Dina Alnabulsi & Ryan D. Talbert | Vol. 63, 2024
Disparities in Health Insurance and the Intersection of Race/Ethnicity, Sexuality, and Gender Identity
...
Capital and Cohesion: A new perspective on the analysis of mortality differentials
...
Women’s Empowerment, Region of Residence, and Contraception among Women in India
...
Latest Articles
Capital and Cohesion: A new perspective on the analysis of mortality differentials
Jon Anson & Heather Booth | Vol. 63, 2024
Regional Innovation and Economic Transformation
Vijai J. Singh & Thomas Allen | Vol. 63, 2024
A Micro-Sociology of an Emerging Global City: Miami
Alejandro Portes & Ryan Bagwell | Vol. 63, 2024
Third-child Fertility Intention in Morocco: Analysis of Determinants Using a Gender-intersectional Approach
Jackson Engala Moduka, Chaimae Drioui, Abdesselam Fazouane, & Rachid Touhtouh | Vol. 63, 2024
Women’s Empowerment, Region of Residence, and Contraception among Women in India
Megha Rana & Ryan Talbert | Vol. 63, 2024
Featured Advisory Board Member
Dr. Amanda K. Baumle is a Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Houston. Her research focuses on demography and sociology of law, with a particular focus on the demography of sexuality, trans demography, and LGBTQ individuals and the law. Her work has included examining economic outcomes, family relationships, migration patterns, and health outcomes for LGBTQ individuals. Dr. Baumle is the author and editor of six books, and the author of articles published in demography, sexuality, law, and general sociology outlets. Her research has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, U.S. Department of Labor, and American Sociological Association. Her recent research has included examining sexual orientation and gender identity charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC, associations of violence victimization with health outcomes for sexual orientation and gender minorities, and predictors of fluidity in sexual identity among sexual minorities. Dr. Baumle was the guest editor of our Special Collection on Demography of Sexuality.
Featured Author
Ryan D. Talbert is an Assistant Professor of Sociology; faculty affiliate of the Africana Studies Institute and the Institute for Collaboration on Health, Intervention, and Policy at the University of Connecticut; and leads the Health Equity Lab. He specializes in health disparities, race and racism, and punishment and inequality. A primary goal of his work is to examine critically how extensions of white supremacy and systemic racism shape and maintain racial health disparities. A second line of research examines the social psychology of race and ethnicity with a focus on attitudes, discrimination, and identity, and a final line of inquiry analyzes the causes and consequences of contact with the criminal legal system. His scholarship has been published in journals such as the Journal of Marriage and Family, Journal of Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities, and Sociology Compass, and has been covered in outlets such as NBCBLK, ASA News, and The Sentencing Project.
Recent article in Population Review: Women’s Empowerment, Region of Residence, and Contraception among Women in India (co-authored with Megha Rana)
Birthrates are plummeting worldwide
The Guardian, by Tory Shpherd – August 10, 2024
Tory Shepherd discusses the trend of declining birth rates across the world and the government interventions to tackle this.
Here is an excerpt:
Governments throughout the OECD – and increasingly in developing countries – are trying all manner of ways to boost fertility.
Most low-fertility countries have some form of maternity leave. Many have subsidised childcare and some form of family allowance and just over half have flexible work hours or tax credits for dependent children, according to the United Nations. But even Nordic countries, with their focus on gender equality, parental leave and a strong social services network, are experiencing declining fertility.
In China, the “one-child policy” has become a “three-child policy”, along with better maternal health care – and decreased access to abortions. Japanese politicians are trying to outdo each other with pronatalistic policies including subsidies, free daycare, better job security and support for fertility treatments. And the South Korean government has spent more than US$200bn to support families to have children.
It hasn’t worked. The best-intentioned policies have consistently led to less of a baby boom and more the occasional baby bump.
Take Australia’s baby bonus, for example, introduced by then treasurer Peter Costello with the exhortation: “One for mum, one for dad, and one for the country”.
It worked, a bit, but experts describe the fertility uptick as more of a “blip”. That hasn’t stopped countries including Russia, Greece and Italy giving baby bonuses a go.
Jennifer Sciubba, an American demographer, political scientist and author of 8 Billion and Counting: How Sex, Death and Migration Shape Our World, was on the Ezra Klein podcast recently talking about the complex interplay of factors determining baby desires.
She says following the “success sequence” – getting an education, a great job, a home, some savings – means pushing back having children. And once people have more money, they also want to have other things in their lives that kids might detract from – going out for a nice meal, taking a holiday, a full night’s sleep.
Having more than two can seem unimaginably intensive, hard and expensive, she says, but it’s never just the money. What about family and community support? Religion? The “little logistics” like needing a new car to fit enough car seats?
Through east Asia, Sciubba says, the idea is spreading that “marriage is no longer required to have a good life”.
“It might actually stifle your life because of gender relations within the household,” she says.
Sciubba questions how much the state can do. Then there’s the prevailing culture; in South Korea, for example, there’s paid paternity leave, but men don’t take it.
“[And] once [countries] fall below [replacement level], they tend to stay there,” Sciubba says.
Hungary, under Viktor Orbán, has offered free IVF, tax breaks and low-interest loans for families with children – and while that has pushed up the fertility rate, it is also a cloak for nationalist identity politics and comes with restrictions on birth control and abortion.
“You can strip away individual rights” in order to increase fertility rates, Sciubba says. “I am not advocating for that.”
She points to the example of Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaușescu, the dictatorial communist leader who came to power in the late 60s. He tried to boost the fertility rate by outlawing contraception and banning abortion for women under 40 with fewer than four children; women died from childbirth or backyard abortions and orphanages filled up with abandoned babies.
“You did see births increase … as long as his thumb was pressing on it. Then it went back down,” Sciubba says.
A 2022 review done by the Australian National University for the federal government’s centre for population found financial incentives like the baby bonus and the family tax benefit can have a positive effect on fertility. “However, the effect is usually small because transfers represent a minor fraction of the total direct costs of children,” it found.
The baby bonus potentially increased births, temporarily, by about 2%. Other policies, including better childcare and better parental leave, can all do a bit, but they are not fixing the problem.
The top three most important factors associated with fertility decisions, the ANU review found, were the cost, job security, and “having someone to love”.
Read more in the original article.
China’s Population Is Shrinking Second Year in a Row
NPR, by Scott Detrow and Dr. Wang Feng– January 21, 2024
NPR’s Scott Detrow talks with Wang Feng, a professor of sociology at the University of California Irvine, about the consequences of China’s population decline.
TRANSCRIPT:
SCOTT DETROW, HOST:
The most populous nation in the world, China, is losing people. For the second year in a row, China’s population has declined. Birthrates reached a new low, and death rates were the highest they’d been in 50 years. According to the country’s National Bureau of Statistics, the total number of people in China dropped by over 2 million. And for some context, that is nearly the population of Houston, Texas. This shift has some people worried about the long-term health of the country and its economy. And to help us better understand these numbers, we are joined by Wang Feng, a professor of sociology at the University of California, Irvine. Thanks for joining the show.
WANG FENG: You’re welcome, Scott.
DETROW: So I know that you take a more optimistic view on this than many other observers. But before we get into that specifically, let’s just explain what’s going on here. What are some of the causes of China’s population decline?
FENG: Well, the accelerating decline is driven by three forces. The first is actually what we call a demographic echoing effect. That is, the smaller births we’ve been seeing in the last few years, a decade or so, is a reflection of the smaller birth cohorts of the parents’ generation.
DETROW: Yeah, there were fewer children being born due, in part, to the one-child policy and other factors. Now there are fewer adults having fewer children. It seems like it’s kind of the next step.
FENG: Exactly. So we have fewer adults reaching the childbearing age. But that’s not the – I think the most interesting part. The most interesting parts are the next two. One is that in the last three decades, young people – men and women, especially women – are postponing and leaving marriage. And then third factor in terms of low birth rate is even for those married women and men, they are choosing either not having children or staying with only one child. So combined you have this declining birth number year after year.
DETROW: Many major countries are looking at a similar dip in population over the coming decades. Is this trickier to figure out in China, though, a country of so many people and a country that has seen such explosive growth in so many different ways over the previous decades?
FENG: Well, it is different for China, I do think so, for a number of reasons. No. 1, it’s the economic growth model, how China has been able to achieve this spectacular economic growth in the last 40 years or so. And that, as noted by many, is driven largely by a young, productive and exploited labor force, mostly migrants from rural areas, and that source is depleting. So in terms of the economic growth model, where the growth comes from, this important source is weakening and – if not ending.
And No. 2 is the way that the Chinese political legitimacy is based (ph). And that is, the government has made the promise to support the large number of elderly and to be the new paternalistic redistributor. So people are expecting that, especially the large number of elderly or soon to be elderly, who are parents of the only children generation, and they are expecting that government to play important role in supporting the old age. And with economic slowing down, with the decline in government revenues – and this could pose a political challenge to the power holders in China if they could not deliver the promise that they once made.
DETROW: We mentioned there’s been a lot of concern about the negatives of a decline in population and that you have written that there’s a more optimistic way to look at it. Can you walk us through some of your reasons for optimism, what you think are some of the positives of this possible trend?
FENG: We are looking at the healthiest and the most educated generation in China, especially, I think, in this case, in China, things have happened so fast – the rapid expansion in higher education and the continued improvement in population health. So we are really not looking at the same population in China today as the population 40 years ago, let alone 80 years ago. So we have a different population to begin with. And also, we’re already seeing this with the new technologies and most recently with the hype around AI. A lot of the repetitive, unpleasant work in the past that have to be done by real human beings, and now can actually be done quite efficiently and inexpensively by the means of technology. And also, very importantly, we have to remember, we as a humanity – the whole world and in China certainly included – have produced so much. There’s so much wealth in the society, and we can do a lot with redistribution both across different income groups but also across generations. So we don’t need to continue to produce the – pursue GDP growth. We have produced so much, there’s enough to go around.
DETROW: That is Wang Feng, a professor of sociology at the University of California, Irvine. Thanks so much.
FENG: You’re most welcome.
India now most populous country in the world
24 April 2023 – China will soon cede its long-held status as the world’s most populous country. By the end of this month, India’s population is expected to reach 1,425,775,850 people, matching and then surpassing the population of mainland China. This forecast is based on the latest United Nations estimates and projections of the global population.
China’s population reached its peak size of 1.426 billion in 2022 and has started to fall. Projections indicate that the size of the Chinese population could drop below 1 billion before the end of the century. By contrast, India’s population is expected to continue growing for several decades.
Fertility is a key driver of population trends
In 1971, China and India had nearly identical levels of total fertility, with just under six births per woman over a lifetime. Fertility in China fell sharply to fewer than three births per woman by the end of the 1970s. For India, it took three and a half decades to experience the same fertility reduction that occurred in China over a seven-year period during the 1970s.
In 2022, China had one of the world’s lowest fertility rates (1.2 births per woman). India’s current fertility rate (2.0 births per woman) is just below the “replacement” threshold of 2.1, the level required for population stabilization in the long run in the absence of migration.
During the second half of the 20th century, both countries made concerted efforts to curb rapid population growth through policies that targeted fertility levels. These policies, together with investments in human capital and gender equality, contributed to China’s plummeting fertility rate in the 1970s and to the more gradual declines that followed in the 1980s and 1990s.
India also enacted policies to discourage the formation of large families and to slow population growth, including through its national family welfare programme beginning in the 1950s. India’s lower human capital investment and slower economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s contributed to a more gradual fertility decline than in China.
24 April 2023 – China will soon cede its long-held status as the world’s most populous country. By the end of this month, India’s population is expected to reach 1,425,775,850 people, matching and then surpassing the population of mainland China. This forecast is based on the latest United Nations estimates and projections of the global population.
China’s population reached its peak size of 1.426 billion in 2022 and has started to fall. Projections indicate that the size of the Chinese population could drop below 1 billion before the end of the century. By contrast, India’s population is expected to continue growing for several decades.
Fertility is a key driver of population trends
In 1971, China and India had nearly identical levels of total fertility, with just under six births per woman over a lifetime. Fertility in China fell sharply to fewer than three births per woman by the end of the 1970s. For India, it took three and a half decades to experience the same fertility reduction that occurred in China over a seven-year period during the 1970s.
In 2022, China had one of the world’s lowest fertility rates (1.2 births per woman). India’s current fertility rate (2.0 births per woman) is just below the “replacement” threshold of 2.1, the level required for population stabilization in the long run in the absence of migration.
During the second half of the 20th century, both countries made concerted efforts to curb rapid population growth through policies that targeted fertility levels. These policies, together with investments in human capital and gender equality, contributed to China’s plummeting fertility rate in the 1970s and to the more gradual declines that followed in the 1980s and 1990s.
India also enacted policies to discourage the formation of large families and to slow population growth, including through its national family welfare programme beginning in the 1950s. India’s lower human capital investment and slower economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s contributed to a more gradual fertility decline than in China.