afflicted with mental or physical illnesses, or by persons who possess traits considered to be detrimental to society (Galton, 1904; Lombardo, 2008; Stern, 2005). Sterilization of persons with undesirable hereditary traits is one means of negative eugenics. Under a positive eugenics approach on the other hand, reproduction by persons presumed to have desirable heritable traits is encouraged.

Until the 1920s, negative eugenic practices were considered acceptable in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, under the claim for the need to promote “racial hygiene” (Broberg & Tydén, 1998; Ekerwald, 2001; Lynöe, 2007; Myrdal & Myrdal, 1935). The pursuit of negative eugenics coincided with the normative glorification of the reified Nordic race. In Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, health practitioners and scientists posited a common ideology of negative eugenics and welfare, pushed forward by a national concern that the mentally or physically ill were harmful to the nation-state. In Sweden, a total of 62,888 sterilizations were performed between 1935 and 1975, permitted by eugenic laws. In Denmark, 11,000 sterilizations were performed between 1929 and 1960, and in Finland, the number of sterilizations between 1935 and 1955 was estimated at 1,908, while under the new law of 1950, the number sky-rocketed to 56,080 between 1951 and 1970 (Bradley, 1998).

These staggering sterilization rates appear to reflect blatant state-supported racism. Yet, while eugenics has typically been associated with the racist discourse of Nazism, Galtonian ideals were adapted not only to totalitarian ideologies but to practices of welfare planning as well (Porter, 1996). We expand on this point below within the context of productivist-socialism.

Productivist-socialism constitutes one strain of socialism, which, in both its democratic and non-democratic forms, departs from Marxist Socialism. While the democratic face of productivist-socialism is reflected in Sweden’s Social Democracy and in British Fabianism, its non-democratic face can be seen in Fascism. Both forms of productivist-socialism found inspiration in technological advances and supported social engineering and planning that prevailed over ideology. However, they differed in their value of democracy. Whereas Fascists considered a technocratic authoritarian state to be a substitute for democracy, Social Democrats in Sweden and Fabians in Britain perceived an industrial society as the safeguard of democracy, thus representing the democratic face of productivist-socialism.

Productivist-socialism promoted a new type of social solidarity among society’s productive sectors. In contrast to old-style Marxism, which envisioned social conflict between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, the new socialism addressed a new dichotomy by distinguishing the productive and healthy segments of society

from its “parasitic elements”, such as welfare-dependent individuals. Importantly, while this type of productive socialism is in keeping with the notion of exclusionary nationalism, in most cases it contrasts with pure Nazi racism. Indeed, national communitarian states did not endeavor to promote “racial purity” but rather a “national productivist” goal.

Productivist-socialism abandoned negative eugenics in favor of a positive eugenics approach. For example, the Fabians, striving to improve the population’s health by increasing reproduction rates of the fittest, employed positive eugenic policies by providing free medical care for the “childbearing women of the appropriate classes”. Although there is no indication that the Fabians promoted racism, it seems that the productivist ideology indirectly led to an “exclusionist” view of the nation based on the convergence of productivism and nationalism. In Sweden, Social Democrats predated current debates on the quality of a population needed for a productive society. Analyzing depopulation tendencies in Western societies, Myrdal and Myrdal (1935) opposed race and class hereditary theories. Yet they hardly supported increased immigration as a solution, claiming that the demographic trend of a decreasing population made it necessary to launch a crusade to “strengthen the cultural and social integrity of the Swedish people” through positive welfare measures. Arguing against increased immigration, they posited that the only solution to depopulation was through social policies that make it easier and less costly for women to raise children. In the meantime, they warned, an influx of foreign elements would result in lowered social standards, and the working classes would be the first to be affected. This was the so-called “population crisis.” The spirit of contemporary eugenic practices, we claim, follows Myrdal’s criteria. Indeed, since the 1990s, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have become more interested in encouraging people who are presumed to possess desirable traits to reproduce. In this sense, reproductive decisions are not solely a matter of individual choice but rather are influenced by state-enforced policy (Duster, 2003). In this sense, state-funded ART could be perceived as a mechanism of positive eugenics. Seemingly offering reproductive rights to all citizens, in reality ART is accessed mainly by older well-earning women who are perceived by the state to be of high productive eugenic value. Differential accessibility arguments are supported in recent studies that stress the unaffordability of ancillary pre-pregnancy ART treatments such as counseling, ovulation stimulation drugs, and ultrasound scanning (Brigham et al., 2013). These treatments are not subsidized even in states with the highest state-subsidization of ART (Chambers et al., 2009; Connolly et al., 2009). Furthermore, because of the age-related decline in ART success rates, the average cost per live birth for non-donor cycles increases significantly with female age (Chambers et al., 2006). Thus, ART regulations that stipulate terms such as the cost of ART for patients, social eligibility criteria, and the number of treatment cycles covered, and/or that place restrictions on some ART practices, implicate inequalities in access to care. Higher birth-rates among immigrants compared to native western Europeans also contribute to the differential use and access to ART, thus rendering state funding of ART a relatively irrelevant benefit for immigrant populations. Together, these factors (high natural birth-rates and costly unsubsidized ancillary treatments) support the view that the studied states are investing heavily in policies that almost solely benefit the segments of society they seek to expand. ART for the strong and economically productive constitutes a positive reformist view of eugenics. Kevles (1985) Identifies two major transitions in the practice of eugenics: the shift from “mainline” to “reform” eugenics and the shift from reform eugenics to contemporary medical genetics. Most relevant to our discussion is the shift from mainline to reform eugenics, which tempered the racist flavor of the former. The failure of mainline eugenics to distinguish between cultural and biological heredity led scientists in the 1920s to a new type of reform eugenics based in human genetics, with the prevention of specific genetic diseases serving as its central focus (Gems, 1999). Reform eugenics is connected to the idea of economic productivism, and especially to productivist-socialism, which represented not only a “middle road” between Marxist-socialism and liberalism, but also between racist regimes and welfare

nation states – the latter of which aspired to preserve the national integrity of their societies and provide the state with an economic competitive edge.

In the two sections below, we introduce into the discussion the issue of immigrant integration policies and outcomes and examine the expected correlation between low integration outcomes and high levels of state-funded access to ART. To explore this relationship, we conduct a descriptive policy comparison among three of Europe's most generous welfare states: Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.

Sweden, Denmark, and Finland: Immigration Integration and ART from a Eugenics Productivist Perspective

A eugenic productivist approach to immigration integration policies

Immigration integration policy-making is a highly sensitive realm of activity for modern Western democracies. The challenges immigrants pose to the fabric of society have become a source of much concern in most Western societies, although the intensity of that concern varies across countries (Haub, 2007). A state's response to immigration integration issues is reflected in its immigration laws. Citizenship in a nation-state confers an inalienable right of residence in that state, but residence of non-citizens is set by immigration laws. In welfare states, citizens are entitled to social benefits as a universal rule, independent of their contribution to society. Therefore, welfare states heavily favor upper- and middle-income groups and are threatened by immigrants whose options for economic self-sufficiency are often limited (Tranæs et al., 2004). State economic interests are also affected by other factors, such as the need to secure the state's demographic structure based on a relatively culturally homogenous population (Fraser, 2001). Indeed, the viability of welfare nation state societies is constantly being debated (Benhabib, 2002). We argue here that generous and inclusive welfare states are not in reality beneficial for immigrants. At first glance, this claim may seem counter-intuitive. Indeed, recent studies have shown that generous welfare states are perceived by immigrants as attractive destinations, especially by those with lower education and professional skills (Koopmans, 2010). Yet, this trend is promoted by mechanisms that may be misleading, for example, the tendency to compare one's level of welfare deprivation to their home country rather than to the citizens of their new state. In fact, a closer look at the data, discussed below, shows that inclusive welfare states tend to yield relatively low levels of immigrant integration into the labor market. Thus, integration policies and types of welfare regimes interact in different ways. Precisely because of immigration and the ensuing transformation of societies into multicultural societies, we detect in current times expressions of counter-measures to this process, such as the two complementary trends of civic integration and eugenics. As King (1999) claims, civic integration is an instance, next to eugenics in the past and workfare today, of "illiberal social policy" in a liberal state. Below we demonstrate our claim by examining immigration integration policies and integration levels in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, three of the most inclusive European welfare states. Despite their many differences, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland can all be considered "people's home" countries, a term coined in 1928 by the Swedish Social Democrat and future Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson to convey the feeling that all Swedes should feel like members of a family, regardless of their social or economic status (Meidner, 1993). In Sweden, the idea found expression in a coalition between Social Democrats and farmer organizations and implied that socialist ideals could be achieved through the welfare state (Meidner, 1993). In Denmark, the idea of the productivist national identity was also promoted by Social Democrats. Finland, on the other hand, could be considered a productivist Lutheran social democracy, where Social Democrats played a secondary role. Of particular relevance to this article, however, is the relationship between the type of productivist people's home each state constitutes and its integration policies. Finland in this respect is perhaps the easiest case because of the relatively low number

of newcomers. In Sweden and Denmark, the picture is more complex. Both countries received non-Nordic and non-European immigrants between the 1960s and 2006. In Denmark, policies of national civic integration were promoted, while Sweden leaned towards multiculturalism (largely due to Olof Palme in his capacity as Minister of Culture and Prime Minister) (Tawat, 2011). In Denmark, policies reflected disapproval of immigrants' cultural practices in the public sphere but instructed non-interference in the private sphere as long as these practices did not harm the majority; in Sweden, ethno-cultural diversity was portrayed as a remedy against racism and xenophobia, and as a means for benefitting from globalization, economically (Tawat, 2011). During these years, both states practiced politics of civic integration of immigrants by emphasizing employment and self-help, while continuing to launch anti-discrimination policies. At first glance these policies seem to contradict the eugenic productivist trend. For example, Swedish integration policies included increased investments in integration with commitments to improve immigrant access to the labor market, including labor market preparation, language classes, and civil orientation programs (Equality, 2009). Yet, it is precisely these inclusive welfare states, which seemingly seek to inspire newcomers, that tend to fall short when newcomers are perceived as an excessive burden on the welfare state. In this sense, the link between national stock and productivity serves as a safeguard for the idea of the welfare state that is part of the collective identity. This perhaps explains why, since the end of the 1990s, restrictive labor immigration policies and unequal naturalization requirements between people from the Nordic countries and others have been implemented, shifting Sweden away from multiculturalism (Hjerm, 1998). Recent OECD reports show that Sweden has a fast-growing income-gap between native Swedes and working immigrants (OECD, 2014). Additionally, Swedish policies that once regulated the housing market have been dismantled and the welfare-state has largely ceased to provide support for the high-rise suburbs where immigrants live. The uprisings in the poor high-rise suburbs of Husby in Stockholm and other Swedish cities in May 2013 speak volumes to Sweden's approach towards its immigrants (Back et al., 2013). Most significantly, however, immigrants are not well-represented in the labor force, and their employment rates stand well below natives' employment rates. For example, the unemployment rate in 2014 was 4.7% for native Swedes and 21.4% for foreigners (OECD, 2016). In Denmark, the integration of immigrants and refugees has become a central political issue (Kristensen, 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). This group constitutes approximately 8% of the population with the majority (approximately 70%), coming from non-Western countries (Bauer et al., 2004). Danish integration policies reflect moderate increases in integration spending alongside increases in restrictive conditions to immigrant status, for example, the need to demonstrate "active citizenship" by proving permanent residency (Liebig, 2007). Unemployment rates in Denmark in 2014 were 5.5% for natives and 11.4% for foreigners (OECD, 2016). Contrary to Sweden and Denmark, Finland has a relatively small immigrant population constituting only 2.962% of its population (OECD, 2007). The main ethnic immigrant group (Ingrians) includes return-migrants, spouses, and humanitarian migrants or refugees. Of the foreign population, the largest groups are from Russia and Estonia (groups that include large numbers of Ingrians), followed by Swedes (a group that includes returning migrants from the 1960s and 1970s). The main refugee groups, with the exception of people from the former Yugoslavia, are from non-European cultures hitherto unfamiliar to the majority population, the largest of which came from Somalia (4,500 persons), Vietnam (2,800), Iraq (2,600), and Iran (1,700) (Finland, 1999). Finland's integration policy sought to provide protection for unaccompanied minors and asylum seekers. However, in December 2015, the right-wing coalition government submitted a government action plan on asylum policy aiming to stem the influx of asylum seekers (Saukkonen, 2016). Additional integration policies focus mainly on attracting students and workers, with slightly favorable integration policies. Unemployment rates in 2014 were 8.7% for natives and 17.6% for foreigners (OECD, 2016). The above suggests a need to explore whether the unsuccessful integration outcomes (high unemployment) in generous inclusive welfare states are counter-balanced by welfare states' investments in and regulation of

reproductive technologies, reflecting a progression towards positive eugenic productivism. We discuss this below.

A eugenic productivist approach to reproduction policies

Inarguably, one of the most serious concerns posed by modern human genome projects is the danger that the human application of modern genetic technologies may resurrect eugenics. Petersen (2007) notes the shift towards genetic models in current health provisions. Rifkin (2005) suggests that while old eugenics was related to ideological drives, the new eugenics is related to market forces. Hansen and King (2013) demonstrated that genetic determinism, both positive and negative, influenced public health policies and attitudes on local and national levels in the United States. Although pro-sterilization advocates repositioned themselves after 1945 to avoid being defined as Nazis, the very idea of eliminating so-called genetic defects raises troubling questions regarding who has the authority to determine what constitutes 'defective'. Still, the question is whether in current times countries could continue with those practices. Indeed, most scholars admit that we are advancing towards a new type of eugenics in modern times. As Allen (2001) suggests, it is unlikely that we will see a return to blatant demands for sterilization, but the requirement for anti-fertilization medication in return for continued welfare benefits in the U.S. is a haunting reminder that we are not immune to the prejudices of our predecessors. Kerr and Shakespear (2012) represent a more balanced view, suggesting that while genetic technologies may undermine individuals' freedoms, that does not discount their merit. However, they stress, it is imperative to listen to those persons who are directly affected by the new genetic technologies. Others e.g., Duster (2003) argue that considering human disease and human nature from a genetic perspective is inherently racist. At the nexus between the old and new eugenics is the productivist factor. We stress in this article the link between the ideas of productivism on the one hand and national culture and national stock on the other hand. When programs of civic integration, such as those in Sweden and Denmark, fail to transform immigrants into a productive force, the need to protect welfare for the productive nationals increases. Although policies may not overtly be designed to deal with this, the evidence strongly suggests that some states are moving in the direction of welfare productivism. The available data on immigration integration and states' support of ART technologies indeed suggest the existence of such a trend. The rapid development of assisted reproduction technologies since the 1970s has posed major challenges to population planning and the regulation of reproduction in general. It is estimated that more than 3 million babies have been born worldwide through IVF, and approximately 350,000 IVF treatment cycles occur in Europe each year (ESHRE, 2006). The average cost of one ART treatment cycle is approximately €3800. By opening the door to new reproductive possibilities, ART has forced state authorities to determine who is entitled to these treatments and at what level of financial coverage. Drawing on the positive eugenics that we claim underlies national productivism, we suggest that certain national-demographic attributes may serve as the basis for entitlement to ART benefits, especially in the Nordic Welfare states. ART promotes larger families and single parenthood, and groups who have access to them are those with resources to pay out-of-pocket. Eligibility criteria to ART vary across European countries. The governments of Sweden, Denmark, and Finland provide coverage (full or partial) for all eligible women, while in France national health insurance covers fertility treatments only for married women. Countries such as Belgium, France, Netherlands, and Sweden provide full coverage to eligible individuals and couples (Brigham et al., 2013). Sweden, Finland, and until recently Denmark, attracted large numbers of fertility treatments by providing generous incentives and coverage for assisted reproduction programs, bound by strict eligibility criteria such as citizenship or legal residence. The eligibility criteria enforced in the nine states discussed in this paper appear in Appendix A. It is suggested that in some of these countries, governments chose to fund expensive genetic technologies to preserve the character of the "people's home" national identities rather than fund programs aimed at helping

marginalized-others achieve greater productivity in the labor market. The discussion thus far has suggested that relatively generous welfare states (Sweden, Denmark, and Finland), which offer the highest level and most complete coverage of ART, suffer from lower levels of immigrant integration compared to less inclusive welfare states. Thus, our key hypothesis is that the level of immigrant integration outcomes in western European states (immigrant employment levels) is inversely correlated with the level and scope of state coverage of ART. To test our hypothesis, in the next section we compare among policies regulating access to ART and immigration integration policies in nine European states (the three states discussed above and 6 other, less inclusive, states).

ART Policies and Immigration Integration in Western Europe: A Case Oriented Policy Comparison

Methods and Data

Like assisted reproduction technologies, the policies regulating their use were developed only recently. Consequently, data on ART exist only for the past few years. Due to the limited data available, we rely here on case-oriented comparison rather than statistical analysis. That said the observations available point to notable trends, which we discuss below. Table 1 presents ART policy and immigration outcome data for 2009 unless indicated otherwise.

Table 1: Table 1: ART Policies and Immigration Integration Outcomes.

Country	Welfare State Type	State Coverage of IVF	National ART Spending (% of GDP)	Non-EU Immigrants (share of total population)	Non-EU Immigrant Employment
Sweden	3	1	0.05	8.8	0.72
Finland	3	0.50	0.06	2.6	0.74
Denmark	3	0.50	0.06	6.2	0.78
Belgium	2	1	0.05	8.1a	0.75
Netherlands	2	0.50	0.03	8.4	0.77
France	2	1	0.04	7.8	0.83
Germany	2	0.50	0.04	7.5	0.87
Switzerland	2	0	0.03	10.3 ^a	0.86
United Kingdom	1	0.50 ^b	0.03	7.5	0.84

^a2012 figures

^bSince the different countries that make up the United Kingdom have different funding criteria for IVF treatments in the NHS, we use the level of 0.5 for partial coverage.


The variables and data sources included in Table 1 above are as follows: Welfare State Type. Relying on Esping-Anderson's categorization of levels of the welfare state we rank the states as follows: 1=liberal welfare states (lowest level); 2=conservative welfare states (intermediate level); 3=social democratic welfare states (highest level). As noted earlier, whereas the social democratic Nordic states of Sweden, Finland, and Denmark represent the highest form of welfare state, the conservative welfare states of the Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland are ranked as intermediate welfare states, followed by the liberal welfare state of the United Kingdom, ranked lowest on the scale. **National ART Spending.** Annual state spending on assisted reproduction technologies as a percentage of GDP Source: (ESHRE, 2010). **Government with State.** Degree of IVF coverage provided by the state: full coverage=1;

partial coverage=0.5; no coverage=0. Source: (ESHRE, 2010). The data on access and level of ART public spending was extracted from a study conducted by the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE, 2010). Certainly, with respect to IVF, data on public coverage alone does not permit conclusions regarding access to ART. One may argue that state coverage of IVF cycles does not capture the influence of individual preferences including religious and cultural norms. However, despite its limitations, the data allow us to compare among different types of western European welfare-states to illustrate the relationship between **ART** policies and immigrant integration outcomes. Non-EU-born population. Non-EU-born immigrants as a share of the total population Source: (Eurostat, 2010a). **Non-EU Immigrant Employment.** Non-EU immigrant employment levels Source: (Eurostat, 2010b). Immigrant employment levels reflect a productivist conceptualization of integration.

Discussion


Table 1 highlights the gap that exists between the three highly inclusive welfare states of Sweden, Finland, and Denmark and other, less inclusive, western European welfare states. The highest-ranking welfare states invest the greatest portion of their GDP in ART, with Denmark and Finland investing 0.06% of the GDP and Sweden investing 0.05%, compared to the states ranking 2 on the welfare state scale (France and Germany 0.04%; Netherlands, Switzerland 0.03%, and the UK investing 0.03% of its GDP in ART). Although ART spending comprises less than 0.1% of the GDP, these figures refer only to procedures involved directly in ART treatment, while excluding other health-care costs associated with ART deliveries, infants, and mothers that are subsidized by the state, such as pre-natal and neonatal care costs related to multiple gestation pregnancies. Consequently, the actual investment of the state in ART is higher than the figures presented (Chambers et al., 2007; Koivurova et al., 2007; Koivurova et al., 2004). Moving on to the relationship between government investment in ART across countries and employment rates of non-EU immigrants, Figure 1 reveals a pattern in the expected direction. As illustrated in Figure 1, states with relatively low immigrant employment rates (reflecting low immigration integration), tend to invest more highly in ART, thus promoting reproduction by the more economically productive (usually native) segments of society. Conversely, on average, states with more favorable immigrant integration outcomes tend to invest smaller portions of their GDP in ART.

Figure 1: Non-EU Immigrant Employment and Government Investment in ART



Finally, Figure 2 brings together the three main factors addressed in this article: immigrant integration levels (non-EU immigrant employment levels), state-spending on ART (as percentage of GDP), and government coverage of IVF (none, partial, full).

Figure 2: Non-EU Immigrant employment, National ART spending, and IVF coverage



The analysis presented in this article illustrates its main argument: the more inclusive welfarist states in western Europe are those that also display relatively unfavorable outcomes in terms of increasing society’s overall economic productivity by integrating non-EU immigrants into the workforce. Furthermore, these states tend to invest larger shares of their GDP on ART technologies which—by nature, design, or both—are more accessible to native populations. Of the nine states surveyed, non-EU immigrant integration levels are lowest in the most inclusive welfare states (Sweden, Denmark, and Finland), the same countries that invest the highest percentages of their GDP in ART technologies and the only states (with the exception of Belgium) that fully fund ART treatments.

Concluding Remarks

Although, the case-selection for the current paper was not random, due to the small number of countries examined, the generalizability of our findings is limited. Future research should expand the scope of cases to include additional countries considered to be major players in ART, including Slovenia, Czech Republic, Spain, Serbia and Belgium. Furthermore, it is important to note that the association we found between ART policies and immigration integration is not proof of causality. That said, against the backdrop of increased immigrant and refugee numbers in Europe and their high levels of unemployment, we suggest that viewing welfare regimes from a eugenic-productivist perspective reveals a new pattern that might explain the dynamics between reproduction policies and immigration integration levels in welfare states. The evidence, despite its limitations, suggests that eugenic values have not died (though the methods have changed) in contemporary people’s nations’ welfare policies, specifically reproductive policies. Thus, despite the fact that eugenics has long lost its scientific authority, the concept still carries relevance.

This article provides a response to recent studies identifying a withdrawal of welfare governments from basic tenets of welfare provisions due to their facilitation of welfare-dependent immigrants' access to

welfare-state arrangements (Chambers et al., 2007; Koivurova et al., 2007; Koivurova et al., 2004). We argue that the picture is more nuanced than what is often portrayed and that the commitment to social-spending and social-transfers to working “productivist” elements of society is not necessarily in decline. The comparative examination presented in this paper suggests that regardless of the government in office, Western welfare democracies in northern Europe are eager to maintain a communitarian welfare state, not necessarily for cultural reasons, but because they see in their hegemonic national identity a guarantee or safeguard for economic survival.

Indeed, although these countries are in need of an increase in population and productivity, they have become increasingly reluctant to allow more immigrants into their borders. Rather, they encourage “the right” productive national stock to reproduce by extending to them access and coverage for expensive fertility treatments. A key driving factor for this practice may be the failure of universal welfare inclusiveness. Sweden, Finland, and Denmark purport to extend to immigrants equal membership and the right to full participation in the community. However, integration policies directed towards ethnic groups have generally succeeded only in the creation of low-paying jobs, resulting in a class of working poor. In advanced welfare states, high investment in assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and low immigrant employment are two sides of the same demographic challenge: sustaining the population and labor force in the face of aging and declining fertility. Governments invest in ART to support native-born citizens in having children, often as a politically and nationally acceptable response to demographic decline. At the same time, immigrants, who could help offset labor shortages, face significant barriers to employment, such as structural discrimination and language barriers, which limit their contribution to the workforce. These patterns reflect welfare states’ dual strategies and tensions: promoting native fertility through ART while underutilizing the potential of immigrant labor.

Analysis of two aspects of eugenic productivist policy immigrant integration and ART policies reveals that despite variations among Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, similarities can be explained by the productivist eugenic logic of each country’s ART regulation. Sweden has increased coverage for fertility treatments, and extended eligibility criteria with respect to age and sexual orientation for native citizens. Denmark has offered partial coverage of IVF since 2011, thus essentially allowing access to only those individuals with the resources to pay out-of-pocket. Driven by demographic concerns, government subsidization of reproductive technologies, maternal leave, and child allowances can be considered to constitute a continuation or resurrection of eugenic population policies from the first half of the twentieth century.

Finally, despite their rejection of ideological nationalism, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, for better or for worse, seem to be framing a new model of national liberal democracies that focuses both on productiveness and is attentive to population composition. These states represent a tendency that might appear attractive to other European nations seeking to preserve their national demographic composition while responding in a productivist way to modern economic pressures.

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Appendix. Comparison of Access, Reimbursement, Legislation, and Regulation of ART.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Criteria limiting access to ART</i>	<i>Limits on reimbursement for ART</i>	<i>Criteria limiting reimbursement for ART</i>	<i>Reimbursement for cross-border ART</i>	<i>National Specific /local legislation on Registry on ART for ART</i>	<i>Clinical, Laboratory Guidelines</i>
Belgium	Age of woman	+	Age of woman, number of cycles and embryo transfers	+	Compu lsory	+
Denmark¹	Age of woman, number of cycles and embryo transfers	-	-	-	Compu lsory	+
Finland	Marital status, age of woman, number of cycles	+	Age of woman, number of cycles	-	Volunt ary+ Compu lsory	+
France	Marital status, age of man, age of woman	+	Marital status, age of man, age of woman, number of cycles	+	Compu lsory	+
Germany	Age of woman	+	Marital status, age of man, age of woman, number of cycles	+	Volunt ary	+
Netherlands	Age of woman	+	Age of woman	+	Compu lsory	+
Sweden	Marital status, age of man, age of woman		Marital status, age of man, age of woman, number of cycles	-	Volunt ary	+
Switzerland	Marital status	No reimbursement	-	-	Volunt ary+ Compu lsory	+

¹ Dansk Fertilitetselskab (Danish Fertility Society). (2016)

United Kingdom	Age of woman, number of cycles, and child welfare	+	Marital status, age of woman, number of cycles, and child welfare	-	Computersory	+	+
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Source: Health Research Board, 2017; Ireni-Saban, 2013.